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Abstract
Yield management in the hotel industry has been described as a method of profitably
managing fixed capacity. A critical element of yield management is the decision
strategy employed as this determines the degree to which optimum solutions are
generated. Recent research has indicated that the use of technology assisted decision
optimising models (the management science model) would greatly improve the
optimisation of decisions by minimising the need to employ guesswork in achieving
optimum solutions.
Despite this assurance, yield management remains couched in uncertainty through being
inextricably associated with forecasting future demand for a perishable product in an
increasingly competitive environment. The consequential pressures on the decision
maker have afforded the opportunity for human idiosyncrasies to play a significant role
in the decision making process. The primary objective of this study, therefore, is to gain
an insight into how decisions are made in the yield management environment of the
hospitality industry.
The study reviews current literature on decision strategies, exploring in particular
models of decision making, heuristics, biases and psychodynamic forces associated with
unconscious decision making, and their respective influences on decision outcomes.
The methodology chosen to elicit the data involved the use of a non-positivistic
paradigm, incorporating an interpretative approach. The strategy employed within this
methodology utilised phenomenological approaches to interviewing respondents and
analysing data. Specific attention was also given to developing a methodology to assist
the author in accessing the unconscious.
The findings of this research reveal that the management science model of decision
making has been disregarded in favour of decision strategies, wherein, according to the
respondents, human intervention plays a more significant role. The findings also
suggest that this human intervention has actively facilitated, and has simultaneously
been facilitated by the potential for decision makers to fall into psychological traps, and
make systematically biased errors. The research also concludes that the unconscious
forces impacting on decision makers forces them to rationalise the irrational, thus
suggesting that conscious and unconscious practices, with regard to decision making
strategies, are inextricably linked.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Yield management, in the hotel industry, is defined as a method of profitably managing
fixed capacity (Lieberman, 2003). Yield management fundamentally requires hotels to
make decisions on the number of rooms that should be allocated, at differentially
prescribed rates, to segmented markets, within an ever narrowing time frame, in order to
maximise revenue (Kimes, 1989; Kimes & Chase, 1998).

However, the decision

process outlined above is neither clinical nor simple. Intensive growth in business
competition, acute price sensitivity of customers and increasing pressure from
shareholders has intensified the need for hoteliers to maximise revenue. These factors,
coupled with increasing time and data overload pressures has resulted in computerised
yield management systems being promoted as a rational solution to the problem of
maximising revenue generation in an increasingly hostile market (Johns, 2000).

The pressure to optimise revenue generation decisions is further complicated by the high
levels of uncertainty facing the decision maker (Appendix 1). This uncertainty is closely
associated with the need to forecast future demand on specific dates, at optimum pricing
levels, under fluctuating market conditions. Although this complex mix of variables
often appears “manageable”, it can promote a fear of, or inability to examine all possible
alternatives. These factors in turn, drive the decision maker into psychological traps, or
the comfort zone offered by familiar patterns of recognition (Bazerman, 2004; Klein,
Orasnu, Calderwood & Zsambok, 1993; Slovic, Finnucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2002).

Additionally, decision uncertainty inevitably leads to risk-laden trade-offs, where
balance needs to be achieved between selling rooms at the highest rate (risking nonachievement of occupancy targets), and selling rooms at the lowest rate (risking the suboptimisation of revenue generation). Accordingly, in a market environment, imbued
with uncertainty, where profit maximisation has become increasingly significant, it is
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interesting to speculate if hotels have embraced mathematical models of decision
making in the search for optimum yield management solutions.

Yield management systems (mathematical models of decision making) take the
guesswork out of the room management decision process (Kimes, 1997; Orkin, 1988;
Lieberman, 2003), by improving the capability of delivering optimum solutions. The
management science decision model (Appendix 2) uses statistical analysis from multiple
relevant data reports to either make the decision (a dynamic model), or to offer the best
option for selection by the decision maker (a semi-static decision support model). These
yield management systems enable parameters to be expressed and ultimately tackled in a
structured way by using decision rules which detail the inventory levels to be made
available, the rates and cost factors associated with this inventory, and the market
segments within which these rules will apply (Sumner & Sellers, 1996; Cho & Connolly,
1996; Lucy, 1995). Application of these rules, according to Jauncey, Mitchell & Slamet
(1995), will lead to consistent maximisation of room revenue, through the manipulation
of room rates in a structured fashion, while simultaneously taking forecasted patterns of
demand into account.

Additional variables (Appendix 3) including competitor price analysis, market segment
data, levels of forecasted demand, cancellation information, rules for restricting the sale
of discounted rooms and price sensitivity data are inputted into the decision model from
the hotel property management system.

Thereafter, the system’s task is to apply

algebraic and statistical techniques to the analysis of this information.

In order to deliver optimum solutions, hotels require efficient and effective information
systems that instantly communicate changes in room availability and price to
decentralised decision makers. The seamless updating of room price and availability
status is critical in minimising the risk of selling rooms at a sub-optimised rate, through
reservations staff being unaware of the changing dynamic (Kimes, 1997; Johns, 2000).
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Combinations of the above factors continuously alter the yield management decision
context, making the optimum solution a moving target for the decision maker. Thus, the
complex combination of moving variables invites the assistance of a management
science solution to this complex decision problem.

Despite the assurances offered by this unemotional decision process, the yield
management decision environment is further complicated by human factors associated
with the seductive influences of heuristics, biases and unconscious forces. Herbig,
Milewicz & Golden (1993) argue that pressures associated with forecasting may lead to
practitioners becoming vulnerable to subjective biases and fears that negatively impact
on the accuracy of the forecast, and suggest that Baysean assignment of judgement
probabilities should be utilised to eliminate that pressure.

But what if the presence of this optimising tool is itself a source of unconscious
behaviour?

And what if these very same forces that drive the need for profit

maximisation and optimisation also impact consciously and unconsciously on the
individual decision maker?

A number of human idiosyncrasies that influence decision behaviour within the yield
management process are outlined by Yeoman & Ingold (2000) and include ethical
concerns

about

overbooking (concern

for

the

customer

outweighing

profit

maximisation), pressure to achieve a budget target, and personal pressures associated
with performance-linked incentive payments.

Avoidance of internal conflict, the

individual’s need to satisfy the group decision goal, and career promotion issues
additionally influence decision behaviour. In addition to these factors, greater weight
being given to qualitative thinking over quantitative thinking may influence the eventual
decision outcome, through the promotion of solutions that are made to appear
“acceptable” via value biases and delusions of success (Tversky, Sattath & Slovic, 1988;
Sloman, 2002). Furthermore, the individual’s perception of their own role and it’s
relevance to the process may substantially influence decision behaviour.
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These behavioural shortcomings are encapsulated in repeated scenarios, wherein hotels,
having a fixed number of rooms that are only available on a particular night (room
perishability), places a fundamental pressure on the decision maker, as unsold rooms on
a “particular” night, represent revenue lost forever.

Conversely, where rooms are

available for sale in advance, the decision maker is faced with a choice between selling
at a lower rate to secure the booking, or waiting until closer to the specific date and
achieving a higher price for the room (Lieberman, 1993).

Although the Internet has become a preferred booking conduit for many guests, it may
become a poisoned chalice for the incentivised decision maker. Indeed, despite recent
research, suggesting that transferring a substantial amount of room booking activity to
the Internet will guarantee significant competitive advantage and generate higher
revenues (Noone & Andrews, 1999; Marmorstein, Rossomme, & Sarel, 2003), the
majority of hotels have not attempted to sophisticate their yield management techniques.
Instead they have resorted to indiscriminate price reductions, based on simplistic timing
rules that do not require prudent communication efforts. This reluctance to embrace
technology has been identified by Yeoman & Ingold (2000), who suggest that many
hotels still input information based on historical demand, associated with particular
customer market segments, attributable to specific times of the year, rather than using a
dynamic pricing strategy, as offered by a computerised yield management system.

The conundrum, therefore, faced by the hotel sector is how to maximise revenue, while
at the same time offering a product which is competitively priced and satisfies pricesensitive customers. If, as suggested, revenue maximisation is a key success factor for a
hotel, it would appear that optimised yield management decisions, capable of being
made in a rational-normative way by the use of technology assisted systems, can
accentuate this requirement. However, while this seems like the ideal solution to a
decision problem, McMahon-Beattie & Donaghy (1999) view yield management
systems as containing inherent heuristical flaws through their “predicated” allocation of
available bedroom capacity to “predetermined” market segments.
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So how do yield management decision makers try to minimise the uncertainty that
impacts on the decision process?

Do they gravitate towards technology based

mathematical models, or do they fall prey to urges and comfort zones where subsidiary
factors, such as unconscious forces associated with the Freudian model, may influence
decision design? Do heuristics and biases, as proposed by Tversky & Kahneman (1974)
improve or impede the decision outcome, and even create a dependency relationship
between conscious and unconscious decision making.

Previous research into optimum decision models of decision making in hospitality yield
management have proven inconclusive (Gore, 1995).

Findings from this research

indicates a preference among for either of two behaviourist decision models, namely the
rational normative model, where options are individually weighted, the best option being
selected, and the bounded rational model, where there is an acknowledgement that the
capacity of the human mind is limited, resulting in rules of thumb (heuristics)
determining the decision process (Gore, 1995; Yeoman & Ingold, 2000).

However, little research appears to have been carried out into factors that may inhibit the
use of particular models of decision making.

The growing justification for the

unquestioned acceptance of the mathematical management science rational model of
decision making is finely counterbalanced by impeding factors that militate against its
acceptance. This dichotomy of opinion has intrigued this researcher and has prompted
the following research question;

How are decisions made, in hospitality yield management environments?

The following chapters will attempt to address this question. Chapter two will constitute
a literature review.

This literature review will address the secondary research on

decision making under three headings, namely, (i) the decision models utilised in
decision making, (ii) the influence of bias and heuristics on the decision making process
and (iii) the role of the unconscious in decision making.
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Chapter three will explore and

critique a range of methodologies that might best address the extraction the information
to answer the research question. Implicit in this section will be a determination of the
researcher’s paradigmatic positioning and an attempt to develop a methodology for
hearing the psychodynamic (unconscious) discourse. A presentation of the research
findings and subsequent analysis is detailed in chapter four. Finally, conclusions and
recommendations will be presented in chapter five.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

2.0

Introduction

This chapter provides a discussion on a number of models of decision making and the
associated factors impacting on the decision making process. In order to answer the
research question, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section addresses
conscious decision making and incorporates the identification and critique of decision
models associated with yield management decision making. Following on from this, the
next section explores the influence of heuristics and biases (conscious and unconscious)
on the decision making process and the final section examines a range of
psychodynamic factors that contribute to, and influence unconscious decision making.

2.1

Conscious Decision Making

Descartes’ famous contention, “Cogito ergo sum” (“I think, therefore, I am”) stands at
the head of a philosophy that sees the conscious process of observation, analysis and
logic as critical instruments in search of objective truth.

Descartes views the self

primarily as the foundation of all knowledge and experience, through which the world
can be controlled and ordered into a sense-making organism. This emphasis of the self,
as the origin of all experience and knowledge, leads to doubt being cast on everything
that cannot be verified from first principles (Mansfield, 2000).

An interesting

counterpoint to Descartes’ contention, advocated by Lacan (1977), states, “Cogito ergo
sum, ubi cogito, ibi non sum” (Where I think, “I think, therefore, I am”, that is where I
am not) will be explored in the section addressing unconscious behaviour.

Theorists belonging to the Enlightment Period of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
(Descartes, Kant, and to a lesser extent Rousseau) reject the idea of the individual as a
completely self-contained and autonomous being (Mansfield, 2000). Kant (1929) argues
that before we perceive anything some conscious process must be in place to do the
perceiving, thus ensuring that every observation must be channelled through the “I.”
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Applying Kantean theory to decision making would suggest that before one makes any
decision, however simple, the self thinks. Rousseau (1953), on the other hand, in
championing the “individuality” of the individual emphasises the uniqueness, autonomy
and absolute governing freedom of individual experience, but concedes that humankind
is born into a world where the individual is preyed upon and entrapped by society.
Lacan (1949) subscribes to this view in his mirror phase (Leader & Groves, 2000),
where the “prematurely born” individual is trapped in an image that is alien to him, and
where true freedom and fulfilment can only be gained by adhering to social pressures,
and creating a false appearance of coherence and completeness in the process.

In agreeing with this theory, Foucault (1979) argues that as individuals we become
trapped by the conviction that autonomy of the self, and its resultant freedoms are our
most precious possessions, but that these actually function to imprison us in a set of
practices and routines that are determined for, rather than by us. Indeed, Foucault (1979,
p.30) reverses the Christian platitude to say that “the soul is the prison of the body.”
Foucault, in using the analogy of the panoptican (a glass covered prison) concludes that
prisoners (the individual), not knowing that they are being observed, become responsible
for “appearing” to behave responsibly, and that this is typical of the processes of
subjectivisation that govern modern life.

This dichotomy between true autonomy and the requirement to conform, results in the
emergence of a conflict between the attempt to grasp individual experience as a totality,
and the belief that its essence and truth is only found in conscious processes. In terms of
decision making, this contradiction has provided a space for the development of
unconscious theory, which directly challenges Descartes, Kant, and to a lesser extent,
Rousseau, (who attempted to keep the doors to emotion and impulse open). Where
decision makers seek to structure themselves solely on their awareness of the world
around them, they can only do so by suppressing those parts of their subjectivity that are
inconsistent, irrational, obscure or unknown (Mansfield, 2000).
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So, what are the key factors influencing the decision making process? The following
sections will explore this conundrum, starting with a description and critique of a
number of behaviourist decision models.

2.2

Decision Models.

Yield management is predicated on large volumes of programmed decisions, taken in an
environment of temporal uncertainty, that relate to price setting, room capacity
management and market segmentation (Yeoman & Ingold, 2000). This process of
programmed decision making is viewed by Rosenfeld & Wilson (1999), as encoding
arguments and rationalisations in a very precise and predictable form, usually through a
set of decision steps to be followed. An alternative view, argued by Davis & Olsen
(1985), suggests that although structured programmable decisions can be completely
automated, provided the requisite information to apply the decision rule is available,
human review is generally considered necessary. The above divergence of opinion
immediately suggests a conflict between the desire to optimise decisions and the degree
of trust in systems that can execute these decisions.
A number of decision models exist that endeavour to explicate the decision making
process. Daft (2001) adopts a positivistic approach to decision making, defining the
process in terms of a broad number of evaluation categories including:


Environments where decisions are rationally constructed, through options being
examined and systematically evaluated before acceptance of an optimal solution
(The rational/normative model).



Decision processes which utilise technology controlled mathematical processes
to deliver the optimal solution (management science).



Environments in which problems and solutions co-exist in a chaotic environment
and where outcomes result from chance encounters between problems,
participants, choices and solutions (The garbage can model).



Environments where the decision maker’s experience and judgement influence
choice (bounded rationality)
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These models are now critiqued both in terms of secondary research relating to the
model and also in terms of how they are associated with yield management decision
making in the hospitality and broader industries.

2.2.1

The Rational/Normative Model of Decision Making

This model incorporates the need for a systematic analysis of the problem and an
objective evaluation of options, resulting in the selection and implementation of the
optimum solution.

While this may prove difficult to achieve in an uncertain and

complex environment, its value lies in forcing managers to think more clearly and
rationally about the decisions they have to take (March, 1994). Assumptions contained
within this model include the need to maximise utility where constraints are
environmental or external and where information is taken for granted and certain (Glazer
Stecker & Winer, 1992).

While agreeing that the rational-normative model has the potential to provide optimum
forecasting solutions for yield management decision makers, Yeoman & Ingold (2000)
propose, in addition, that it enables objective, cost-benefit analysis of suggested options.
An inherent implication in this argument is that pure rational choice assumes the
existence of a common set of preferences, whose alternatives and consequences are
defined by the environment, and that perfect knowledge of all alternatives and their
consequences also exists.

Criticism of the rational/normative model of decision making is not uncommon. Gore
(1995) argues that the model is not relevant to the real world of yield management
decision making, where extenuating factors such as decision time pressure, dichotomies
between qualitative and quantitative measures of success, political factors and the
existence of “group-think” conspire to impede the decision making process. This results
in the model being more useful in showing how decisions should be made, rather than
how they are actually made (Jennings & Wattam, 1994).
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Perceptions of decision making in organisations often associate “action” with “rational
choice.” Depending on contextual factors, “rationality” is alternatively defined in terms
of being “intelligent” and “successful,” or “coldly materialistic” and “not telling the full
story,” imputing either a label of “sanity” or “unacceptability” to the decision making
process, depending on one’s perspective (March, 1994). This use of language to signify
the meaning or universally accepted context of the model, also determines its
acceptability, associating it, therefore, with Lacan’s (1949) mirror phase theory. This
perception suggests the possibility of unconscious impacts on decision making, either
through a rationalising rejection of decision data, or alternatively, through an
unquestioning support for decision enabling data.

An interesting alignment with this perspective, proposed by Glazer et al (1992), argues
quite strongly that the mere presence of additional information may have dysfunctional
consequences, even where decision makers process the information correctly. This
“local rationality” phenomenon contends that although decision makers may focus on
“chunks of information” that assist in the delivery of a pattern recognised decision, the
presence of “additional information” will have a “seductive” or distracting effect,
leading managers to seek out alternative decision making components. This practice
ultimately results in poorer decisions if these additional components are not those most
closely tied to success.

2.2.2

Management Science and Technology in Decision Making

Management science tools are traditionally seen as having the greatest application in the
area of forecasting (Bartol & Martin, 1998). However, scientific models have conferred
significant benefit in a number of other areas including process measurement, strategy
formulation, shelf space optimisation, inventory replenishment, efficient and effective
allocation of skilled workers within flexible manufacturing systems, co-ordinating
contracts in decentralised supply chains, and optimising yield management decision
making, using models adapted from queuing theory, linear programming, network flow
models, multi criteria decision making and simulation (Hahn, 2003).
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The inherent mathematical algorithm in the management science model can contain
thousands of variables, each one relevant in some way to the ultimate outcome. Clark &
Scott (1997) and Bohan & Dillane (2001) argue that advances in computing capabilities
have increased the scope for technological support and further extended the potential
capabilities of the management science/operational research toolkit. These advances
lessen the risk involved in successfully forecasting the probability of a future event, a
practice which, from a decision making point of view, is traditionally filled with
uncertainty and fraught with anxiety. The real value of the management science model,
therefore, lies in its ability to extract decision pathways from a maze of uncertainty that
is increasingly being attributed to information overload.

Empirical evidence shows that where organisations adapt management science
principles, a corresponding increase in customer service and revenue generation occurs.
Subramanian, Scheff, Quillinan, Wiper, & Marsden, (1994) report that the use of linear
programming at Delta Airlines to assist in airline fleet assignment for over 2,500 daily
flights is estimated to have saved the company over $300 million over a three year
period. The development of quantitative models within yield management systems,
suggests Wisniewski (1997), is estimated to have contributed about $500 million to
American Airlines on an annual basis. In terms of customer service, Kentucky Fried
Chicken reduced waiting times for customers by fifty per cent, and also improved
productivity, sales and profit through the application of management science techniques
(Apte & Reynolds, 1995).

The model is closely aligned with the rational/normative model of decision making.
However, an additional advantage associated with the management science model is that
it can speedily and accurately solve problems that have too many explicit variables for
human processing. Management science decision tools have a significant application in
yield management forecasting due to their innate ability to comprehensively aggregate
historical data and present it in a useable format (Kimes, 1989; Rosenfeld & Wilson,
1999). In arguing the case for management science solutions to forecasting problems,
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Wright (2000) illustrates how quickly scenarios can change, evidenced by the growing
trend towards customer relationship management.

The pull coming from ever

demanding and proactive customers, and the push from increasingly sophisticated
technology, coupled with increasing globalisation, make predictable futures more and
more unlikely and forces organisations to gather and process increasing amounts of
customer data within narrower market segments.

Wisniewski (1997) argues that information overload, caused by a combination of the
increasing pace of competition and continual improvements in telecommunications,
strains the information capacity of managers and this ultimately diminishes their ability
to assess, analyse or react to problems or opportunities.

However, while accurate

forecasting enhances an organisation’s performance, inaccurate forecasting can seriously
debilitate an organisation, in which practitioner bias may become a factor impacting
negatively on the accuracy of forecasts (Herbig et al, 1993). The authors argue that the
use of management science techniques that include scenario analysis and the
interpretation and assignment of judgement probabilities (Baysean rules), would
constitute an effective tool in counterbalancing the negative effects of bias and elaborate
unconscious rationalisations embedded in forecasting.

Developments in technology have changed how systems have been able to manipulate
data and assist in decision making. This suggests that the availability of user friendly
technology should have propelled decision making from an intuitive model, with a
greater emphasis on human intervention, (Gore 1995) to a more rational model that
improves decision making effectiveness through the elimination of guesswork (Marakas
2003). Applications of this evolution are common in research literature and incorporate
a wide industry usage. Lewis & Shoemaker (1997) suggest that SPSS systems have
addressed the issue of consumer price sensitivity, removing the uncertainty of gut
feeling or trial and error from the decision process. Modern software packages greatly
improve capacity management decisions through negating the tendency to disregard
information which may be critical to the decision making process (Orkin 1998).
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Scenario analysis afforded by yield management computer technology also maximises
efficiency through the involvement of fewer intermediaries and faster decision making
due to the universal and instant access to data and the creation of horizontal relationships
(Lieberman, 1993; Brown & Pattinson, 1995).

However, research also illustrates that there are potential downsides to the use of
technology. Donaghy et al (1997) suggest that the hospitality industry has been slow to
adapt to technology citing the unavailability of integrated software and the requirement
for “multiple technologies” as creating a bias against using technology. The perception
of a “loss of control” is identified by Carroll & Siguaw (2003) as militating against the
acceptance of technology in the decision making process. They argue that the global
shift

to

increased

numbers

of

distribution

channels,

with

their

complex

interconnectivities, can create the feeling of a loss of control on the part of the decision
maker and that this in turn creates a mental block against utilising the technology.

This point is developed by Davis & Olsen (1985) who argue that senior managers, who
have requested information from subordinates, subsequently use a non-routine form of
decision making, which in turn leads to many management decisions and the
environment in which they are taking place becoming diffuse and unstructured.

Interestingly, Gehrlein & Fishburn (1976) feel that the inability to handle large volumes
of information is not an exclusively human weakness.

In describing information

overload, they contend that mechanical systems are themselves prone to overload, due in
part to the inability of the system to detect all ordered pairs in an underlying linear order,
and that this perception on the part of decision maker, has implications for the level of
trust in a mathematical system.

2.2.3

Logical Incrementalism

Logical Incrementalism, although associated with the conscious decision making
process, moves away from the logical/normativism to a model in which human influence
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becomes more evident. Quinn (1978) proposes a model where decision making takes
place through a series of small proactive steps, where ongoing evaluation, choice,
adaptivity and flexibility are implicit in the development of the solution. This model
acts to select the most valuable alternative from a number of variables at a particular
time, through a process of cycling, recycling and reformulation of information and
alternatives, which enable decisions to be made in a halting, incremental, non-linear
way.

However, there are also criticisms of this model. Yeoman et al (2000) suggest that the
use of logical incrementalism may lead to decision making by exception, where the full
range of alternative solutions are not considered.

What is considered are those

alternatives that do not differ substantially from the status quo. This, according to
Miller, Hickson, & Wilson, (1996), may substantively result in incrementalism
becoming a formula for inertia, in which the existence of a central reservations system
and departmental responsibility for profit or loss, collectively mitigate against the
success of Quinn’s (1978) model. The resultant scenario promotes the search for “good
enough” solutions within which, a corresponding minimisation of the willingness to
evaluate risk resides.

2.2.4

The Garbage Can Model of Decision Making

The garbage can model offers an interesting and alternative perspective on the process of
organisational decision making.

The model can be used to explain the pattern of

decision-making in environments of high uncertainty, where decisions are typically
characterised by poor goal definition and ambiguity, and where problems and solutions
co-exist. Poorly understood technology and limited employee integration with problems
also define its use (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972). What differentiates it from other
models is that it offers the possibility of dealing with patterns of multiple decisions
within organisations rather than focussing on the processing of a single decision. The
model is, therefore, appropriate to decision environments that appear chaotic, due
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mainly due to their close association with the phenomenon of uncertainty (Cohen et al,
1972).

The key point in this model is that problems and solutions are attached both to choices
and to each other, not because of any means-end linkage, but because of their temporal
proximity. In addition, the model appears to deviate from perceived constraints on
decision making that have traditionally been imposed by vertical hierarchies of authority
and the constraining effect of bureaucratic decision rules.

Poorly understood and

unclear technology, characterised by the absence of explicit databases that apply to
decisions, suggests that cause and effect relationships are difficult to identify and enable
the use of this model. In addition, time constraints on individuals forces participation in
any given decision to be fluid and limited (Daft, 2001). These factors contribute to the
model being associated with the bounded rationality model of decision making, in which
the extent of the evaluation of available options is limited by information overload.

Although decision makers are involved with one choice opportunity at any one time,
they also constantly move from one choice opportunity to another (March, 1994). This
unique characteristic of the model proposes that the decision process is not a sequence of
steps that begins with a problem and ends with a solution, but rather that decisions are
fundamentally the outcome of independent streams of solutions and problems, coexisting and interacting within the organisation.

A potential flaw in the garbage can model of decision making is that it affords a form of
autonomy to the decision maker. Individuals within the organisation may push for the
adoption of their solution regardless of the existence of a problem. Existing problems
may not be solved by the adoption of a particular solution. In addition, problems and
solutions may be valued and perceived quite differently by different participants in the
decision making process (March, 1994).

Although “randomness” is a defining

characteristic of the mode, enabling choice opportunities to be matched with problems,
individuals can also vision choice opportunities in terms of their own personal desire for
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prestige and success. This unstructured approach to the decision process affords the
opportunity for the implementation of the super-ordinate goals of the individual.

2.2.5

Boundedly Rational Decision Making

Simon (1972) defines rationality as behaviour appropriate to the achievement of goals.
This practice coined the phrase “satisficing of objectives,” which essentially removes the
need for the decision maker to evaluate all options. The requirement to be “rational” is
bounded or limited, therefore, by the enormous decision complexity faced by managers,
suggesting that there is a realistic limit to how “rational” managers can be. The resultant
human intuition, according to Daft (2001), is not arbitrary or irrational, but is based on
years of practice and hands-on experience often stored in the subconscious. The
overarching proposition, therefore, embedded in this decision model, is that in situations
involving ambiguity, previous experience and judgement are used to make the “correct”
decision (Appendix 4).

While bounded rationality is a departure from the pure form of the rational model, it still
fits within the framework of conscious decision making as described earlier. Hospitality
research indicates that relatively few decisions are made using the pure rational
analytical process. “Pattern recognitions” of previously recognised situations and the
reliance on a number of guiding principles or heuristical rules of thumb are used to
reduce the complexity of assessing probabilities to simple judgemental operations
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Klein et al, 1993). This practice is viewed as being
appropriate to the decision making process.

However, other theorists are more critical of the bounded rationality model of decision
making.

March (1994) suggests that in the search for a “good enough” solution,

decision makers identify a number of strategies to overcome cognitive constraints.
These strategies include “editing” problems before entering into the choice process.
This results in the loss of the holistic view by reducing complex problems to their
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component parts, and framing the decision to be taken within the decision maker’s own
beliefs of what constitutes the problem and the solution.

Furthermore, this form of hierarchical decision making may conflict with the team
decision making goal of yield management (Yeoman et al, 2000), in which the evolution
of group-think results in lack of commitment to the search for an optimum decision, and
promotes instead the search for limited information to make “satisficing” decisions. The
value of these “satisficing” practices is explored by Arnold, Robertson & Cooper (1991).
Their Subjective Expected Utility Theory concludes that individuals often make
decisions on the basis of expected outcomes resulting in the team having a high level of
agreement with the decision taken, while simultaneously experiencing low levels of
morale.

2.3

Heuristics and Biases

Before discussing the effects of heuristics and biases on the decision making process, it
is necessary to briefly profile the authors of this theory and its significance for
understanding the decision making process.

Daniel Kahneman is Professor of

Psychology at the University of British Columbia and Amos Tversky was Professor of
Psychology at Stanford University, until his untimely death in 1996. What makes their
theories most significant and radical is that they apply human behaviour in the guise of
heuristics and biases to judgement and decision making under conditions of uncertainty.
Their work skilfully integrates the causal relationships between clinical and statistical
prediction, the subjective probability associated with the Bayesean paradigm and both
the positive and negative significance of rules of thumb in decision making.
In October 2002, Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic
Sciences for his groundbreaking work in applying psychological insights to economic
theory, particularly in areas of judgement and decision making under uncertainty. As
the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences does not award prizes posthumously,
Kahneman, when receiving the award, poignantly acknowledged his colleague
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Tversky’s contribution to the research, stating “Certainly, we would have gotten this
award together.”

In their seminal paper on Prospect Theory (1979), Kahneman & Tversky’s findings
counter traditional assumptions of economic theory. Their theory proposes that people
make rational choices based on their self-interest, evidenced when they frequently fail to
fully analyse situations in which they must make complex judgements. Thus, rather than
economists making their decisions in a logical, unemotional manner, the authors found
that decisions were based on factors such as fairness, vividness of past events, how the
problem was numerically framed and the individual’s aversion to loss (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979).

Heuristics are defined as pattern recognitions or rules of thumb that become useful and
effective when providing hard pressed managers with simple ways of dealing with
complex decisions. However, despite their efficacy, a key drawback of their usage
involves individuals being frequently unaware that they are dependent on them. This
dependence leads to decision makers making systematically biased mistakes, indicating
the presence of unconscious traps in decision making, wherein the instrumental
rationality of human actions in serving egotistical ends, enables rational choice to fall
prey to an individualistic bias (Wrong, 1994; Bazerman, 2004).

In addition, an inability or unwillingness to learn from mistakes can seduce the decision
maker into repetitious behaviour. Nutt (2002) argues that the practice of rushing to
judgement because of time or peer pressures, ensnares unsuspecting managers in
psychological traps, through limiting the search for remedies, and consolidates the
existing fear of moving away from the tangible to the unknown. What makes these traps
so dangerous is their invisibility, and within this “invisibility” behavioural catalyst such
as “misuse of evaluation,” forces decision makers to take a defensive posture by
collecting information that “justifies” the decision that they have already taken
(Hammond, Keeney, & Raiffa 1999).
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The failure to learn by ignoring ethical questions, or through escalating commitment to
proven errors by failing to objectively reflect on past decisions, also suggests that
decision makers will repeatedly stumble down the same failure prone path (Bazerman,
2004). This inability or unwillingness to free oneself from past decisions is attributable,
according to Hammond et al (1999), to a conscious or unconscious inability to admit to a
mistake.

Judgemental heuristics have traditionally been classified under three main headings: (i)
the availability heuristic, (ii) the anchoring and adjustment heuristic and (iii) the
representativeness heuristic. More recent research into heuristics and biases (Sloman,
2002; Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002 and Slovic, Finnucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2002), has
focussed on such areas as the influence of “emotion” and “feelings” on the decision
process, and the automaticity of decision making as exhibited in theories of sympathetic
magical thinking and the affect heuristic.

2.3.1

Availability

Availability is described as “the tendency to judge the likelihood of an occurrence on the
basis of the extent to which other like instances or occurrences can be recalled” (Bartol
& Martin, 1998, p153).

The authors ask the following question to illustrate this

heuristic:
“In a typical English text, does the letter “K” appear more often as the first letter in a
word, or as the third letter?”
People generally judge that the letter “K” is more likely to be the first letter in a word,
even though the letter is almost twice as likely to appear in the third position. They do
this because of a bias called availability. In this case, it is usually easier to recall word
beginning with the letter “K” than words in which “K” is the third letter. Availability
shows up in the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of deaths due to vividly
imaginable cause, such as, airplane accidents, fires and murder, and to underestimate
more common, but less spectacular causes, such as emphysema and stroke.
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Organisational examples of this heuristic are seen where managers base their annual
performance appraisals on the most recent and easily recalled performance of
subordinates.

Decision makers often experience difficulty in extracting diagnostic information from
the signs and signals attracting their attention.

This makes them prone to using

information that is readily available, while overlooking information that may be more
diagnostic (Nutt, 1999). This, the author suggests, is often done spontaneously and to a
large extent indiscriminately, without any rules to guide what is and what is not accepted
as fact. For the most part, this occurs where managers avoid the use of statistical
information or mathematical models in their decision making. Tversky & Kahneman
(1973) propose that decision makers assess the frequency, probability, or likely causes
of an event by the degree to which instances or occurrences of that event are already
“available” in the memory.

While this “vividness” can make the availability heuristic a valuable tool in managerial
decision making, the heuristic can also be fallible because the availability of information
is also affected by factors unrelated to the objective frequency of the judged event, such
as when the mind unconsciously blocks out undesired information which is “vivid” for
all the wrong reasons (Plous, 1993;Bazerman, 2004).

Salience, according to Kahneman, Sloman & Tversky (2001), influences the
retrievability of an instance, which suggests that personal experience of the success or
failure of a decision is more significant than hearing or reading about it.

This

determinant of decision intentionality is also explored by Slovic et al (2002) who
suggest, through their writing on the affect heuristic, that an initial conscious or
unconscious feeling of “goodness” or “badness” attributes a positive or negative quality
to a stimulus, and that this automatic categorisation of the stimulus in turn influences
decision making. This phenomenon is also categorised in the laws of sympathetic magic
(Rozin & Nemeroff 2002), in which the law of similarity (appearance equals reality),
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and the law of contagion (once in contact, always in contact) identify the influence of
human feelings towards a range of options as the ultimate determinants of decision
choice. This proposal, therefore, suggests that individuals will normally seek out the
comfort zone of familiarity rather than engage in objective analysis of available options.

2.3.2

Anchoring and Adjustment

Anchoring and adjustment is defined as “the tendency to be influenced by an initial
figure even when the information is largely irrelevant” (Bartol & Martin, 1998, p153).
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic proposes that decision makers make assessments
by starting from an initial value and subsequently adjusting this value to yield a final
position. This can lead to decision makers being drawn to available information due to a
combination of the “anchoring” of personal experience and selective perception of
solutions (Plous, 1993;Bazerman, 2004). A common anchor impacting on forecasters is
the record of past events or trends, where according to Yeoman et al (2000) yield
managers, when giving their opinions on a forecasting option based on their previous
“experience,” can result in anchoring on the part of other members of the yield
management team.

Anchoring often prejudices thinking in that it inhibits the making of good decisions.
The anchoring trap permits this through an over reliance on one’s first thoughts which,
subsequently establish the terms on which a decision will be made. Again this is
associated with both the affect heuristic (Slovic et al, 2002) and the laws of sympathetic
magic (Rozin et al, 2002).
When considering options on which to make a decision, Hammond et al (1999) suggest
that the mind gives disproportionate weight to the first information it receives and that
these initial impressions, ideas, estimates or data, anchor subsequent thoughts. This
argument corresponds with Sloman’s (2002), articulation of his two systems of thinking
theory in which he arrives at a similar conclusion when addressing the influence of the
tension between an immediate intuition, and a more measured rational belief, on the
decision making process.

In addition to this, Kahneman et al (1982) argue that
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anchoring occurs, not only when the initial estimate is stated and given to the decision
maker, but also when the decision maker bases his estimate on a data set that is the result
of an incomplete computation.

2.3.3

The Representative Heuristic

Representativeness is defined as “the tendency to be overly influenced by stereotypes in
making judgements about the likelihood of occurrences” (Bartol & Martin, 1998, p.153).
Tversky & Kahneman (1983) offer an interesting example of this heuristic through their
conjunction fallacy theory. Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken and very
bright. She majored in Philosophy as a student. She was deeply concerned with issues
of discrimination and social justice and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
The authors asked participants to rank order eight statements about Linda according to
the statements probability. The statements included the following two:


Linda is a bank teller (T).



Linda is a bank teller and is involved the feminist movement (T and F).

More than eight percent of the groups of graduate and medical students with statistical
training and a group of doctoral students in the decision science programme of the
Stanford Business School rank the statement T and F as more probable than statement T.
A general principle participants used to make this judgement is similarity or
representativeness. In the paragraph description Linda is more similar to a feminist bank
teller than she is to a stereotypical bank teller.

In this decision environment, making a judgement is based on initial “gut feelings or
traits” that correspond with previously formed stereotypes. Bazerman (2004) argues that
judgemental deficiencies arise where individuals tend to rely on such strategies, in the
absence of sufficient information, or when better information that would lead to more
accurate decisions exists, but is ignored. Within the hospitality industry this heuristic
can be used to predict the success of a rate category for a market segment based on its
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similarity to previous rate categories for that segment that were, or were not successful.
It also can be utilised for decision making when comparing room rates against
competitor rates or where one’s rates are based in relation to where one stands within a
competitive set Yeoman et al, 2000).

The representative heuristic can alternatively lead to irrational behaviour. The “status
quo” trap suggests that decision makers display a strong bias towards alternatives that
perpetuate the current situation (Hammond et al, 1999). This pull of the status quo,
suggest the authors, becomes even stronger when there are several alternatives, and
decision behaviour in such instances may be associated with unconscious impacts
including:


The search for the comfort zone of familiarity



Fear of failure



Information overload



Sins of commission (making a wrong decision) being punished more severely
than sins of omission (avoiding the making of a decision)



The psychodynamic influence of shame

Representativeness, in the form of the “evidence trap,” also leads decision makers to
seek out information that confirms their instinct or point of view, while avoiding
information that contradicts it.

Hammond et al (1999) suggest that there are two

fundamental psychological forces at work here. Firstly, our tendency to decide what we
want to do before we figure out why we want to do it, and secondly, our tendency to be
more engaged by things we like than by things we do not like. This leads us to be drawn
to information that confirms our subconscious leanings. The “evidence trap” is again
closely associated with the law of similarity as proposed in the laws of sympathetic
magic (Rozin et al 2002).
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Decision makers also rely on the representativeness heuristic in which probabilities are
evaluated by the degree with which one situation is representative of or similar to
another (Tversky & Kahneman 1971). However, this approach to the judgement of
probability leads to serious error because several factors are typically ignored, such as
insensitivity to statistical probabilities of outcomes, insensitivity to sample size,
misconceptions of chance and insensitivity to predictability.

2.3.4

Magical Theory

The laws of sympathetic magic (Rozin & Nemeroff 2002), involve a set of heuristics or
biases that place a significant emphasis on the individual’s perception of what is real for
them. Magical theory fundamentally highlights the contrast between an initial reflexive
evaluation and a more considered rational assessment. These cognitive heuristics differ
from the classic heuristics, such as availability and anchoring, in that they are more
strongly associated with “feelings.”

What is really interesting, however, is the fact that the decision makers are either aware,
or can be made aware, of the irrational aspects of these laws (Rozin et al, 2002).
Individuals, therefore, rationalise the irrational, through a conscious contradiction of
empirical data. This preference for the irrational state is guided and controlled by the
power of feeling, in which the interaction of feelings or beliefs with logical, rational
reason is evidence of a conscious state being used to validate or rationalise an
unconscious state. The laws of sympathetic magic, therefore, support Freud’s primary
process theory which states that the mind does not distinguish between hallucination and
reality. The law of similarity, in proposing that “appearance equals reality,” relates this
heuristic to the Tversky & Kahneman’s positive view on the representativeness heuristic
(1984).

However, it also suggests that similarity promotes categorisation, thus transforming this
generally useful heuristic to a biasing influence in the world of symbolic language and
images, relating it to the signifier and the signified theory, as proposed by Lacan (1956),
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where the unconscious has to be understood as a chain of signifiers. This would suggest
that the linguistic signifier must be thought of as something that actively cuts into
something else that is not yet structured in the strict sense, and in doing so gives rise to
meaning (Van Haute, 2002).

Avoidance of actions that feel harmful is a very powerful influence on decision making
(Johnson, 2004). Simon (1987), in a departure from his bounded rationality theory,
argues that the intuition of the emotion driven manager is very different from the
intuition of the expert, the latter’s behaviour being the product of learning and
experience, the former’s response, being more influenced by primitive urges. The laws
of sympathetic magic propose that while negative feelings may be unfounded,
individuals do acknowledge them, supporting Freud’s theory that the unconscious does
not process negatives.
This acknowledgement of negative feelings can specifically impact on decision making
when individuals avoid disagreeing with someone that they like or fear, or when
elements of risk are associated with a decision. Accordingly the belief that appearance
equals reality also links significantly with the misuse of analogy by influential members
of a decision team, further reinforcing the powerful influence of Lacan’s signifier and
signified theory (Arnaud, 2002).
The law of contagion similarly argues that physical contact between the source and the
target results in the transfer of some effect or quality (physical, mental or moral), which
can be negative or positive in valence.

A modification of this law suggests a

disproportionate influence of the “halo effect” of experience or the signification of the
“position” of individuals within the decision environment. The idea that negative bias is
stronger than positive bias is encapsulated by decision makers not wanting to repeat a
mistake, due to their recognition of a particular set of negative circumstances being a
more powerful influence, than the repeating of a process characterised by recognition of
a set of positive symbols. This in turn may lead to the defence mechanism of avoidance
and the suggestion that negative fears are more powerful than delusions of success
(Rozin et al, 2002).
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2.3.5

The Affect Heuristic.

The affect heuristic mirrors the philosophies associated with the laws of magical
thinking.

Slovic et al (2002) suggest that “feelings” encapsulated in a sense of

“goodness or “badness,” that equate with the positive or negative quality of a stimulus,
can significantly drive judgement and decision making.

These feelings can occur

rapidly, sometimes being triggered by the use of language, situating this heuristic also
within Lacan’s (1956) signifier and signified theory. Reliance on “feelings” differs from
the cognitive or rational approach to decision making, and although analysis is certainly
important in some decision making circumstances, reliance on affect and emotion is seen
as being a quicker, easier and more efficient way to navigate in a complex environment.

This theme is developed by Damascio (1994), who suggests that “somatic markers” or
“images” marked by positive and negative affective feelings, guide judgement and
decision making in a process where people refer to an “affect pool” containing all the
positive and negative tags that are consciously or unconsciously associated with the
decision.

“Rational” choice or preference can also be manipulated through controlled exposures.
Zajonc & Markus (1982) suggest that when objects are repeatedly presented, the mere
exposure is capable of creating a positive attitude or preference for these objects. A
different perspective is offered by Slovic et al (2002), through their identification of
“proportion dominance,” which looks at the impact on judgement and decision making
of how information is presented.
They conclude that in situations that involve uncertainty or ambiguity, one information
format normally attains a higher value, leading it to carry a greater weight in many
judgement tasks. This heuristic may have significant relevance in yield management,
where decisions are often based on numerical projections and forecasts, inviting the
possibility that decision makers may give greater weight or trust to specific data in order
to justify their decision, or become blinded by the “halo effect” of the leader when it
comes to team support for particular decisions.
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The affect heuristic also impacts on the willingness to take risks. This heuristic is used
by Alhakami & Slovic (1994) to illustrate how risk and benefit, are negatively
correlated. Their research suggests that if decision makers “like” an activity, they are
likely to judge the risks as being low and the benefits as being high. However, if they
“dislike” it, they tend to judge the opposite, (high risk and low benefit).

Agreement with this theory is found in Finnucane et al (2000), who demonstrate that
where time pressure reduces the opportunity for analytic deliberation, the inverse
relationship between perceived risks and benefits increased greatly. This supports the
contention that, affect influences judgement directly and is not simply a response to
prior analytic evaluation. This strategy bears a great similarity to the representativeness
heuristic with its associated attraction to familiarity.

The affect heuristic is also

associated with the availability heuristic, where Wright (1975) proposes the “affect
referral heuristic” as a mechanism by which the “remembered” affect associated with an
outcome, influences subsequent choice.

Slovic et al (2002), however, caution against an unquestioning acceptance of the affect
heuristic in the making of decisions. They argue that experiential thinking can misguide
decision makers in two ways, firstly, by a deliberate manipulation of affective reactions
by those wishing to control the decision behaviour through the abuse power and the
misuse of analogy, and secondly, the existence of unconscious stimuli in the
environment that are not amenable to valid affective representation.

2.4

Unconscious Decision Making

Although heuristics and biases are primarily perceived by some as being associated with
conscious decision making, they can also play an unconscious role in decision making.
Kersten (2001) argues that while conventional organisational theory portrays
organisations as being rationally ordered and emotion free life spaces, where the right
decisions are made for the right reasons by the right people, in a reasonable and
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predictable manner, this image is as about as far from reality as the 1950’s image of the
“ideal” family ever was.

On a more dramatic level, mention of the unconscious mind paints a picture of the
interior life of an individual that is potentially fractured and prey to irrational impulses
that threaten its usual role in the social order.

Mary Shelly’s depiction of the

relationship between Dr. Frankenstein and the monster he created is an analogy of the
modern self in that it illustrates the relationship between the almost pathological
involvement in the conscious mind’s rational processes (the scientist) and the
vulnerability, primal innocence and malicious physical violence that embodies the
dangerous and dark domain of the unconscious. Equally in Robert Louis Stevenson’s,
“Dr. Jeckyl & Mr. Hyde,” the rational scientist experiments on himself until he is
completely transformed into his own malicious and amoral double (Mansfield, 2000).

What we see in both of these examples is not a conscious mind controlling its irrational
impulses, but one that is fascinated by, and drawn towards the dark and uncertain
impulses it was thought to rule.

Psychoanalytic interpretation of organisations points to underlying unconscious causes
of behaviour where much of the rational and taken-for- granted reality of everyday life
gives an “acceptable face” to preoccupations and concerns that lie beneath the level of
non-pathological awareness (Morgan, 1986), in which the unconscious is structured like
a language.

This philosophy fundamentally contradicts the theories of eighteenth

century rationalists like Kant who viewed the conscious mind as the defining attribute of
the human relationship with the world. In many ways, the Kantean approach still
prevails in modern businesses, where managers and decision makers appear
uncomfortable with the possibility of unconscious processes being part of their decision
making processes (Mansfield, 2000).
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The unconscious, however, acts as a triggering mechanism, where we do not know why
we feel what we feel, why we fear what we fear, why we think what we think, or why
we do what we do (Kahn, 2002). Ideas and images constantly pass in and out of our
awareness in our everyday lives. Freud (1913) argues that the notion that ideas on the
fringe of the mind reoccur unpredictably, is not due to some simple process of mental
circulation, but rather that these peripheral thoughts are strong and even menacing
enough for the conscious mind to want to suppress them. Freud, cited in Kahn (2002),
contends that the unconscious consists of the Id, the unconscious part of the mind, the
superego which, operates as a conscience through prohibitions, fears and guilt, and the
ego, which acts as a form of watchman, trying to satisfy both the ego and the superego.
Kahn (2002) suggests that it is not just fear, guilt and shame that are being kept at bay by
the superego, but also wishes, desires and dreams of success.

Dreams are not the only place where such unconscious investments re-appear.
Workplace nuances such as parapraxes (Freudian slips), jokes, and body language, (i.e.
the pushing back of one’s hair, the scratching of the nose, obsessive tidying and
washing), are neurotic symptoms of this “surprise surfacing” of incongruous material.
These interferences can be viewed as manifestations of the unconscious that are beyond
the control of the individual (Mansfield 2000).

Experts in the field of marketing, such as Chrzanowska (2002), in applying neuroscience
to their marketing armoury have identified that these nuances indicate how social
expectations can introduce conflict between the conscious and unconscious parts of the
mind, in an environment where the conscious mind is not fully aware of the deeper
dynamics influencing attitude and behaviour.

Issues of motivation are also central to the psychoanalytic approach, in that individuals
are often unaware of the true reasons motivating their behaviour, because the
unconscious mind contains ideas experiences and feelings that are blocked from
conscious awareness by the power of repression (Glassman 2001). Although direct
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proof of the unconscious is deemed unobtainable, Freud (1913) suggests that it can be
accessed through dreams, and particularly wish fulfilment in dreams, in which the latent
or threatening content of thought is transferred into something less threatening (the
manifest content) via the controlling influence of the “dream censor,” whose function is
to ensure that sleep is not disturbed. A modern analogy of this may be illustrated
through individuals being inhibited in saying what they think or feel. A glimpse of this
unconscious process may be achieved through the identification of defence mechanisms.

According to Freud (1920), the psyche is automatically regulated by the Pleasure
Principle. In The Pleasure Principle, Freud views the drive to maximise pleasure in
terms of the need to avoid that which is unpleasant. This identification of pleasure with
a discharge of tension, and “unpleasure” with an increase in tension, drives human
behaviour linking it with the correlation between decision making and the feelings
associated with that decision (Rozin et al 2002; Slovic et al 2002).

Neuroscientists, such as Pinker (2003), in agreeing with Freud’s psychoanalytic theory,
argue that behaviour comes from an internal struggle among modules with differing
agendas and goals. Pinker suggests that each of us feels that there is a single “I” in
control, an illusion that the brain works hard to produce. Instead, however, we move our
eyes to whatever looks interesting, which fools us into thinking that the detail was there
all along, suggesting that the brain’s ability to override habits or urges is not, therefore,
an implementation of the rational free agent.

Thaler (1994) suggests that human

thinking and decision making are biological adaptations rather than engines of pure
rationality, in which systems work with limited amounts of information, need to reach
decisions in a finite period of time, which ultimately serve evolutionary goals such as
status and security, through the unqualified acceptance of a heuristic.

Unconscious decisions, therefore, offer the perfect defence mechanism, where according
to Pinker (2003), people rationalise the irrational. This enables decision makers to
excuse themselves by arguing that it was “the culture of the time” (Irish Banks), or
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taking performance enhancing drugs to “level the playing pitch” (Olympic athletes), thus
illustrating an unwillingness to take responsibility and creating the perfect alibi, the “getout of jail card,” the ultimate “doctor’s excuse note.”

Campbell (1949, p.8) offers perhaps the most succinct and incisive overview of the
impact of the unconscious as follows:
“The unconscious sends off all sorts of vapours, odd beings, terrors, and
deluding images up into the mind – whether in dreams, broad daylight, or
insanity; for the human kingdom beneath the floor of the comparatively
neat little dwelling that we call our consciousness, goes down into
unsuspected Aladdin caves. There not only jewels but also dangerous jinn
abide: the inconvenient or resisted psychological powers that we have
thought or dared to integrate into our lives. And they may remain
unsuspected, or, on the other hand, some chance world, the smell of a
landscape, the taste of a cup of tea, or the glance of an eye may touch a
magic spring, and then dangerous messengers begin to appear in the brain.
These are dangerous because they threaten the fabric of the security into
which we have built ourselves and our family. But they are fiendishly
fascinating too, for they carry keys that open the whole realm of the desired
and feared adventure of the discovery of the self.”
Psychodynamic theorists have indicated that a number of factors, including problem
framing through misuse of analogy, overconfidence, control and regulation, the need for
power, anxiety, shame in the workplace, fear of success, attitudes to technology, and
centralisation of decision making, both collectively and individually contribute to
unconscious behaviours that in turn impact on the decision making process.

2.4.1. Framing through Misuse of Analogy
According to March (1994), the tendency to “categorise” and “stereotype” in order to
make sense of complex data, increases in times of uncertainty.

Indeed, making a

comparison with the “known,” or forcefully indicating one’s prior experience of the
problem often helps to remove the ambiguity of choice in the minds of the decision team
members creating a comforting calm in the process (Brindle 1999). However, despite
this positive intent, endeavouring to deflect attention from the decision to be taken can
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cause the process to go astray when issues of problem framing through misuse of
analogy shape matters.

Problem framing represents the way in which the problem is defined or presented, yet
the way the problem is not defined can also be significant. Limiting the decision making
space to a binary (either/or) context, omits critical data and limits the discussion to the
problem as defined by the space.

The decision to launch the “Challenger” spacecraft, despite an awareness that the o-rings
would fail under freezing temperatures, illustrates this point (Brindle 1999). “Framing”
can make it difficult for decision makers, psychologically speaking, to reverse their
decisions.

In addition, this “hubris effect” can lead undecided decision makers to

become unduly affected by charismatic leaders, or alternatively, to leaders needing to be
surrounded by “yes men,” who in turn feel unable to voice a critical view (Staw & Ross
1978).

Misuse of analogy also impacts on decision making in an unconscious manner. Brindle
(1999) illustrates this well when describing how suggestions are sometimes categorised
as being “like a previous idea that failed,” or “that definitely worked before.” This
categorisation has a substantial influence on decision makers through associated
emotional contexts.

These emotional contexts again correspond with the laws of

sympathetic magic (Rozin et al 2002), and Lacan’s identification of language as being
an unconscious signifier (Arnaud 2002). Indeed, a modern example of this phenomenon
was seen when American news media, referring to the Clinton political scandal as being
“like Watergate,” had a subconscious impact on listeners who immediately associated it
with the fall of the U.S presidency (Johnson 2004).

In structuring the unconscious like a language, Lacan’s (1956) influential conclusion
proposes that individuals must locate themselves in the field of language, where
phenomena, “acted out” through imagery and unconscious symbolic determinations,
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enable participation in everyday organisational activity. The essence of this is that while
the individual is forced to inhabit this symbolic order, they maintain at an unconscious
level their pursuit of intense satisfaction, by endeavouring to achieve the sense of
completion and self-identity that it had lost through being born (Lacan 1956; Mansfield
2000). This leads to many “rationalist” observers viewing organisational dysfunctions,
including recurrent operational failures, careerism, or the repeatedly aggressive
behaviour of managers, as nothing other than deficiencies in decision making or
manifestations of the inability to think decisions through, while ignoring the powerful
undercurrent of desire, and its impact on the decision process (Arnaud 2002).

2.4.2

Overconfidence

Problem framing through misuse of analogy is closely linked with overconfidence in
decision making, typically where uncertainty is a critical component of the decision
making process. Lovallo & Kahneman (2003) suggest that decision failure is best
explained, not as a result of rational choices gone wrong, but more likely as a
consequence of flawed decisions due to delusional optimism. To achieve a desired
outcome, rationalisation of the decision choice is often achieved through the spinning of
scenarios of success, while overlooking potential for mistakes and miscalculations. This
over-optimism is caused by the tendency of individuals to over-exaggerate their own
talent, which is then amplified by a tendency to misperceive the cause of certain events,
i.e. taking personal credit for successes while attributing negative outcomes to external
factors.
The inherent psychodynamic forces impacting on the decision process include the need
for recognition and an unwillingness to admit a mistake. This escalating commitment to
an incorrect decision is facilitated by individuals consciously and unconsciously
blocking out or distorting negative information that will increase tension levels in the
decision maker, linking it with Freud’s Pleasure Principle (1920). Another apparently
positive but equally psychodynamic motive persisting with a course of action which is
failing, is that consistency and persistence are often valued as signifiers of desirable
leadership qualities in modern society (Daft 2001).
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2.4.3

Control and Regulation

Many individuals find themselves working in organisations that are obsessed by rules
and compulsions to control and regulate. Such organisations outwardly manifest the
trappings of success, while inwardly they conceal suppressed emotions and tensions
(Kersten 2001). While decision making appears consultative in these organisations
through elaborate sets of meetings and committees, it is more often than not centralised
and hierarchical, resulting in psychodynamic forces and defence mechanisms, such as
low morale, self-protection and a preoccupation with perfection influencing the decision
process.
These “rational” organisations, characterised by an absence of “judgement-free spaces,”
act to contain aggression, explore errors, and stress compliance, conformity and
obedience, where subordination and the identification of one’s ego with the organisation,
results in entrapment and retarded development (Kersten 2001).
This confinement of the individual is often expressed in excessive concern for security,
lack of independence, lack of feelings and an inability to assume responsibility for one’s
actions (Jacobson 1993; Diamond & Adams 1999), linking it with Foucault’s (1979)
idea of the individual’s freedom being compromised by the mere fact that they belong to
an organisation.

Furthermore, where the pursuit of economic goals becomes an organisational aim in
itself, organisational narrative and myth goes beyond being a sense making tool,
providing members instead with an emotional outlet, where fantasy prevails over reality
and where spontaneous activity temporarily replaces regimentation (Gabriel 1991).

Despite this individuals often rationalise methods of bypassing organisational rules.
Slovic (2002) suggests that individuals are capable of believing that they are following
all of an organisation’s rules, while at the same time being aware that they are
disobeying some of them. This unconscious bending or breaking of rules emerges,
according to Furnham & Taylor (2004), when individuals perceive the rules as being
either “unfair”, or leading to “unnecessary” additional work being required. The internal
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rationalisation here is that breaking the rule does not have a significant consequence,
perhaps because they have been broken without censure on a continuous basis.

Additionally, ignoring the rules enables the individual to justify their actions by
constructing and enhancing better results in their own minds, while simultaneously
downplaying the potential outcomes if the required protocols were followed.

This

perception is further copper-fastened by the sustained belief that those who have drawn
up the rules do not work in the decision maker’s area and have not thought through their
value and usefulness (Furnham et al 2004).

2.4.4

Power

Organisations can become “maelstroms of political activity,” according to Miller,
Hickson & Wilson (1996), where power games that are only partially open to view are
played out. This view contrasts with seeing decision making as a functional prerequisite
of an effective organisation. Power can be used to frame the matter for decision in a
way that suits one individual’s requirements, but inactivates those of another by
manipulating, withholding or ignoring relevant information, thus creating a situation
where the means by which decisions are made may be separately rational, while the ends
may not be.

Zaleznik (1970) describes organisations as a political pyramid, where individuals
compete for finite resources, and where “the psychology of scarcity and comparison”
emerges when authority is unevenly distributed in the pyramid. This results in coalitions
of individuals, grouping themselves into unconscious collusions as a defence against
perceived risk. This in turn can lead to some parts of an organisation gaining power or
acknowledgement through their ability to control access to resources (Pfeffer & Salancik
1978). Consequently, in environments of uncertainty, individuals who are in a position
to buffer the organisation from instability can become empowered to make decisions
beyond their own competence (Hinings, Hickson, Pennings & Schnech 1974).
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Organisational conflict can also be sidelined through the removal of topics from the
discussion arena that might complicate the status quo. Again, this can be achieved by
ignoring data or privately indicating prior personal experience of a particular set of
circumstances that contributed to the failure of a similar project. Beck (1992) progresses
this idea suggesting that the ultimate expression of power is to prevent any awareness of
conflict in the first place, by shaping views and beliefs in such a way that one’s own
interests are not recognised by others. This unreflexive practice creates a scenario where
organisational interests are perceived to be shared, thus reducing conflict by the current
state of affairs remaining unquestioned.

2.4.5

Anxiety

Anxiety is very much at the centre of unconscious discourse. Fear, resulting in the
implantation of anxiety and the consequential defence from its effects, is an important
factor in understanding organisational effectiveness. The long term effectiveness or
success of an organisation is often bound up with the techniques it uses to contain the
emergence of anxiety (Menzies Lyth, 1988). This argument is supported by Kets de
Vries (1991), who proposes that when individuals enter the workplace they do not leave
their emotions behind, yet the overriding assumption in organisations is that they run on
the basis of objective data and in a logical manner, where in reality, emotions influence
how people do work and behave in organisations.

According to Obholzer (1994), there are three levels of anxiety that employees may
experience.


Tasks undertaken by the employee can generate anxiety, specifically when taskdoers consider the responsibility that they bear and the consequences of failure.



Anxiety also derives from personal history, encapsulated in experience of
authority figures, of success and failure, of competition and rivalry and of being
valued or undervalued within the decision environment.
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The final level of anxiety is of a more primitive level and is associated with the
psychological separation from the mother figure and the shocking discovery that
we are individuals.

Relationships within an organisation can also be characterised through an acute
awareness of never being “good enough,” even when agreed targets are exceeded. The
lack of positive feedback here results in risk-taking decision making ability being
diminished, and anxiety being unconsciously acted out through defence mechanisms
such as denial or repression (Walsh 1999).

Anxiety also promotes the persistence with a course of action beyond an economically
defensible point. Psychological theorists argue that escalation represents the outcome of
a decision error, where a host of social and psychological pressures for persistence come
into play, that conspire to prevent the decision maker owning up to a mistake (Staw,
1981; Bazerman, 2004).

This is compounded where decision makers operate in

environments where probabilities and expected values can only be estimated, and where
decision criteria cannot be judged by statistical laws. This enables the decision making
process to become a subjective exercise, reflecting the decision maker’s preference for
short term convenience at the expense of longer term opportunity costs (Drummond,
1997; Lopez, 1981).

2.4.6

Shame in the Workplace

Shame also promotes anxiety in situations where organisations discourage pessimism.
Walsh (1999) contends that a blend of attachments at work, coupled with the need for
the individual to meet performance targets, may create work environments that are
shame- laden.

The relationship between shame and decision making ability can be associated with the
tendency towards overconfidence (Lovallo et al 2003), but with the diminished
propensity for risk taking, as outlined in the affect heuristic, by Slovic et al (2002).
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In defining shame as the experience of a diminution of self, in which one’s performance
is exposed as unacceptable, fragile or contemptible, psychodynamic factors come into
play resulting in an inability to generate a realistic sense of self-esteem, which ultimately
burdens the individual with unrealistic aspirations for perfection to overcompensate for
their vulnerability (Walsh, 1999; Czander, 1993).

2.4.7

Fear of Success

Fear of success is also associated with the development of anxiety, or more
appropriately with unconscious guilt in the individual.

Although it seems quite

acceptable to assume that fear of failure can promote irrational behaviour on the part of
managers, fear of success can also elicit irrational behaviour (Jarrett & Kellner 1996).
Accordingly, Freud (1915) argues that ordinary people become uncomfortable when a
deeply rooted and longed for desire comes to fulfilment, particularly where there is a
perception, consciously or unconsciously, that success has been achieved by the
displacement of someone else.

An example of this behavioural trait is recognisable where yield management decision
makers become uncomfortable with the practice of ‘overbooking’ (Ingold et al, 2000).
Overbooking involves overselling rooms to ensure maximisation of occupancy.
However, a consequence of this target being achieved may be the displacement of
legitimately booked guests from the hotel’s stock of rooms, leading to feelings of
unconscious guilt in the decision maker.

2.4.8

Attitudes to Technology

In situations where organisations operate within a façade of rationality which
overemphasises goal orientation, while simultaneously viewing emotion as antithetical
to performance, technology often makes it easy to fake, or manipulate authenticity
(Smith & Sharma 2002; Lukensmeyer & Parlett 1997). Orlikowski (1992) agrees,
suggesting that human behaviour is both enabled and constrained by the rules and
resources that result from previous action. Her structurational model suggests that a
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duality of technology can exist where designers physically construct a technology to
satisfy management priorities and expectations, in which users socially construct the
technology by deciding which features to accept, ignore, use or adapt to suit their way of
working.

This issue is also addressed by Walls (2002), who argues that the premise behind
rationality in organisations is based on the notion that reasonable people will respond to
their environment by assessing the known facts, estimating possible outcomes and
weighting those outcomes against their respective costs. However, though managers
have become more comfortable with logical solutions, due to the growing presence of
technology, they simply expect too much of the same from the people around them
In such scenarios, employees often become part of a co-ordinated complexity of forces
that structure the place of technology, in which the individual belongs to the technology,
rather than being its master. The suggestion here is that this “belonging” may in reality
become dehumanising where the technology is pre-programmable, making room for
irrational, capricious and unpredictable behaviour (Malevich, 1968).

Virilio (1998)

agrees, suggesting that terms like “interactive” and “user friendly” are but forms of
subtle enslavement of the human being that can lead to unconscious revolt within the
individual, corresponding with Foucault’s (1979) theories on organisational enslavement
of the individual.

2.4.9

Centralisation

Although technology has enabled centralised decision making, Eisenhardt (1997)
suggests that centralisation of decision making power in an organisation invariably leads
to the emergence of political behaviour or group-think in the support team. Complex
decisions are increasingly taken by groups, resulting in a corresponding tendency to
believe that the group will make a better decision. However, tensions in these groups
has become an everyday experience, by competing forces separating or pulling the
organization’s actors together as required by particular sets of circumstances.
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In proposing that these forces mitigate against effective decision making, Chrispin
(1996) concludes that temporal delays in information exchange and solution choice and
breaches of confidentiality through a dissemination of personal authority, lead to groups
becoming static and “decision inert,” and this rationalisation of failure, or indecision,
becomes acceptable.

2.5

Linking Conscious to Unconscious Thinking

Conflict often emerges between the most formal and highly abstract concepts and the
most immediate and intense emotions. This is richly illustrated by post-modern theorists
who envisage a contemporary era in which we are consistently driven to express instant
and unevaluated feelings in an “automatic” manner via “pop questionnaires” that are
designed to trigger emotion. This in turn leads to our work and social values being
understood in terms of satisfaction, pleasure, like or dislike, excitement or boredom, and
love or hate (Mansfield, 2000).

The identification of the self is related to both conscious and unconscious decision
making, and plays a critical, though often understated, role in both processes. Indeed the
word “I” suggests uniqueness that conflicts with the idea of belonging to an
organisation, associating it instead with Foucault’s Panoptican Theory (1979).
Foucault’s anti-subjective approach, views individuality as how we have been made to
think of ourselves as individual subjects by those who have invented moral categories
that assert doctrines of guilt and responsibility, in order to control and manage the
individual.

Recent research in neuroscience, (Pinker, 2003; Chrzanowska, 2002), require concepts
of the unconscious to be embraced, albeit in a more contemporary model.

These

neuroscientists argue that unconscious stimuli influence feelings and subsequently
impact on conscious decision making. This can be identified where the brain becomes
involved in the preconscious filtering, processing and categorising of stimuli of which
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we have no awareness. Because conscious awareness is a limited channel, the brain
likes to automate behaviour wherever possible, resulting in phenomena like the “time
gap experience” (driving a familiar route without being aware of it until you reach your
destination).

2.5.1

Two Systems of Reasoning

In the process of decision making, tensions can exist between immediate intuition and a
more measured rational belief, exemplified by a comparison between the
representativeness and availability heuristics on the one hand, and a coherent justifiable
set of data or beliefs on the other. Within this tension individuals can be torn between
decisions that they resonate towards (associative thinking), and decisions that they find
analytically more accurate (rule based). Sloman (2002) argues that parallel processing
of information through diffuse associative links (intuitive bias, regulated by associonistic
or unconscious forces, where information is rejected or ignored) conflicts with deliberate
and sequential manipulation of internal representations through a rule governed system
(conscious computer logic), making decisions more difficult for the decision maker.
The practice of selecting the “familiar” or deciding to reject an option can be either
deliberate or unconscious, exhibited through willingness, or an unwillingness to take a
risk. Rule based systems (if-then scenarios) create a large set of propositions, in which
rule based language is encoded into a signifier and signified model of operation that
gives decision making a logical structure. Here, the “correct” application of the rules is
determined by the relations among symbols, rather than through any meaning that we
attribute to the symbols (Sloman, 2002).
These approaches correspond with those inherent in the theories of bureaucratic
dysfunction as proposed by Merton (1968), and Selznic (1966), wherein the adherence
or belief in organisational goals is simultaneously aligned with the achievement of
individual agendas. This is not to say that these practices, but rather that rule adversity
corresponds with institutional norms replacing organisational goals.
Evans & Over (1996) agree, suggesting that these two systems of thought are driven by
different forms of rationality. Associative behaviour is concerned with the achievement
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of one’s goals, whereas rule based behaviour connects with ensuring that one’s
conclusions are sanctioned by a normative theory. Sloman (2002) argues that when a
response is produced by an associative system, we are conscious only of the result of the
computation and not the process (indicating the presence of unconscious or automatic
behaviour), whereas we are aware of both the result and the process in a rule based
computation. In situations where computer data gives an alternative and more justifiable
solution to an initial intuitive feeling, individuals may chose to reject the computer
solution because they are fed up with being dictated to (rule aversion behaviour)
(Sloman, 2002).
So which of these forces is the stronger? In contrasting the power of decisions that are
intuitively compelling against those that are probabilistically correct, Tversky and
Kahnemen’s Conjunction Fallacy Theory argues strongly that judgment related to
Similarity and Representitiveness is stronger than logical argument. This preference
links strongly with compulsive behaviour argument proposed by Arnaud (2002), and the
Inclusion Fallacy Theory proposed by Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez & Shafir (1990),
which argues that compelling logical arguments often fail to erase an even more
compelling intuition.

2.6

Behavioural Indicators of Unconscious Behaviour

Employees in organisations experience work group tensions that create mutual
interdependencies. Bion (1961) discusses these tensions illustrating them as the wish to
face reality, or the wish to avoid it when it is perceived as painful or causing
psychological conflict, between group members. Bion suggests that the complexity of
feelings in the individual as part of a group springs from three basic assumptions.


Groups dominated by the basic assumption of dependency, see the primary task
as the satisfaction of the needs and wishes of its members and the leader
becomes the personification of this purpose.

This pathological form of

dependency inhibits growth and development and is often characterised by a
heavy resistance to change and preoccupation with status and hierarchy as basis
for decision making.
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The second basic assumption (fight or flight), argues that the group is prepared to
do neither or to do each indifferently. Evidence of this can be found where
groups spend inordinate amounts of time protesting rather than planning
alternatives.

Decision behaviour under this assumption is characterised by

aggression, suspicion and a preoccupation with rules and procedures.


The third basic assumption (pairing), suggests that the group believes that future
events will solve existing problems, the future thus becoming a defence against
the difficulties of the present. Decision behaviour under this assumption is
characterised by the preoccupation with alternative futures.

When a group is under the influence of basic assumptions, trivial matters can take on
disproportionate importance. Questioning attitudes are viewed with suspicion as they
challenge familiarity and predictability. This can result in effective decision making
being impeded as the capability for rational thought is sacrificed in the web of
dependency.

2.7

Conclusion

This literature review explored the factors that are associated with the decision making
process.

Section one critically analysed the decision models associated with yield

management decision making.

The decision models explored included those that

pertained to the rational normative model of decision making, in particular the
management science model, and models of decision making that require varying degrees
of human intervention.

The subsequent section identified conscious and unconscious heuristics and biases that
might impact on the decision making process. These included the traditional heuristics
of representativeness, availability and anchoring and adjustment, and more recently
researched heuristics that relate to the effect of human feeling on the decision process,
and the psychological impact of positive or negative valences.
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The final section explored psychodynamic (unconscious) factors that potentially
influence the decision maker in exercising decisions, and attempted to relate conscious
to unconscious decision making. These factors include anxiety, overconfidence and the
need for applause or recognition.

The author feels that the notable absence of research into unconscious influences on
yield management decision making in hospitality management, indicates a potential gap
in the literature.

The literature review indicates that the management science model of decision making
will offer the optimum solution to the problems associated with forecasting demand and
optimising rates, under conditions of uncertainty. However, subsidiary influencing
factors on the decision making process, emanating from both biases and unconscious
forces may conspire to undermine the achievement of this optimum solution.

The following chapter will address the methodologies to be employed in accessing the
requisite data to answer the research question.
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Chapter 3
Research Methodology
3.0

Introduction

Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2003) define research as something that people undertake
to obtain information in a systematic way, in order to increase their knowledge of a
particular topic. Researchers may use quantitative, qualitative, or a mixed methods
approach, to elicit data that will assist in answering their research question. Quantitative
research is associated with a positivistic orientation that adopts an etic or outsider’s
perspective, which incorporates measurement tools such as hypothesis testing, as an
integral part of the research process.

Qualitative research emphasises an emic or

insider’s perspective, and is based on a phenomenological approach, which focuses on
understanding the meaning that events have for the subjects being studied, through
exploring the richness and subtlety of their experiences (Patton, 1991; Maykut &
Morehouse, 2001; Phillmore & Goodson, 2004; Denzin & Lincoln, 1998).

However, what counts as evidence, and how it is collected, often constitutes a difficulty
for the researcher.

Social theory, according to Burrell & Morgan (2000), can be

conceived in terms of key paradigms, based on different assumptions about the nature of
society, within which, the researcher’s frame of reference plays a critical role.
Therefore, in order to understand alternative points of view, and to gain an appropriate
and accurate insight into answering the research question in an unobstructed manner, it
is critical for the researcher to understand the assumptions on which their own
perspective is based.

In order to extract and evaluate information, best suited to answering the research
question and the supporting objectives, the following sections will attempt to critically
analyse and address the approach taken by this researcher, beginning with an analysis of
ontology, and epistemology. The fundamental research paradigms (positivism and nonpositivism), the research design, and the selection of data gathering and analysis tools
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will also be evaluated. Particular attention will be paid to the difficulty of accessing the
unconscious framework of both the interviewer and the interviewee, in attempting to
hear the psychodynamic discourse. Finally, issues relating to interpretation and
practitioner bias, the limitations associated with the methodologies, and ethical factors
impacting on the research process will be considered.

3.1

Research Question

The research project will seek to answer the following question:


3.1.1

How are decisions made in hospitality yield management environments?

Supporting Objectives

The following supporting objectives will be addressed through primary research, and
will facilitate answering the research question.


To ascertain if there is a predisposition towards a particular decision model



To investigate if bias or heuristical factors influence the decision making process



To explore the role of psychodynamic forces in the decision making process



To establish if a relationships exist between conscious and unconscious decision
making

3.2

Ontology and Epistemology

Research is a messy, non linear process, where researchers, through being innovative
and creative, seek out different pieces of the “puzzle”, until they reach a point when they
are able to present as complete a picture as possible.

Within this process, the

researcher’s actions are underpinned by a set of basic beliefs that define research
approaches.

Ontology and epistemology issues tend to emerge together and

subsequently influence methodology chosen, consequently defining what falls inside or
outside legitimate inquiry (Guba & Lincoln, 1998). Ontology examines the researcher’s
assumptions about the nature of reality (how knowledge exists), whereas epistemology
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examines their assumptions about the most appropriate ways of gathering the requisite
information to address the research question (Crotty 1998).

Ontological assumptions therefore concern the very essence of the phenomena under
investigation, where “reality” is viewed as being either external to the researcher or the
product of the researcher’s own mind.

Maykut & Morehouse (2001) propose that

ontological assumptions associate themselves with questions such as “what is real, and
what counts as evidence? Based on this proposition, non-positivistic researchers view
the external world as a conduit to explore the research question, whereas positivistic
researchers believe the external world is made up of tangible and immutable structures
that exist as empirical entities (Burrell & Morgan, 2000).

Epistemology frames the research approach in terms of how one goes about obtaining
knowledge. It is fundamentally concerned with providing a philosophical grounding for
what kinds of knowledge are possible and how the researcher can ensure that they are
both adequate and legitimate (Crotty 1998). This suggests a need to identify, explain
and justify the epistemological stance that is taken. Burrell & Morgan (2000) argue that
critical to this approach is whether the researcher considers the available knowledge as
capable of being transmitted in a tangible form (acquired knowledge) or through a more
personalised, subjective conduit (experienced knowledge).

Epistemology, therefore,

tries to unfold the relationship between the knower and the known, while simultaneously
emphasising the role that values play in generating “understanding” (Maykut &
Morehouse, 2001).

Values play a key role in the stance taken by the researcher. Positivistic researchers
believe that these values can be suspended in the development of understanding, as the
required research outcomes, namely, generalisation and verification of propositions, are
the key drivers. Non-positivists, on the other hand, believe that values mediate and
shape what is understood, arguing that only tentative explanations are possible through
the discovery or uncovering of propositions (Phillimore & Goodson, 2004).
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The

epistemology of the non-positivistic researcher rejects the standpoint of the detached
observer, arguing that one can only understand, by occupying the frame of reference of
the participant. Positivistic researchers, on the other hand, search for regularities and
causal relationships between constituent elements through verifying or falsifying
hypotheses.
The epistemological relationship between the researcher and the research environment is
also critical to the process of knowledge acquisition. Non-positivistic researchers see
the information source, as being autonomous and free willed, whereas positivistic
theorists hold a deterministic view that sees the individual and their activities as being
completely determined by their environment, (Burrell & Morgan, 2000; Maykut &
Morehouse, 2001).

3.3

The Inquiry Paradigms – Positivism and Non-Positivism

The failure to think through the relationship between data and theory can seriously affect
the quality of the research.

Paradigms therefore become important in structuring

research and providing flexible guidelines that connect theory and method to determine
the structure and shape of any inquiry (Goodson & Phillimore, 2004; Easterby-Smith,
Thorpe & Lowe, 2002).

An initial difficulty for the researcher comes from the fact that terminology is far from
consistent in the research literature and social science texts, where one frequently finds
the same term used in a number of different, sometimes contradictory ways (Crotty,
1998). Although this ambiguity exists across research methodology texts, two general
overarching philosophical perspectives shape our understanding of research.

These

paradigms are positivism and non-positivism (also labelled as phenomenology, social
constructivism, constructionism, subjectivity etc.). It is important to state that these
approaches are not mutually exclusive, indeed, some researchers see great benefit in
combining elements from both traditions to produce a hybrid theory (Easterby-Smith et
al, 2002). In an effort to allay any subsequent confusion, this research will address
inquiry paradigms under two main headings, namely, positivism and non-positivism.
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3.3.1

Positivism

Positivism (coined by August Comte in 1830) is associated with knowledge obtained
from observable and measurable facts, resulting from detached objective enquiry, rather
than being inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition (Kincheloe,
1991; Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). The positivistic relationship between knowledge and
observable fact contains an ontological assumption that reality is external and objective,
with an epistemological assumption that knowledge is only significant if it is based on
observations of this external reality. This associates it with a quantitative approach to
inquiry, wherein researchers can be substituted, one for another, without having any
impact on the findings (Phillimore & Goodson, 2004).
Total commitment to this research strategy requires independence of the observer from
what is being observed.

Consequential elements of this approach encompass the

negation of the researcher’s feelings, the identification of causal explanations for human
behaviour, verification or falsification of hypotheses, fragmenting research data into
measurable chunks and utilising statistical probability to facilitate the drawing of
generalisable inferences (Cresswell, 2003).

Interestingly, positivistic research

characteristics still dominate research studies in the hospitality industry, where a
pronounced absence of reflexivity, leads, in turn, to the researcher’s voice as an expert,
dominating the texts, making inaudible, the “authentic voices of those researched”
(Phillimore & Goodson, 2004).

3.3.2

Non-Positivism

Non-positivistic strategies aim to understand the meanings events have for those being
studied, implying that the researcher sees the individual and his or her world, as coconstituted. This approach proposes that reality is not objective and external, but is
socially constructed by being given “meaning” through the language and behaviour of
ordinary people (Patton, 1991; Valle & King, 1998). From a research viewpoint, this
differs from positivism in that, rather than focussing on factual data and its frequency of
occurrence, peoples’ thoughts, feelings, and the way in which they communicate with
each other, are the key research drivers.
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Researchers influenced by the non-positivist inquiry paradigm favour research being
undertaken in a collaborative fashion, wherein the researcher and the researched are seen
as partners in the production of knowledge.

The interaction between both parties

becomes therefore, a key site for both research and understanding. This approach also
cautions against specific attempts to identify generalised theories, as practiced by
positivistic researchers may result in frameworks being forced inappropriately on others
(Schwandt, 1998).

Local knowledge is implicit in this collaborative approach to

knowledge generation. If the researcher believes that this knowledge is contextually
bound, then, for the research to have a theoretical value, it should focus on these local
and unique practices, and negate the temptation to generalise across cultures
(Boyacigiller & Alder, 1991; Cook & Brown, 1999).

Furthermore, how we understand the nature of reality, according to Phillimore &
Goodson (2004), directly affects the way we see ourselves in relation to knowledge.
Knowledge that can be separated allows the researcher to take an objective view,
whereas if knowledge has to be constructed, separation of the researcher from the
research subject is not appropriate. Maykut & Morehouse (2001) differentiate between
the assumptions of the positivistic and the non- positivistic researcher through
condensing the fundamental differences between the two approaches into two questions.
Positivists ask “what is happening”, whereas the non-positivists ask “why is it
happening”. This researcher wonders, however, if an inherent ontological assumption in
each of these approaches is that it is happening, thus engaging a perception on the part
of the researcher that the phenomenon is real, or is rationalised as real in the mind of the
respondent

Recent research has suggested that these paradigms are not mutually exclusive.
Interestingly, Hammersely (1993), in calling for methodologically aware eclecticism,
proposes that an either/or approach to paradigm selection, is less than helpful. He
argues that qualitative and quantitative approaches provide a crude characterisation that
is often misleading, and as such, should not be viewed as alternatives. The author
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suggests that a full range of options should be part of the researcher’s armoury, in terms
of both methods and philosophical assumptions. For example, where unstructured data
is collected and subsequently coded, it can be later subjected to quantitative analysis.
This approach facilitates the exploratory approach taken by non-positivists to be
integrated with the verification/falsification approach taken by positivists.

3.4

Further Distillation of the Inquiry Paradigm

Adapting a particular inquiry stance (positivistic or non positivistic) suggests that the
researcher must carefully match the methods of collecting and analysing data with the
research question.

To further refine the perspective of the researcher, Burrell and

Morgan (2000) subdivide the two overarching approaches into four distinct paradigms,
which, theoretically, according to the authors, are mutually exclusive, and have specific
interactions with the organisational world.

Despite this initial pronouncement, the

authors later outline how elements of one paradigm have infiltrated each other, leading
to a hybrid usage of inquiry paradigms. The four paradigms are labelled as:


Functionalist



Interpretivist,



Radical Humanist



Radical Structuralist.

Each of these paradigms divides along research perspectives such as ontology,
epistemology, human nature and methodology, in addition to their relationship with the
order/conflict debate. According to the authors, positivistic and non-positivistic stances
are each associated with polar positions relating to ontology, epistemology, human
nature and methodology.
The ontological position of the non-positivist is nominalist, which holds to a belief that
there is no real structure to the phenomenon of interest beyond that which exists in the
mind of the individual. Conversely, the ontological perspective of the positivist is
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realist.

For the realist, the phenomenon of interest exists as an empirical entity

independently of the individual’s appreciation of it (Burrell & Morgan, 2000).
The epistemological position of the non-positivist suggests that knowledge can only be
accessed through an alliance with the narrative of the participant, rejecting the idea of
generating objective knowledge to answer the research question. The epistemological
position of the positivist suggests the opposite, namely, that the required knowledge can
be achieved using scientific techniques that predict outcomes or validate hypotheses
through establishing causal relationships (Burrell & Morgan, 2000).
Within the human nature debate, non-positivists hold to a voluntaristic view, which
argues that the individual is completely autonomous and free-willed. Positivists, on the
other hand, hold a determinist view, which proposes that individual behaviour is
completely determined by their environment (Burrell & Morgan, 2000).

The methodological debate is also characterised by differing approaches on the part of
non-positivists, who adopt an ideographic approach, and positivists, who favour a
nomothethic approach. Non-positivists believe that in order to understand and access
the required knowledge, the subject must be allowed to reveal their feelings in an
undirected manner. Positivists are more comfortable with systematic approaches such as
surveys, questionnaires and objective research tools (Burrell & Morgan, 2000).

It is important to note that while these approaches appear to offer either/or scenarios,
intermediate positions are possible, (Cresswell, 2003), and imperative for the researcher
(Hammersely, 1993).

A diagrammatic description of the relative positions of the paradigmatic approaches is
shown below.
Subjective

Sociology of Radical Change
Radical Humanist
Radical Structuralist
Interpretive
Functionalist

Objective

Sociology of Regulation
Source: Burrell & Morgan (2000), Sociological Paradigms & Organisational Analysis (p.22).
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3.4.1

The Functionalist Paradigm

This paradigm adopts an objective approach within the sociology of regulation. It is
realist, positivist, determinist and nomothethic and seeks to provide rational explanations
for social affairs. It is problem oriented in approach (needing to provide practical
solutions to practical problems), and is rooted in sociological positivism, wherein
relationships can be identified, studied and measured. Sociological theories associated
with this paradigm include interactionalism and social action theory, integrative theory,
social systems theory, and objectivism, while organisational theories associated with the
paradigm include the action frame of reference, theories of bureaucratic dysfunction,
social system theory, pluralism and objectivism (Burrell & Morgan, 2000).

3.4.2

The Interpretive Paradigm

Researchers within this paradigm see knowledge as an emergent social process, created
by the individual. The approach assumes that understanding and explanation comes
through human consciousness that exists within the framework of the individual. It
takes a sociology of regulation approach, and is nominalist, anti-positivistic, voluntarist
and ideographic. While the ontological status of the organisation is seen as extremely
questionable, researchers support a social world of subjectivity through the use of a
common language and shared meanings. Sociological theories associated with this
paradigm include solipsism, phenomenology, hermeneutics and phenomenological
sociology, while organisational theories associated with the paradigm include
ethnomethodology, and phenomenological symbolic interactionalism (Burrell &
Morgan, 2000).

3.4.3

The Radical Humanist Paradigm

This inquiry paradigm takes a nomanilist, antipositivist, voluntarist and ideographic
stance within the sociology of radical change. It is concerned with overthrowing the
order of existing social arrangements and providing a critique of the status quo. Its
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central emphasis upon human consciousness is in keeping with the subjectivist approach
to social science associated with the interpretivist paradigm.

Sociological theories

associated with this paradigm include solipsism, French existentialism, critical theory
and anarchistic individualism, while the organisational theory associated with the
paradigm is anti-organisational theory (Burrell & Morgan, 2000).

3.4.4

The Radical Structuralist Paradigm

This paradigm associates with the sociology of radical change, albeit from an objectivist
standpoint. It is realist, positivistic, determinist and nomothethic. Sociological theories
associated with this paradigm include contemporary Mediterranean Marxism, conflict
theory and Russian social theory, while the organisational theory associated with the
paradigm is radical organisational theory (Burrell & Morgan, 2000).

These four paradigms offer insights into matching the research question with the
approach taken to answer the question.

3.5

Factors Influencing the Choice of Paradigm

Additional factors require consideration before final selection of a suitable paradigm.
The adoption of an inductive or deductive approach to research, the stage in the research
process at which one develops theory and whether the emphasis is on testing or
developing of a theory, all impact on the choice of research paradigm (Carson, Gilmore,
Perry and Gronhaug, 2002). However, as suggested earlier, allocating strategies to one
tradition (deductive) or the other (inductive) is often unduly simplistic, as these
strategies may not be mutually exclusive. What matters is not the label that is attached
to a particular strategy, but whether it is appropriate to the research question and
objectives (Saunders et al, 2003).
Deduction entails the development of a theoretical structure, with causal hypotheses,
prior to it’s testing through empirical research methods. In adopting a totally deductive
stance, the researcher uses existing theory that has helped to shape the research question,
to determine the approach to data gathering and data analysis (Yin, 1994). This strategy
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demonstrates a preference for starting with and utilising theory, rather than allowing it to
develop.

Bryman (1988) argues against this approach, suggesting that “prior

specification of a theory raises the possibility of introducing premature closure on the
issues being investigated.

Nevertheless, when a deductive approach is taken at

commencement, it helps in providing an initial framework, for linking the research into
the existing body of knowledge (Saunders et al, 2003).

Induction, on the other hand, allows data to guide research and theory building, through
using observations of the empirical world to construct explanations and theories.
Adopting a totally inductive approach proposes that the researcher starts by collecting
data and then explores this data to see which themes and issues to concentrate on (Yin,
1994). This can be a difficult strategy for the inexperienced researcher, as themes
emerging from the data must be analysed on an ongoing basis.

Carson et al (2002) suggest that while pure forms of induction may protect the
researcher from existing theory, exclusively deductive approaches prevent the
development of new theories. The authors suggest a balance of inductive and deductive
approaches for non-positivistic research, using a deductive framework derived from the
literature review and evaluating this empirically and inductively to allow new insights to
emerge.

The stage at which the research is developed is also significant. Although, generally
speaking, the researcher usually brings some prior theory to the research, positivistic
researchers consult prior theories in the literature to arrive at hypotheses or research
questions at the early stages of the research, and are unlikely to add prior theory during
the later stages. Non-positivist theorists, on the other hand, use theory at various stages
in the research (Carson et al, 2002; Fetterman, 1989). Miles (1979) suggests that prior
theory can help in defining the problem, where following a pure non-positivistic
approach, with the setting very loose parameters at the start of the research, imposes a
self binding framework.
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The setting of loose parameters often results in the accumulation of incoherent, bulky or
irrelevant observations that may be impossible to interpret. The author feels, however,
that while Miles (1979) criticism may indeed be appropriate for conscious discourse, the
accumulation of apparently incoherent, bulky or irrelevant observations may be exactly
what is needed for unconscious discourse.

Carson et al (2002) argue that anti-

positivistic approaches allow for a compromise or balanced approach of developing
preliminary theories early on, bracketing them, and revisiting them at a later stage.

Whether the researcher should follow a theory building or theory testing approach also
influences the choice of paradigm. Theory building falls under the influence of nonpositivistic research, where the purpose of the study is to seek out meaning and
understanding of phenomena. Theory testing is associated with a positivistic approach,
where proof of, or negation of the theory is required (Carson et al, 2002).

3.6

Methodological Approaches Associated with the Philosophical Paradigms

Having selected an inquiry paradigm, appropriate to answering the research question, the
next step in the process is selecting an appropriate methodological approach. Carson et
al, 2002) suggest that under the umbrella of anti-positivistic research, theorists use a
variety

of

interpretive

approaches

such

as

critical

theory,

constructivism,

phenomenology, hermeneutics, grounded theory, and case studies, to understand the
deeply set beliefs, emotions, and meanings that are embedded in the activities and
behaviour of individuals in different contexts.

3.6.1

Critical Theory

An assumption of critical theory is that discoverable social realities exist, from which,
the researcher liberates the participant from their mental chains, thus allowing them to
transcend obstacles to their development (Fay, 1987). This methodology aligns with
Burrell & Morgan’s (2000) radical humanist paradigm, through allowing the researcher
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and the participant to be interactively linked, wherein the belief system of the researcher
influences the inquiry. Apart from being associated with emancipation, critical theory is
often associated with evaluation, indicating a leaning towards a positivistic position
(Carson et al, 2002).

3.6.2

Constructivism

Constructivism differs from critical theory in that it is based on the acceptance of
multiple discoverable realities, which are socially and empirically based intangible
mental constructions. In this process, created knowledge depends on the interaction
between the researcher and the respondent. The aim of constructivism is to achieve an
understanding of the similarities and differences of constructions between the researcher
and the respondent, wherein the researcher’s experience must be accounted for (Carson
et al, 2002).

3.6.3

Phenomenology

Phenomenology, on the other hand, is a philosophy without pre-suppositions, which
assumes that even though we cannot be certain about the independent existence of
objects in the external world, we can be certain about how they appear in consciousness
(Brown, 1995).

Phenomenologists, according to Bogdan & Taylor (1975), are

committed to understanding social phenomena from the perspective of the actor. This
approach, in effect sets out to describe the lived experience of individuals concerning a
phenomenon, through exploring the structures of consciousness in human experiences,
wherein, the researcher seeks out the central underlying meaning of the experience, or its
“essence”. This is achieved through emphasising the intentionality of consciousness
(Cresswell, 1998; Polkinghorne, 1989).

This intentionality, where consciousness is

perceived as always being directed towards the reality of an object, may have significant
relevance in accessing the unconscious, through unconscious behaviour exhibiting itself
in the rationalised explanations of the individual.
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Burrell et al (2000) contend that within the phenomenological approach, there are a
number of distinctive and interrelated approaches, distinguished by their degree of
subjectivity,

including,

solipsism,

transcendental

phenomenology,

existential

phenomenology, ethno-methodology and phenomenological symbolic interactionalism.

3.6.3.1.

Solipsism

Solipsism, in denying that the world has an independent reality, suggests that reality is
completely the product of individual perception. The world becomes no more than the
subject perceives it to be, wherein knowledge is totally limited to what people
experience, without perceptual reference points.
tangible beyond oneself and one’s ideas.

In other words, there is nothing

This perception totally dismisses the

significance of the organisation, suggesting that the individual is totally autonomous and
independent, with regard to decision making (Burrell & Morgan, 2000).

3.6.3.2

Transcendental Phenomenology

In focussing on the intentional object of consciousness, where reality, or pure meaning
for the participant, replaces objectivity, transcendental phenomenology is, according to
Cresswell (1998), equivalent to psychological phenomenology.

Here, all the

assumptions of everyday life are brushed aside in the pursuit of pure subjectivity, the
intentionality of which is the source of all meaning (Burrell & Morgan, 2000). This
inquiry perspective is quite similar to a narrative approach as proposed by Czarniawska
(2004), wherein consciousness focuses on that which constitutes it, making it
comparable with the signifier theories of Lacan (1956), in which the unconscious is
constructed like a language. Although this pure form of interpretivism may steer too
close to solipsism for answering fully the research question, through viewing the
experience of the participant as being undiluted, it may open the door to unconscious
discourse. This “access” may be enabled through interviewers experiencing the defence
mechanisms of interviewees who utilise reference points to illustrate their experience.
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For example, if, when individuals are making a decision, their true intention is other than
utility maximisation, the unconscious may play a part, wherein reality is not consciously
constructed, but is instead revealed to it by an unconscious act of intentionality.

3.6.3.3

Existential Phenomenology

Existential phenomenology views the world from a sociological perspective, focussing
more on everyday activities than transcendental phenomenology. Meaning is dependent
on reflexivity, and is attached to actions retrospectively, wherein only the already
experienced is meaningful. The approach has a temporal dimension, through containing
elements of the past and the anticipated future (Burrell and Morgan, 2000).

By

focussing on the past, individuals are able to attribute meaning to the present. This
approach looks at understanding the social world from the point of view of those living
within it, using constructs and explanations which are intelligible in terms of the
common sense interpretation of everyday life.

However, this again presents a difficulty, in that it does not completely address the
research question, because of an inability to deal with any reality outside of the
individual’s consciousness and in particular where the phenomenon of interest, is not
common-sensical. Nevertheless, one man’s reality may differ from another’s, and the
unconscious behaviour of an individual may indeed be inextricably linked to experience
of past events.

In an effort to unearth more fully the essence of the individual experience, sociologists,
within the interpretive paradigm, have endeavoured to illustrate that the hard, concrete,
tangible, and real aspects of organisational life are dependent on the subjective
constructions of the individual.

This has encouraged them to focus on

ethnomethodology and phenomenological symbolic interactionalism in an effort to fully
access the experience of the individual with regard to a particular phenomenon.
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3.6.3.4 Ethnomethodology

Ethnomethodology is grounded in the detailed study of the world of everyday life,
concerning itself in the process with how individuals go about the task of seeing,
describing and explaining the order of the world in which they live. It also looks at how
individuals order, and make sense of their everyday activities, and most importantly,
make these activities accountable to themselves and to others, in the sense of being
observable and reportable (Garfinkel, 1967).

Bittner (1965) argues that within this environment, the individual is not a disinterested
bystander, but rather is one who uses the rational organisation as a gambit of
compliance. This is achieved through the construction of rules as portraying commonsense meanings, in the mind of the individual. Here, rules are invoked by merely using
them, making the rationality of the organisation tangential to the controlling needs of the
individual. This implies that the organisational world is constructed by its members
under a façade of compliance. Bittner’s research is important in demonstrating the role
of “accountable” practices in the social construction of reality, wherein the social world,
in becoming the direct product of human unconsciousness, affords the researcher a
glimpse into how unconscious behaviour informs conscious decision making.

Indexicality and reflexivity play a role, where individuals seek to make their activities
“rationally accountable”. Indexicality relates to shared ideas that are not explicitly
stated. Here, the rationalising of an activity comes through use of language (linguistic
ethnomethodology), where conversations convey much more than is actually said
(Silveman, 1972). Zimmerman & Wieder (1970) argue that the social world is created
through the accounting practices of individuals, as they engage in the routine activities
of everyday life, through movement within the rules being “possible.” These examples
of ontological oscillation reinforce an approach already identified by this researcher as
being appropriate to answering the research question.
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Situational ethnomethodologists seek to understand how people negotiate the social
contexts in which they find themselves and may consciously question the taken for
granted elements of everyday situations in order to reveal the underlying processes at
work. However, in providing explanations for how the individual appears to order his
world through the use of various accounting practices, ethnomethodology may steer into
the realms of positivism, through its seeking out knowledge from the perspective of
what the researcher feels is common sense?

3.6.3.5

Phenomenological Symbolic Interactionalism

This approach, in differing from ethnomethodology by the degree of attention it gives to
interaction, is typified by its emphasis on the emergent properties of interaction through
which individuals create their social world, rather than merely reacting to it. In addition
to this, meaning is attributed to the environment, rather than being derived from and
imposed upon the individual.

While ethnomethodologists explore how individuals

account for and make sense of their world (rationalising the irrational),
phenomenological social interactionalists explore how individuals employ a number of
practices, for example negotiation, to create and sustain different definitions of their
world (Burrell and Morgan, 2000).

Cresswell (1998) summarises the steps involved in using phenomenological research
tools as follows:


The researcher brackets his or her own preconceived ideas about the
phenomenon in order to understand it through the voices of the informants



The researcher writes the research questions and asks individuals to describe
their everyday lived experiences



The researcher collects data from individuals who have experienced the
phenomenon, through interviews and self reflection.
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3.6.4

Hermeneutics

Hermeneutic approaches suggest that objective knowledge can be obtained by reliving
experience through the conduit of the subject, wherein language, in reflecting the inner
life of those who use it, becomes the main avenue for gaining an understanding of their
world. Burrell & Morgan (2000) argue that the social whole cannot be understood
independently of its parts, suggesting that words in a sentence must be understood in
terms of their total context rather than as fragmented meanings.

Therefore, while

phenomenology is primarily oriented towards the immediate phenomena of human
experience, such as thinking and feeling, hermeneutics is more context directed
(Oldman, 1985). The author contends that in interpreting human action, hermeneutics
often tries to go beyond the observable in order to try to read between the lines, thus
categorising it as trans-phenomenal.

3.6.5

Grounded Theory

Grounded theory is both a methodology and a tool used in data analysis. Glaser &
Strauss (1967) see the task of the researcher as developing theory through examining the
same event or process in different settings or situations. Glaser (1992) argues that
researchers should start with no presuppositions, and should allow ideas to emerge from
the data, whereas Strauss & Corbin (1998) recommend familiarisation with prior
research and the use of structured and mechanistic processes to make sense of the data.
This difference in emphasis has implications for the researcher in explaining their
adherence to one or the other of these approaches.
The Straussian view of grounded theory assumes that pre conceptions are inevitable, due
in the main to the interest of the researcher in the topic, and that this results in the
researcher familiarising themselves with previous work conducted in the general field of
research, before starting to generate their own theories. This approach strays into the
positivistic environment, in that it suggests the development of a prior heuristic.
Nevertheless, an advantage of this approach is that there is initial clarity about what is to
be investigated, leading to fast and efficient collection of information, allowing for
replication of the study by other researchers.
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The disadvantage of this approach is that it may only confirm what is already known and
may offer little in the form of explanation if the results are inconclusive or negative.
The grounded approach, therefore, while acceptable at providing both explanations and
new insights, can be regarded as suspect due to its lack of clarity and its need for
standardisation of methods (Mason, 2002).

3.6.6

Case Studies

Case studies also fall under the umbrella of non-positivistic research. Collis & Hussey
(2003) describe case studies as extensive examinations of a single instance of a
phenomenon of interest. However, while these studies are particularly suited to nonpositivistic research, they may need to be carried out over a long period (Carson et al,
2002). Rather than confirming or disconfirming prior theory, case studies can also focus
on a more in-depth study of specific issues, using interviews, follow-up interviews, and
documentary evidence, through a blend of inductive and deductive approaches.

3.7

Specific Issues Pertaining to Hearing the Psychodynamic Discourse

Words are often the means by which we come to understand and navigate situations, in
that we create our world with words, we explain ourselves with words and we also
defend and hide ourselves with words (Bogden & Taylor, 1975). The unconscious
discourse is closely associated with the Lacanian theory of the signifier and the signified
(1956). It therefore incorporates and integrates the relationship between the signifier
and the signified, and, as such, has major implications for accessing the unconscious
(Arnaud, 2002). Indeed, Lacan (1956) has described the unconscious as being structured
like a language.

Walsh (1996) in describing the unconscious as any aspect of experience of which an
individual is not aware, including thoughts, assumptions, feelings or actions, suggests
that a problem for the qualitative researcher, may be one of “hearing” the unconscious.
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Furthermore, if an individual’s motives are unconscious, the subject can not, rather than
will not talk about their real motives. This resistance, or inability to communicate, may
be due to their lack of psychological vocabulary or the presence of “shame,” “guilt” or
anxiety in the subject’s environment Furnham & Taylor (2004).

True interpretive

research, therefore scrutinises narratives as much for what they reveal about the
narrators, as about what they narrate (Walsh, 1996).

Unconscious material can be conceptualised as internal and subjective, or as contextual
and directly observable, and the research approach will depend on which assumption one
follows. If unconsciousness is structured like a language, then research must focus on
the words that the participants use to describe their experience.

If, however,

unconsciousness is distinct from language, then qualitative methods must incorporate
non verbal data (Walsh, 1996).

While traditional views of unconsciousness see it as resting within the individual, recent
research has conceptualised it in interpersonal terms (King, 2003). This suggests that if
the unconscious is located within the individual, that access can only be afforded
through that individual, suggesting that researchers must find ways to access the
unconscious.

Here, researchers typically use the interview technique, wherein the

participant’s elaborations, clarifications and associations become the data for analysis.

Walsh (2003) suggests that this methodology follows from the assumption that human
consciousness is the basis of all experience, including unconscious experience. As a
result, all procedures begin with and remain focussed on the researcher’s and the
participant’s consciousness. By contrast, locating unconsciousness between individuals
focuses more on the context of the individual’s actions, and views the research process
as a socially embedded activity, where reflexivity is achieved through the researcher’s
scrutiny of verbal behaviour in the light of cause and effect, leading it therefore to a
more positivistic slant (King, 2003).
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Researchers also need to be aware that the subject’s unconscious is inaccessible to the
actively engaged subject, whereas, the researcher is presumed, somehow to have access
to their own unconscious. Here, language exists at the level of both conscious and
unconscious discourse. For interpretive research, this means that a scrutiny of words
within a given narrative is presumed to reveal the structure of the subject’s experience.
It is also important that the researcher’s interpretive narrative be scrutinised for the
structure embedded within it, as a researcher’s language can illuminate their own
particular frame of reference.

Apart from structured language, access to the unconscious is also possible through
dreams, parapraxing (Freudian slips) or through free associations (saying aloud whatever
comes to mind in an effort to allow patterns to emerge). Body language, (grimacing,
furrowed brow or a particular stance) may also indicate unconscious detachment from
what is being said (King, 2003).

The observation of anxiety and the corresponding use of body language and defence
mechanisms offer a glimpse into the unconscious of the individual. Anxiety arises when
the ego is faced with an influx of stimuli with which it cannot cope.

Defence

mechanisms subsequently distort reality through the redirection of gratification.
Repression,

displacement,

reaction

formation,

regression,

denial,

intellectualisation/rationalisation and sublimation are often depicted as characteristic
defence mechanisms (Glassman, 2001; Furhnam & Taylor, 2004; Kahn, 2002).


Repression arises where threatening emotions are blocked from becoming
conscious, thus forcing the mind keep a lid on unacceptable feelings.



Displacement or projection involves blaming other sources of anxiety rather that
the true source, or projecting one’s own unacceptable feelings, through anger
onto someone else. People use displacement when they perceive that the real
target is too threatening to confront directly.
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Reaction formation involves transferring the feelings that produce unconscious
anxiety into it’s opposite in the conscious state. These defence mechanisms give
themselves away through excessively demonstrative behaviour.

Here the

individual asserts the feelings too much and is overly extravagant and
compulsive about demonstrating it. Thus the “hater” expresses “love” and the
“intolerant totalitarian” becomes an advocate of participant democracy.


Regression is observable where the individual becomes fixated with the past or is
unable to outgrow a clinging dependence through constantly looking back. This
defence mechanism is exhibited through temper tantrums, or reverting to the
sulkiness of adolescence.



The defence mechanism of denial is seen through the refusal to admit that
something unpleasant is happening.



Intellectualisation and rationalisation are higher level defences that depend on
complex cognitive processes. Intellectualisation is the unconscious control of
emotions and impulses by excessive dependence on “rational” interpretations of
situations. Rationalisation involves offering an acceptable reason for behaviour
rather than the true reason. The researcher needs to be wary of the rational
analysis that interviewees make for their own behaviour, as it prevents the person
from recognising the true motives for actions. Thus, it represents a form of
distortion from reality. In rationalisation, the decision maker finds excuses to
justify actions that were caused by repressed and unacceptable feelings.



Sublimation is the only defence mechanism that does not protect the ego. It
differs from displacement in that the drive energy is redirected to a socially
desirable creative reality.

Walsh (1999) agues that a stumbling block to exploring the links between the
psychodynamic world of the individual and the organisational world, is that
psychodynamic literature focuses on infantile experiences in a manner almost
incomprehensible to those outside the therapeutic world.

She also argues that the

language used in the psychodynamic world (despair, shame, envy, rage and attachment)
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often raise a smirk when applied to the organisational world, wherein difficulties arise in
transferring a psychotherapeutic framework, traditionally focussed on individual private
dysfunction and distress, to an organisational context defined by public rationality. This
suggests an unconscious rejection of “non rational” approaches to decision making.

3.8

Data Collection Methods

Easterby-Smith et al (2000) bracket qualitative data collection methods under the
umbrella of interviews, observation methods, and diary methods, whereas quantitative
research is more associated with questionnaires and surveys. As this research proposes
to follow a qualitative approach, the methods associated with this approach will now be
considered.

3.8.1 Interviews
Qualitative or semi-structured interviews are described by Mason (2002) as the
construction or reconstruction of knowledge, rather than its evacuation, and as being
characterised by relatively informal styles, a thematic approach and a contextual focus.
Bell (1999) reinforces this point, arguing that interviewers can probe responses and
identify motives and feelings, wherein the way in which the response is made can
provide information that a written response might conceal. However, Frey & Fontana
(2000) caution that the spoken word often has a residue of ambiguity, irrespective of
how carefully one words the questions or codes the answers. This may create a problem
for the researcher as to whether to use topic or resource interviews.

Topic interviews and resource interviews, although approaching the construction of
knowledge in differing ways, are not mutually exclusive Seale (2001). Topic interviews
view how interviewees say things and tend towards being hermeneutic or ethnographic.
This treating of conversation as a social process, causes empirical representation to
becomes less of an issue, resulting, sometimes, in a criticism of the method’s validity.
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Resource interviews on the other hand, view information as what people say and rely on
a contextual approach to elicit the true feelings and views of the interviewee. Resource
interviews can become topic interviews through the identification of opportunity.
However, opportunism in topic interviews does present a problem of bias, e.g. a
tendency in the interviewer to seek out answers that support a preconceived notion, can
creep into interviews.

It can also be difficult for participants to remain focussed, particularly where the means
of accessing information is through interview (Heron, 1996). Marshall & Rossman
(1995) suggest that interviewers may use a set of prompts to guide the interviewees to
respond to a question and that systemisation in the questioning and gentle probing may
be required to overcome feelings of unwillingness or discomfort in the interviewee.
Deciding on the style of the research questions is another issue. Collis et al (2003)
differentiate between approaches that are appropriate for both the positivistic and nonpositivistic designs.

Positivistic approaches involve a specific research question,

followed by a number of hypotheses, whereas with non-positivistic approaches, the
research question may need to be refined as the research process proceeds. Questions
within the positivistic paradigm should:


Express a relationship between variables



Be unambiguously stated



Imply the possibility of empirical testing

Non-positivistic approaches on the other hand may use one or two “grand tour”
questions, followed by a small number of supporting sub-questions. This strategy is
appropriate to approaches where the methodology is considered to be associated with
emergent theory. Effective access to data is enhanced in the anti-positivistic paradigm
by paying attention to the language of the question by:


Avoiding words such as “effect”, “impact” and “determine” that suggest a
relationship between variables



Using open-ended questions, without reference to the literature or theory, unless
otherwise directed by the research design (Cresswell, 2003)
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3.8.2

Ethnography

Ethnography differs from data collection through interviews, in that it aims to clarify the
way culture simultaneously constructs, and is formulated by peoples’ behaviours and
experiences, therefore giving a primacy to being interpretive. Tedlock (2000) & Mason
(2002) describe participant observation as a method of generating data which involves
the researcher immersing themselves as participant observers in a research setting, while
systematically and reflexively observing dimensions of that setting. Geertz (1993) in
describing ethnography as “thick description” proposes the practice of, establishing
rapport, selecting informants, transcribing texts and keeping a diary, followed by the
writing up of the diary notes as soon as possible after immersion.

The process,

according to Cresswell (2003) consists of looking at what people do (their behaviours),
what they say (their language), and the tension between what they really do and what
they ought to do. This point is re-enforced by Carson et al (2002), who contend that a
key advantage of ethnographic research is its closeness to the reality of the topic under
investigation. Accordingly, it can provide significant understanding of the phenomena
being researched, as well as producing new, previously unrecognised phenomena and
insights.

3.9

Data Analysis

It is important to bear in mind that data analysis is not sharply divided from other
activities in the process, such as collecting data and formulating the research question.
A potential difficulty with the analysis of qualitative data lies in its complexity. The non
standardised nature of this data requires that it must be classified into categories before it
can be meaningfully analysed, otherwise, a mere impressionistic view of what the data
means may emerge (Saunders et al 2003). These authors also suggest that qualitative
data analysis can be approached from either an inductive or deductive perspective. The
analysis of qualitative data differs from quantitative data in that it is conducted through
the use of conceptualisation rather than through the use of diagrams and statistics. The
interpretivist paradigm is, broadly speaking, associated with an inductive approach to
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data analysis and uses strategies such as comprehending the meaning of text through
action or reflective techniques. The functionalist paradigm, on the other hand, is more
associated with a deductive approach which incorporates strategies related to
discovering regularities in the data (Burrell & Morgan, 2000; Tesch, 1990).

Classifying data into meaningful categories provides the researcher with an emergent
structure that is relevant to the research question. Riley (1996) suggests that the use of
aids such as interim summaries, self memos and a researcher’s diary are sources of
additional information that assist in the formulation of an answer to the research
question.

These interim summaries are useful for self checking the research

methodology being employed, developing new topic themes and making comments
about the person interviewed, the location, events that might have occurred during the
interview or observation that might have impacted on the nature of the data being
collected. The researcher found this strategy particularly useful.

Spiggle (1994) suggests that while analytical procedures manipulate data, interpretation
makes sense of it through abstract conceptualisations that represent a holistic and
illuminating grasp of meaning, enabled through the deciphering of codes. Mason (2002)
describes how data may be read in a combination of literal, interpretive or reflexive
manners, and suggests moving beyond the data through a process of cross sectional and
categorical indexing to evaluate the extent to which the research data addresses the
research question and theoretical concerns. However, she cautions against simple serial
indexing, insisting that further sub classifications and cross referencing between
different texts in a non static environment will allow “surprises” to emerge from the
data. In addition, the process of data analysis is contingent on whether the researcher
aligns themselves with deductively based or inductively based strategies.
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3.9.1

Deductively Based Analytical Strategies

Deductive approaches to data analysis are based on existing theory. They assume that
the researcher is in a position to commence data collection with a well defined research
question and objectives, in addition to a clear framework and set of propositions that
have been derived from the theory. The literature review and the theory therein will
shape the data analysis. Pattern matching and explanation building are two examples of
deductively based data analysis procedures (Saunders et al, 2003).
Pattern matching involves predicting a pattern of outcomes based on theoretical
propositions and using testing to explain what the researcher expects to find. Patterns
can be dependent on each other (verification) or independent of each other (evidence
based) (Yin, 1994).
Explanation building involves building an explanation while collecting and analysing
data rather than testing a predicted explanation as described above. This approach is
quite similar to the grounded theory approach, but differs in that explanation building is
still designed to test a theoretical proposition, albeit in an iterative manner, rather than to
generate new theory as is the case with grounded theory (Yin, 1994).
A key element of the deductive approach to data gathering is that while predetermined
categories may change, subject to the data that the interviewee provides, analysis will be
guided by the theoretical propositions and explanations with which the researcher
commenced. (Saunders et al, 2003).

3.9.2

Inductively Based Analytical Strategies

Inductive approaches include strategies such as data display and analysis, template
analysis, analytic induction, phenomenological data analysis, grounded theory, narrative
analysis, discourse analysis and case study analysis. Inductive approaches are often
considered beneficial where the research project is exploratory. Saunders et al (2003)
suggest that qualitative strategies often combine inductive and deductive approaches to
the analysis of qualitative data.
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Data display and analysis comprises of three concurrent sub-processes; data reduction
(simplifying or selectively focussing on parts of the data through the use of summaries),
data display (organising the data into diagrammatic or visual displays) and drawing and
verifying conclusions (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Template analysis involves categorising and unitising data to identify and explore
themes, patterns and relationships. This approach combines deductive and inductive
approaches in that it consists of a predetermined list of codes and categories that are
amended to represent the themes represented in the collected data (Saunders et al, 2003).
King (1998) suggests that template analysis is similar to data display and analysis in that
it offers a more flexible route to analysis, through it allowing amendment to satisfy the
needs of the research.

Analytic induction proposes the intensive examination of a strategically selected number
of cases in order to empirically establish the causes of a specific phenomenon (Yin,
1994)

This inductively lead approach commences with a loosely defined explanation of the
phenomenon to be explored, which is not derived from existing theory. Explanation is
tested through a purposefully chosen case study that will allow the phenomenon to be
explored. Saunders et al (2003) propose that this strategy has the capability of leading to
the development of well grounded explanations through the collection of rich and
thorough data, based on the explored actions and meanings of those who participate in
the process, whether through in-depth interviews, observations or a combination of these
methods.

When using phenomenological data analysis, the researcher finds statements in the
interviews that relate to how individuals are experiencing the topic, lists out these
significant statements (horizontalisation of the data) and treats each statement as having
equal worth, while working to develop a list of non-repetitive, non-overlapping
statements (Moustakas, 1994; Lee, 1991).
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These statements are then grouped into

‘meaning units’ of data (the participant’s experience of the phenomenon), using
verbatim examples. This is followed by outlining a description of the textures of the
experience (textural description). The analyst then explores all possible meanings and
divergent perspectives, through varying the frames of reference about the phenomenon
and continuously constructing a description of how the phenomenon was experienced.
The analyst finally constructs a holistic description of the meaning and essence of the
experience (Cresswell, 2003).
Grounded theory does not permit the prior specification of codes to analyse data,
holding as it does to a more purely inductive analytical approach. It is designed to build
an explanation, or generate a theory around the central theme that emerges from the
research data.

Strauss & Corbin (1998) suggest that grounded theory should be

structured and systematic at each stage of the analysis, however, it also allows for
analysis to be carried out in a less formalised way, while still maintaining a systematic
and rigorous approach to arrive at a grounded explanation. This method of analysis
involves the dis-aggregation of data into units through open coding, the recognition of
relationships between categories through axial coding and the integration of categories
to produce a theory through selective coding.

A criticism of grounded theory in qualitative data analysis is that it is inherently
positivistic through applying “sliced data” to a priori theory, however, Collis & Hussey
(2002) argue conversely, that rather than applying data to theory, grounded theory
engages in the discovery of codes from the interpretation of data.

The grounded theory approach is similar to phenomenological data analysis, through its
provision of a procedure for developing categories of information (open coding)
interconnecting the categories (axial coding), building a story that connects the
categories (selective coding) and ending with a discursive set of theoretical propositions.
Critical differences between the approaches relate to their association with positivism
(grounded theory being more so), and whether the data is sliced (grounded theory) or
remains more intact (phenomenological data analysis).
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Discourse analysis is associated with constructionism, and incorporates the associated
phenomenological perspectives of ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionalism
(Potter, 2002). Constructionism, according to Gergen (1994, p52), examines “the way
language derives its significance in human affairs from the way in which it functions
within patterns of relationships”. While being similar to grounded theory, in that it is
both a methodology and a data analysis tool, it also seeks to expose contradictions
between text and actual practice, through exploring the relationships between
conversations and the signifying practice, when expressed as language (Henwood,
2002).

Inquiry perspectives using discourse analysis reject the idea that language is simply a
neutral means of reflecting or describing the world.

This approach suggests that

discourse analysts are interested in texts in their own right, rather than seeing them as
means of getting at some reality that is assumed.

This may cause problems of

interpretive bias for the analyst, as description may be analysed in a number of different
ways, depending on the orientation of the speaker and the writer (Gill, 2002).

Individuals use discourse to offer blame, to make excuses or to present themselves in a
positive light, suggesting that discourse does not occur in a social vacuum. Gill (2002)
argues that as social actors, we continuously orientate to the interpretive context in
which we find ourselves, and construct our discourse in order to fit that context. This
analysis method may therefore be significant in accessing of the language of the
unconscious.

Looking at “how” participants respond can offer valuable analytical clues to the
researcher that go beyond the literal usage of conversation. An important first step in
this process is the suspension of belief in what is normally taken for granted in language
use. This, in effect, involves rendering the familiar, strange (Potter, 2002).
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Analysts using this approach have rejected the more traditional cognitive explanations of
social interaction (actions being a consequence of mental processes) and have instead
looked at how mental processes are constructed and used in interaction (Potter, 2002).
This allows the researcher to explore situations where interviewees “break off” from a
flow of conversation associated with a specific response to give a more personal
opinion.

This researcher feels that this may facilitate an exploration of the

deconstruction of meaning in addition to the ongoing construction of meaning, and
consequently aid in accessing the unconscious.
Discourse analysis involves the careful reading, re-reading, and interpretation of texts in
a rigorous manner (Billig, 1988). This immersion in the material is time consuming, but
is a necessary preliminary to coding. The categories used for coding will be determined
by the questions of interest. Potter & Wetherell (1987) caution that merely getting the
gist of the text is the wrong way to approach the analysis, as this inevitably ignores
nuances, contradictions, and areas of vagueness. In addition, discourse analysis involves
the researcher in interrogation of their own assumptions, and the ways in which they
make sense of things through reading passages in particular ways.
There are two separate phases in analysing discourse (Gill, 2002). Firstly, the searching
for pattern in the data takes the form of both variability (differences within and between
accounts) and consistency. The second phase involves formulating tentative hypotheses
regarding the functions of particular features of the data, and checking these against the
actual data. Although discourse analysis requires sensitivity to the way language is
used, Billig (1991) also proposes that it requires sensitivity to what is not said. Narrative
approaches suggest that maintaining the integrity of the data collected and conducting
analysis from the verbatim transcripts or sets of notes is more appropriate to interpretive
approaches. While grounded theory involves the fragmentation of qualitative data to
further the process of analysis, some researchers consider this approach to be
inappropriate. Saunders et al (2003) propose that phenomenological and life history
approaches are based on individuals’ accounts of their experiences. The ways in which
they explain these experiences through their subjective interpretations and relate them to
constructions of the social world in which they live (Saunders et al, 2003)
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Case Study analysis consists of making a detailed description of the case and its settings.
Where the case presents a chronology of events, Cresswell (1998) suggests analysing
multiple sources of data to determine evidence for each step or phase in the evolution of
the case. Typically, data analysis in case studies is a multi stage process. Stage one
involves categorical aggregation, wherein instances from the collected data are explored
for issue relevant meanings. Patterns of categories are established through coding.
Direct interpretation follows and may include the establishment of causal relationships..
Finally, naturalistic generalisations are developed, and augmented by tables and figures.

3.10

Interpretation Issues and Practitioner Biases

Research is never value free.

Examples of this occur when questions may arise

concerning the personal biography of the researcher and how this biography determines
the approach to the research (Dyer, Aberdeen & Schuler, 2003).

This approach

questions the adequacy and efficacy of the author’s interpretation, promoting instead, a
more open approach for readers to reach their own conclusions. Whether or not one
writes oneself into the narrative of the research is also a concern. This raises issues
relating to the possibility of researchers remaining totally objective when it comes to
research (Fullagar, 2002).
The acknowledgement of multiple interpretations, the questioning of the researchers
interpretation of data, and the privileging of the readers own judgement of the text, are
all closely aligned with the validation of data interpretation (McGregor, 2000; Ateljevic
& Doorne, 2002). Here, the authors place a high degree of significance on subjective
accounts and individual interpretations of texts in a socially constructed environment.
This approach gives a greater resonance to issues of interpretation, and also accounts for
the researcher’s own biases and subjectivities by opening up the analysis to multiple
interpretations.

Morgan (2002) and Pritchard, Morgan, Sedgley, Khan & Jenkins,

(2000) agree, arguing for the need to provide a space for voices to come alive and be
heard in an environment of respect. Accordingly, Denzin & Lincoln (1998) conclude
that research has evolved from being content specific to being context specific, and that
the authority of the researcher as an objective expert has been rejected.
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The values and biases of the researcher can also play a role in the interpretation of
phenomena and the construction of texts. Jamal & Hollingsworth (2001) argue that in
order to move towards more interpretative qualitative research, it is necessary to depart
from the more static, quantitative and positivistic knowledge bases, to a more dynamic,
experiential and reflexive approach, where there is a recognition that social agents are
central to the construction of knowledge, and that the researcher’s voice is one among
many that influence the research process.

Bias is possible in ethnographic research. Marshall & Rossman (1995) contend that care
must taken to ensure that values are not imposed by the ethnographer. An interesting
differentiation between the polar opposites of participant and non-participant
observation is provided by Gill & Johnson (2002), who argue that by becoming
embroiled in the every day lives of the subjects, the researcher may lose the ability to
become dispassionate, whereas the lack of interaction raises the problem of
ethnocentricity (a failure to understand the underpinnings of the subjects overt
behaviour).

In terms of researching the unconscious, transference and counter transference may
impact on research validity. Transference refers to the process by which an interviewee
reacts emotionally to an interviewer with an unconscious spontaneous reaction, where
feelings, unrelated to the research, are transferred to the interviewer.

Counter-

transference is where the interviewer may experience feelings of protection, repulsion,
or attraction to the interviewee which may subsequently affect the interview dynamics.
Researchers need to be aware of when transference triggers counter-transference, as this
dynamic may disempower both parties (King, 2003).

Discourse analysis also offers the potential for bias in interpretation. The description of
a phenomenon can be both constructed and interpreted in multiple ways, depending on
the orientation of the speaker and the analyst.

The researcher, therefore, needs to be

aware that individuals may construct discourse to fit in with their own contexts, or what
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they believe is an “expected” answer, or they may perceive the researcher as a conduit
for expressing subjugated feelings. The researcher therefore, needs to be cautious of
over-speculation, through being drawn in by the emotional context of the response, or
through attempting to align the discourse of the respondent to their own embedded
beliefs. In addition, the researcher must be aware that discourse analysis does not lead
to the production of broad empirical generalisations, s it is designed for specific
interpretive contexts (Gill, 2002).

3.11

Limitations of the Methodologies

In describing the importance of qualitative research in the hospitality industry, Walsh
(2003), argues that the researcher must seek to understand the situationally based local
perspective.

In choosing participant observation as part of a research suite, this

researcher too felt the need to explore the behaviour of decision makers in a natural
environment, to evaluate how processes were connected.

Thus observation as a

participant offered the prospect of new insights into decision practices in a real time
environment. This research took place some weeks after the interviews in order to
broaden and give greater legitimacy to my findings. This approach follows Hammersely
& Atkinson (1995), who ague that epistemologically, it is better to observe a decision
making meeting in progress than to depend on retrospective or reconstructed accounts. I
also felt that this approach would be more reflexive and dispassionate than the interview
process.

However, difficulties were experienced when attempting to gain access to yield
management meetings, and when trying to access documentation (training documents
and data sets used to assist with formulating the decision), relating to the decision
making process. The author repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to gain access to
this information through phone and e mail contacts with the human resource
departments of all hotels, where interviews had taken place. This concerted approach on
the part of the author yielded a positive response from just one of the hotels that had
participated in the interviews.
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The author felt that while this reluctance may have been due to a confidentiality factor, it
may also have been due to him not being an employee of the hotels in question, or that
the hotels were concerned about the sensitivity and transparency of their data. However,
he also speculates that due to the time lapse between interview and the request for
further information, the hotels in question may, on reflection of what was already
contributed, may have decided not to facilitate further probing into their decision
processes. This approach corresponds with a finding of the literature review that a
dearth of research exists into unconscious factors influencing decision making in yield
management.
In terms of the ethnographic approach, Gill & Johnson (2002) describe access to
boardrooms as being notoriously difficult and suggest that this may be due to the fear of
potential indiscretion. Alderfer (1968) suggests that protracted negotiations regarding
access can also provide critically important insights into the organisation’s culture.
Interviews have a limitation when taken in isolation. Denzin et al (1998) and Blackburn
& Stokes (1999) argue that as the worlds of the academic researcher and the interviewee
are so culturally different, that any one-off, face to face interview is essentially an
artificial setting. The interview process maximised at one hour, in an environment
where the researcher was trying to elicit data to understand what lay behind the decision
making process.

Difficulties were experienced when interviewees curtailed the

interview, due to being pressed for time.
The scarcity of time also placed a limitation on the research, providing an impediment to
the study in the process. This in turn resulted in a mere surface understanding of what
influences the decision making process. Time also impacted when trying to re-arrange
interviews that had been cancelled by the interviewee.
Finally, the topic itself, being so subjective, created a difficulty for the researcher in
constructing a methodology that would enable unconstrained interviewee response. The
researcher acknowledges that this constraint on the interviewee may be associated with
resistance, caused by the immediacy of the interview environment and the inherent
difficulties of establishing rapport, and that this potentially inhibited the researcher from
gaining access to the unconscious.
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3.12

Location and Participants

Five Dublin hotels offered to participate in the research. Each of the hotels was graded
as a four star hotel (The Dublin Guide). In two of the hotels, two members of the yield
management team were interviewed separately. One member of the yield management
team was interviewed in the other three hotels.

A more detailed profile of the

participants is found in Appendix 4.

3.13

Ethical Considerations

Ethical constraints should be implicit in the research approach (Bell 1999). These
include, negotiating access to the research site, seeking permission to tape an interview,
verifying interview transcripts with the interviewee, guaranteeing anonymity and
following the organisation’s ethics protocol, if required. In addition, honesty about the
purpose of the exercise, integrity in the conduct and reporting of the interview, and a
commitment to allow the interviewee access to the transcript, should also apply.
Furthermore, the research process should not harm or embarrass the participants, or
those organisations about which information is gathered.
However, despite this, situations can come to the researcher’s attention which suggest
illegal practices, and having guaranteed confidentiality, may cause an ethical dilemma
for the researcher. Although confidentiality is a given, particularly in encouraging open
and honest responses, this honesty may throw up information that is unknown to senior
management. It is also important to realise that the researcher may be considered as
someone in authority by the participants, and that this perception may influence the way
that they answer, through either withholding information, or feeling obliged to answer
the questions in a particular way.

Furthermore, the pressure to achieve results may encourage falsification of research
findings, through the exaggeration or omission of results. Additional pressure may also
come to bear on the researcher to alter the findings if the findings cast the host company
in an unflattering light (Collis et al, 2003).

89

Informed consent through informing potential participants of the purpose of the research
and obtaining their permission, may pose problems where it might be perceived by the
researcher as being more appropriate to gain information in a covert manner. Ditton
(1977) argues that participant observation is essentially deceitful, as, if the researcher
informs the participants about the purpose of the research, he becomes unsure whether
the participants have adjusted their position, or not. The ethical dilemma here is how
much deception in a given situation is acceptable. Easterby-Smith et al (2002) contend
that researchers should be truthful, vague and imprecise.

The researcher also plays a part in the research approach. This is influenced by the
epistemological position of the researcher as to whether they remain detached or become
part of the research instrument (Carson et al, 2002).

Within the non-positivistic

paradigm, being the subject of the research process demands that the background and
previous experience of the researcher be explained, as previous experience will have an
impact on how the researcher structures understanding, and may simultaneously prevent
them from seeing a certain aspect of the problem (Storbacka, 1994). In addition, being
swept along by one’s own views and experiences can lead to a skewing of the research
findings. This phenomenon is recognised by Alvesson & Deetz (2000) who make a
strong case for critical sensitivity in carrying out research, which will serve to
counterbalance the more natural practice to seek out only that evidence that confirms the
researcher’s beliefs.

Ethical issues also apply to accessing unconscious behaviour. Although reflexivity is
critical to the practice of qualitative research, the problem of unconsciousness seems to
stand in its way, in that, if aspects of lived experience are unconscious to an engaged
participant, then how can one become reflexive (Walsh, 1996).

Reflexivity thus

becomes a problem, due to the participant being forced to pay attention to details that
might typically be ignored.

90

In addition, the researcher must become acutely aware of their own assumptions as they
move beyond a surface understanding of lived experience, to look for examples of
unconscious behaviour (King, 2003). Furthermore, validity problems may arise if the
researcher specifically looks for evidence of unconscious decision making, in that the
overt imposition of the researchers needs may bias the methodology, cloud the
interpretation and steer the inquiry paradigm towards becoming positivistic rather than
interpretivistic.

Mason (2002) argues that researchers may overcome such ethical dilemmas by acting as
thinking, reflective practitioners who are prepared to ask difficult questions about the
ethics and politics of their own research practice on a regular basis. This researcher tried
to overcome the above ethical issues by being constantly aware of the ethical dilemmas
created by the methodological approach taken to answer the research question.

3.14

Reliability, Validity and Generalisability

The distinction between verification and falsification also has also a broad significance
for the researcher. Easterby-Smith et al (2002) argue that while much of the debate
surrounding verification and falsification relates to the positivist paradigm, nonpositivists might also take lessons from this debate. In terms of validity, Easterby-Smith
et al suggest that for the results of non-positivist research to be believable, there must be
transparency. This transparency is achieved through the researcher explaining how they
gained access to a particular organisation, what process lead to the selection of
informants, how data was recorded, what processes were used to summarise and collate
the data and how this data was transformed into theories.
Silverman (2000) agrees, arguing that qualitative research methods must be seen to be
protected from opportunistic researchers who pick evidence out of the mass of data to
support their particular prejudices. To defend against this kind of “anecdotalism,” he
suggests adopting practices such as refutability of evidence, constant comparison,
comprehensive data analysis prior to analysis, and greater vigour in tabulating data.
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3.15

Conclusion and Justification of Chosen Methodology

This section will outline and justify the inquiry strategy and the associated
methodologies, data collection and analysis methods utilised by the author to answer the
research question and to address the associated sub-objectives.

Referring back to the overarching paradigms and the issue of ontology and
epistemology, the author will mainly adopt a non-positivistic approach as he believes
that the information required to answer the research question will be more appropriately
constructed through the voices and beliefs of the research participants. However, he
disagrees with one assumption associated with the interpretive paradigm, namely, that
the subjects under study are completely autonomous.

Ontologically and epistemologically, the author associates more with the relativist
perspective (data to answer the question is constructed by the people who make the
decisions). Additionally, while the author does not subscribe to decision makers being
wholly autonomous, neither does he believe that they are totally controlled by their
environment. Therefore, an intermediate viewpoint which allows for the influence of
both determinist and voluntary standpoints is taken.

Methodologically, the author stands firmly within the ideographic perspective. Indeed,
by prefacing the research with “how” he makes an assumption that there are multiple
realities that can be constructed by the actors.

This places the author within the

interpretivist paradigm, wherein knowledge is seen as an emergent social process, and
where understanding and explanation of the phenomenon of interest, comes through the
language of the respondent. The research question, in asking how decisions are made, in
reality asks if extenuating forces impact on the decision making process. Therefore it is
not simply a case of the respondent describing how decisions should be made, but rather,
how they feel that these decisions are made.
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With regard to the choice of paradigm, the author concurs with Carson et al (2002) and
recommends taking a broadly inductive approach, which proposes constructing rather
than testing theory, thus firmly placing the research within the non-positivistic paradigm.
The author also concurs with Saunders et al (2003) and Yin (1994) in seeing some merit
in a deductive approach. The approach therefore taken involves taking a deductive
approach at the commencement of the research, through providing an initial framework
from the literature review, and evaluating this empirically and inductively to allow new
insights to emerge (Carson et al, 2002).

While a number of the methodologies discussed earlier offer possibilities in assisting
with obtaining data to answer the research question, the methodological approach
chosen by the author will employ a combination of phenomenology and hermeneutic
enquiry to access both the conscious and unconscious elements of the research question.
While broadly speaking, phenomenology is associated with the conscious state, due to
its focus on intentiality, transcendental phenomenology and hermeneutic inquiry seem
appropriate to accessing the subjectivist state of the unconscious, whereas existential
phenomenology,

an

ethnomethodological

approach

and

the

utilisation

of

phenomenological symbolic interactionalism may be appropriate for accessing the
unconsciously constructed conscious state through language signifiers (Lacan 1956).

Broadly speaking, phenomenological sociology, characteristic of the interpretivistic
paradigm is underwritten by the basic assumption relating to order in social affairs.
However, the fact that reality may be “created” within such social affairs may result in
the author straying into the radical humanist paradigm, profiled by Burrell & Morgan
(2000). Nevertheless, the author feels that a combination of the phenomenological
approaches listed above may be effective in understanding if individuals consciously
construct the decision environment, to satisfy and placate their own unconscious urges.
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As a method of inquiry, hermeneutics is concerned with clarifying the meaning of
hidden messages, such as messages with multiple meanings and messages that carry
essential importance for the ways that the participant lives (Nakkula & Ravitch 1998).
Hermeneutics was therefore considered as being additionally useful in collecting data
that observes the underlying causes of managerial behaviour in relation to their decision
processes, thus making it a useful method of accessing both conscious and unconscious
behaviour.

Thus, the approach chosen by the author to access unconscious behaviour is a narrative
interview approach, within a broad phenomenological/hermeneutical framework,
utilising a discourse analysis/hermeneutic strategy, to read between the lines in an
inquisitorial manner. The reason for this rather complicated approach is because of the
difficulty in accessing the unconscious. The tactic used in the interview is to start by
attributing membership to the interviewee (“describe your role and career in the
organisation”).

This is followed by enabling the emergence of logico-scientific

knowledge (“How are decisions made”). This helps to create a safe and unthreatening
environment, which might not occur if the researcher went straight into talking about
their feelings, risking a premature ending to the interview.

An ethnomethodogical

approach of questioning their explanations in an unthreatening manner follows, drawing
out underlying factors in the decision making environment of the respondent. The
strategy here is to expose the ordinary, and to uncover justifications and defence
mechanisms, thus allowing access to the unconscious. This approach will allow a
continuous movement from the creation of logico-scientific knowledge to narrative
knowledge, where the telling of stories of human intentions and deeds may access both
conscious and unconscious behaviour.

In addition, while adopting a mainly positivistic approach, the author was also open to
considering the application of other inquiry methods.

Theories of bureaucratic

dysfunction offered a complimentary approach to the interpretivist strategy, particularly
when addressing sub-objective (iv).
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Other methodologies were evaluated, but were not considered as appropriate to
answering the research question as those listed above. Critical theory is associated with
theories of emancipation and research into organisational power struggles. While not
discounting the possibility of conflict, particularly in relation to what was found in the
literature review, the overwhelming assumption of the author is that compliance
determines behaviour although he is open to evidence of conflict emerging during the
research.

Similarly, it was felt that while grounded theory would address how people react to a
phenomenon, phenomenology would be more appropriate in dealing with how they
experience it. In addition, grounded theory’s all too systematic approach, and its close
association with the positivistic approach mitigated against its use. Regarding case
studies, the author felt that as they are often bound within a specific time period, and
normally deal with events that have happened, they would not be appropriate to the need
to construct interpretations, as required by the research question.

Data collection methods consisted of taped semi-structured interviews followed by
observation techniques afforded by ethnography.

The data analysis suite selected

consisted of phenomenological data analysis, to induce themes from the data and
discourse analysis, used to deconstruct the data in order to illustrate what lay behind it
(Lee, 1991). Other collection methods were not used. Although focus group interviews
are notoriously difficult to organise, this researcher would have been loath to use them
due to the possibility that the mere presence of other participants might dominate
proceedings or dampen a willingness on the part of participants to share their true
feelings.

In summary, a broad spectrum of phenomenological strategies was selected, to unearth
the data required to answer the research question, and to deal with both conscious and
unconscious discourse.

Specific data collection techniques of interviews and

ethnography were utilised, along with the analysis methods of phenomenological data
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analysis and discourse analysis. Discourse analysis was used to find contradiction in the
texts.

This follows from the view of Tonkiss (1998), who argues, in relation to

interviews, that it is not so much the views that are expressed that important, but how
different views are establishes and warranted.
The author listened to each tape within one hour of conducting the interview and
transcribed perception notes during and after the interview to assist with discourse
analysis at a later stage. Also, as access to documentation proved difficult, discourse
analysis could only be used to analyse e mails that indicated a preference on the part of
the hotels, not to allow access to written data such as training manuals, and data sets
used to assist with the analysis of data.
Throughout the analysis, the researcher found it challenging to ensure that his input was
meaningful and sensitive, rather than attempting to impose his own interpretation,
without justification.

The researcher had a reflexive input into the data analysis.

Interview texts were read a number of times, both literally and reflexively (Mason
2002). In addition to multiple readings of the interview transcripts, each of the tapes
was listened to in order to identify additional contextual factors that might supplement
the determination of meaning, such as, tone, expression, changes in voice volume,
pauses, laughter, annoyance and paraphraxes. Broken sentences, including sentences
being cut short by the interviewee, were also considered.

The selection of respondents followed a letter sent to a number of four star hotels in the
greater Dublin area. This was followed by five pilot discussions with the general
managers of four star hotels, primarily to introduce the author and explain the purpose of
the research, and to allay any ethical issues or concerns that might impede the research
process. Participants were selected based on their grading (four star) and that they had
access to technology for assisting with or making decisions. Interviews lasted between
forty five minutes and one hour. Interviews were taped, except in one case where the
respondent expressed a wish not to do so. Additional notes were taken during the
interviews. Observation as a participant took place in one of the hotels. All other hotels
declined the offer, some doing so by e-mail.
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Chapter Four
Findings and Analysis
4.0

Introduction

In this chapter, the findings from the primary research will be presented as they relate to
each of the sub-objectives that support the research question. In the previous chapter,
the suite of methodologies, appropriate to enabling respondents to describe their
experience of the decision making process in yield management, were explored and
selected. The resultant body of transcripts tells of this experience.
Analysis of the transcripts identified a number of common themes that emerged from the
interviews and ethnographic observations. These themes were condensed, in relation to
each of the sub-objectives, and presented in terms of representative trends and
meaningful relationships, that would facilitate answering the overall research question
(Lee, 1991).
While the management science model may be viewed as the optimal model of decision
making for yield management, evidenced by comments from Dublin hoteliers during
pilot discussions to arrange interviews, who suggested that “it is the only show in town,”
and that they have selected this model because, “it permits only a 3% emotional input
into the decision making process,” and has “afforded their hotel the opportunity to
finally move away from the subjective biases of human decision making”, it is important
to note that the respondents in the interviews, in describing their approaches to decision
making, were neither familiar with, nor did they use the technical jargon associated with
these models.
What the author attempted to achieve through the interviews was to facilitate a
description of what each of the respondents perceived as the essence of their evaluation
of the decision making process. Evidence of contradiction in the interviews was sought
through the use of discourse analysis. Evidence from e-mails and the participant data
notes were also integrated into the findings.
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4.1

Findings associated with objective (i)
To ascertain if there is a predisposition towards a particular decision model.

As a first step to answering the research question, the author sought to inquire if there
was a preference for particular decision models, or indeed, if particular decision models
were disregarded by the participants. In a number of the interviews, the time at which a
decision needed to be taken and the level of pressure on the decision maker at the
particular time, were significant determinants of the strategy adopted in making that
decision. Three approaches to decision making were prominent across the research
sites. Respondents described approaches that were synonymous with the bounded
rationality model, the garbage can model and logical incrementalism, in situations that
were characterised by the degree of time pressure on the decision maker.

When asked how they viewed the decision making process, interviewee (A) stated:
“From a yield management perspective we would tend to look at things
from a rolling 90-day perspective and once a week a small team of us meet
to discuss strategy relevant to market segments, rate segments and room
types, tactical promotions etc., and within those meetings, we make
decisions about opening or closing various rate categories or room types to
maximise the room rate or the actual yield for the hotel on a given set of
dates.”
Later in the interview, (A) reinforced this view by stating; “And then at the very last
minute when the city is full, it becomes very much the supplier’s market.

You can

charge what you like then.”

When asked of their experience of the decision making process closer to the due date,
respondent (B), an employee of the same hotel took a less sanguine approach when
stating:
“It’s a combination of controlled and chaotic, controlled chaos if you like.
You are just trying to make sure that you are staying on top of what you
have coming in and using that to your benefit, rather than your detriment,
and I think that’s for the most part, what I would do I would say a fairly
chaotic environment more often than not.”
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Respondent (C) also suggested an approach consistent with time pressured decision
making, when stating; “We all understand the dynamics of the market place and you
know, you have to make decisions as you go along, you have to review as you go along,
you know” .This overview of the temporal aspect of decision making was expressed
later in the interview, when (C) states: “I try to work on an ad hoc basis. We will look
at the enquiry in isolation, totally in relation to the group’s piece of business and in
relation also to the time of the week and the time of the month.”

How the hotel was perceived to be performing in relation to their external environment
also seemed to promote the use of last minute decision making. When asked about the
process of price setting, interviewee (D) commented:

“Our Rack rates (maximum standard rates) are set on an annual basis but
sometimes we would go out onto certain websites with some of our rooms at
a certain price, and we might decide to change that then, based on how it is
performing, closer to the time”.
Later, in the same interview, when commenting on the pressure to make decisions, (D)
comments “So, therefore, you insist on somebody taking the two nights together, but if
you know that it is not going to happen a week out, you can always drop your rates. So,
I suppose, it’s trying to manage things as best you can”. This view was consolidated
again, later in the interview when stating:

“But you might find, say for instance, on a weekend, if it’s not a bank
holiday weekend, we might reduce the Saturday night rate to the
Thursday/Friday night rate, and we would make those decisions on an
ongoing basis.”
Evidence of competitive environmental pressures impinging on the temporal nature of
the decision making also surfaced in other interviews, with respondent (F) commenting;
“We have a meeting next week. We have left our rates at €190. Our rooms don’t seem
to be selling, so we may have to drop them, closer to the time.”
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Strong evidence of a preference for greater human involvement in the decision making
process was found across each of the interviews.

This expressed preference was

particularly evident when discussing variables such as technology and the requirement to
evaluate data. When asked if they utilised technology to measure price sensitivity,
interviewee (A) answered: “We do [long pause]….to a certain extent.

I mean we

measure it more intuitively than specifically.”

Later in the interview, when discussing the relevance, for decision making purposes of
the data they use (A) commented: “This technical data is in turn supported by intuitive
information that one has about what is going on in the market place, like what you hear
from other properties, what we hear from customers and what we hear from our
employees, etc.”

When discussing their attitude to allowing a financially affordable technology to play a
greater part in making the decisions, interviewee (C) responded: “No I would still want
a greater human influencing
th

(September 11

factor” and later, when using a critical incident

2001) to explain their preference of the human model over the

technological model, (C) commented: “The Americans were walking around the hotels,
and you know, when you see the like of that, and when you see people walking around
like that, you say, human intervention has to be more important.”

This expressed preference for the role of the individual in the decision making process
also broadly corresponded with a strongly expressed desire for autonomy in the decision
making process. When commenting on their experience of the decision making process,
interviewee (C) stated:
“I personally am happiest working with decisions that I feel happy about,
and I feel that, ‘yeah I will have a go at that.’ I am definitely a gut feeling
type of person, yeah. But equally I could say ‘I could feel bad about this.’
To me this is really important personally. I am a really big believer in
going with my gut feeling and that maybe comes with time in the business
and experience, I don’t know. I am a big believer in that, yeah. So it’s sort
of intuition, I suppose that’s another word for it.”
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Experience and pattern recognition were also identified by respondents as being a
significant determinant of their decision approach.

Respondent (F) describes this

intuitive approach to decision making in her rule of thumb approach. “Another rule of
thumb we have is that three star hotels fill up before four stars. So if we see three stars
filling up we know that we are going to be next.”

Respondent (D), in stressing the significance of personal experience, commented:
“But having said that we would often take two groups because we know that
one is going to wash down and one is going to cancel. A lot of the time –
there is a little bit of poker going on, – a lot of the time you would take two
groups because it’s six months away and although there will be times when
you end up with the two groups, because they didn’t cancel as you thought
they would, to be honest 80% of the time your gut feelings are pretty good.”
This preference for human intervention was also evident where respondents voiced a
distinct preference for decentralised decision making. When outlining their views on
this, respondent (A) commented; “Effectively the local dynamic, or the local
environment, drive your decisions about revenue strategy rather than what is
necessarily going on in the wider environment” There was agreement from respondent
(B), albeit for a different reason, who felt that; “You don’t want to have a central
reservations office in India, determining if a person travelling to Dublin can get a room
that night”

The lack of support for rational decision making models, and specifically in relation to
the management science model was epitomised in the consistent downplay of
technology in each of the interviews. This was perhaps the strongest theme uncovered
by the primary research.

Throughout each of the interviews, this downplaying of

significant benefits of technology assisted decision making, was articulated through a
counter pointed and validating opinion, expressing the importance of the human input in
the making of effective decisions. Although at times there was an acknowledgement of
the significant role that technology could play in the decision making process, this initial
acknowledgement was consistently downplayed, often quite irrationally.
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When offering their view on the usefulness of technology in decision making,
respondent (A) was quite circumspect, stating:
“Technology plays a huge role. Technology per se is not the thing that
plays the role. The role really is the intelligence it provides. And the
functionality of the technology, the availability and accuracy and
functionality of the intelligence, and so it certainly does play a big role in
assisting the decision making. There is no question about that.”
However, respondent (B), a different member of the same yield management team
expressed a contradictory view, when stating:
“I believe that any technology is only as good as the person that is using it.
It is a system that’s just there, that’s been put in place by the hotel, - costs a
lot of money. I mean, it’s never going to make decisions for you but it can
give you advice on what to do. But only the people are going to know
what’s best for the business. I mean, I wouldn’t say that it gets in the way
of making good decisions, I just think that as long as it’s used properly,
[pause]…then it should be an assisting tool in your decision making, but it
shouldn’t guide all or your decisions, maybe some, but it certainly shouldn’t
make decisions.
I’d say that’s what I would probably think about
technology [pause] …and how it should be used in our hotel system.”
Again, while acknowledging the capability of a technology assisted decision making
system, respondent (D) questioned its acceptability, stating:
“Although we may have some rooms available that are not on the computer,
and we could probably offer those rooms at a lower rate than what is on the
computer to our business client, but because the computer refuses to do this,
we could have lost that business forever. But a human person would not
have done that. So I believe that when you are trying to get loyalty from
customers you definitely cannot rely on technology to make your decisions
for you.”
The transparency of technology assisted decision making was also a bone of contention
to some of the respondents. Difficulty with the transparency associated with technology
appeared to translate into a justification for a preference for human intervention in
decision making. Again, the downplaying of technology was associated with a related
factor, in this case, what the individual might lose. This was articulated by respondent
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(D), who in decrying transparency, stated, “We don’t have as much flexibility in yield
management as you might think because our hands are tied a lot of the time.”
Later, issues of cost, and the related issue of the decision maker’s role in updating
information were also used to denigrate the relevance of technology in decision making.
Respondent (D), speculating on the potential arrival of a technology based decision
making systems commented:
“Oh yeah, there are some companies beginning to look into that, but will
they pay for their system to be integrated into Opera which is our PMS
system? I doubt it. I mean, how many PMS systems are there in Irish
hotels. Huge, huge amounts. It’s almost a full time job now for us to ensure
that we have the right rate, the right availability out there at any one time
and amended when things change. It’s seriously time consuming.”
The spectre of human based decision making being replaced by a technology system
also resulted in a tendency to downplay the potential benefit of technology in the
decision making process.

When addressing this issue, respondent (B) earnestly

commented:
“No. No, definitely not. [pause]…No [laughing] I’d say that would be
the end of my job, you know. And that would be the first reason because
you know I have to protect my own interests.”
Respondent (C) also expressed a fear of being replaced by technology, by articulating a
desire to cling onto the status quo, through rationalising that everything was ok at the
moment, when commenting:
“That’s a fair comment but it’s more about what’s being done to date.
Maybe it’s just letting go and allowing the computer to do its own thing, and
trusting it to do its own thing, and maybe that will come in time, but as
regards to the here and now I don’t think that it’s quite there yet. I don’t
think technology is quite there yet. Maybe for the next generation of sales
managers or hotel people that will come through they may well decide that’s
the way to go.”
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Later, the same respondent, when addressing the idea of trust in technology assisted
decision making comments:
“I think yeah. It’s simply because…it’s the classic isn’t it. It’s just the
human brain trusting a machine and it’s the same today as it was when
computers first came out.
It’s trusting the machine, it’s trusting the
mechanical brain to do what you need to do, to gets results that you want
and I am sure that it will come in time more into the hotel industry and it’s
probably in place, but you know, I don’t know because I mean I haven’t
worked in a large hotel environment for a number of years, so I don’t really
know what is happening in these hotels or as to how far they are trusting
these systems coming in.”
The role of technology was also downplayed in an effort to emphasise the importance of
the individual in the decision making process. In addition, interviewees appeared to
disregard the fact that technology systems could input decision constraints into the
system.

When reviewing the process of how technology could make decisions,

interviewee (B) commented:
“Like I know they say it’s unemotional, and computers as they say can make
that pure logic decision, and based on logic you’d say, ‘well yeah, take the
first option,’ because the computer doesn’t know that the second one is
going to come, so the computer would take the €160 and sell at the first bid.
That’s what the computer would tell itself to do.”
Interviewee (C) was far more emphatic on this issue, describing the possibility of
securing a decision making technology system as a waste of money;

“We don’t have that system in place. We don’t have any automated yield
system in place, so, therefore, we make our own decisions on yield. This is
a conscious decision on our part. It has to do with our size. We don’t need
a system that can do that sort of decision making. We are not big enough.
We have only got forty-four rooms. It would be a waste of money in my
humble opinion.”
Other technology deflecting reasons including, not supporting internet based decision
systems, were articulated by respondent (E), who commented:
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“The problem I have is that we have no guarantee that our name will come
up quicker on the system then any of the other independent hotels here in
Dublin. I think that the names are ridiculous, things like, Expedia.com.uk.
I mean, hey, what the hell am I doing looking for a room and I have to
remember a name like Expedia.com.uk. I mean, it’s bad enough that we
don’t get priority when somebody decides to use the Internet, but I think that
the names are not easily remembered.”

This downplay was evidenced later by the same interviewee stating:

“We are dealing on the other hand with so many different systems that are
not connected, it’s terribly manual. The problem is that the systems don’t
communicate with each other, so how could you take advice from them?”
This unwillingness or inability to trust technology in decision making emerged as a
universal theme across the interviewees. Respondent (D) in particular was quite vocal in
expressing disquiet with regard to their technology systems. The following statements
were extracted from the particular interview as evidence of such feelings.

“I mean we have had a few issues with our property management system.”

“So we do find faults in the data, and it’s only through our human
interaction that we find that, and that’s a little bit scary because we have
had huge issues with our Property Management System and I’d rather not
go into that.”
“We do use technology but as I have said, maybe I am a little bit old
fashioned but I am not 100% reliant nor ever could become 100% reliant on
technology. But I suppose I’m a bad person to ask, because as I have said
we have had a huge amount of problems with the property management
system we have and this is meant to be a very good system.”
“We often find that sometimes little blips appear. We just tear up the
reports and we have to go back and start from scratch again, so I wouldn’t
really trust technology in that regard. I really wouldn’t.”

105

On the other hand, Internet technology was viewed positively, through being used in
some cases as an advertising medium, albeit reluctantly.

The benefit of property

management technology was also viewed positively, due to its operational ability to
internally update data. Respondent (D) conditionally supported the need to be visible on
a distribution system, by minimising the number of rooms available for sale on the
system, when stating:

“Like, we agree an allocation to say your tour operators, like some of the
big wholesalers in the U.K. And in order to get onto their website, that
large numbers of customers can access, you have to commit a number of
rooms to them. We obviously try to give them the least number we can”.
Later he consolidated this view, when commenting;
“So in effect, we don’t really want to deal with them, but we want the
exposure.”
However, respondent (D) was less forthcoming in her support for using the Internet
when suggesting that she would “feel exposed” and would feel that she was “baring her
soul” if forced to use it on an ongoing basis.

This need to reluctantly use technology as an advertising conduit was reinforced in
another interview when respondent (E) commented:
“There is another thing too. When you approach some of the websites they
have a band of rates that they only deal with, so for us to get on that website
we must correspond with the rate band, and there are a lot of four star
hotels competing for business so this is another way that we are tying our
hands by having to conform to the demands of the distribution system. So
getting onto a programme, however beneficial it might or might not be, is
dependent on the rate that you are willing to charge, but as I said earlier,
hey we need the business. It’s very competitive out there.”
Although the use of technology to update data was also highlighted as assisting with the
decision making process, a preference for manual input again surfaced, with respondent
(D) commenting:
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“There is an section in the property management system that you can insert a comment
on a particular day, like ‘don’t sell below such and such’ – but it has to be manually
activated and it is not as quick as clicking your fingers.”

Mixed attitudes towards the significance of data in determining decisions emerged
during the interviews. The data used was invariably of a historical nature, and was,
generally speaking, internally generated. In addition, data was selected to validate the
decision choice, and was seldom evaluated in terms of its validity. An interesting theme,
relating to the need or willingness to evaluate data emerged during the interviews,
wherein a number of respondents did not see the necessity to do this. Some comments
have been extracted from the interviews to illustrate this point.

“We do... [long pause]…to a certain extent. I mean we measure it more intuitively
than specifically” (A)

“Computers can do this I know, but will give us less control.” (A)
“Yeah…we would look at it at least monthly. It’s not unusual for us to say
‘we are unhappy, or we feel unhappy about that particular set of numbers,
so let’s double check to see if they are as accurate as they say they are.”
(A).

“Regarding data, I suppose we just come to meetings, or through
communication, they present the data, whoever has it.” (B)

“We don’t have a computer system that we could put it all into and it might
give us an answer as part of the yield management system. It’s pretty up to
individuals like myself, or the yield meeting that is attended by the director
of marketing and myself, the director of sales, hotel manager, and the
director of rooms, and obviously the general manager as well. They will
hear all the options and come up with decisions and strategies, and that’s
where we move from.” (B)
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“No. Not really because we have not had that situation to date, because
with Fidelio it’s as good as the information we put in, and it’s as good as
you use the information that you get out of it. So we have created our own
manual reports by way of a spreadsheet or whatever and we input these
figures into various reports and manipulate and use those figures and we
gauge our performance on those figures and to date we haven’t had any real
issues with that, as far as I am aware.” (C).
The verifiability of the data, according to the respondents also appeared to impact on
how the decision was processed. However, there was a reluctance to engage in the
process of verification. Respondent (B) admitted to an occasional need to verify data,
when stating:

“Eh….[long pause]…you do have to have a certain amount of trust in the
system but the systems as well tend to make mistakes, so you do have to do
manual checks which are time consuming and annoying to do data
processing work which is in fact double checking. But I guess it has to be
done on the figures that are already there, so it is never an enjoyable job
but, yes, sometimes it has to be verified or double checked I would believe.”
Respondent (D) also felt somewhat reluctant to quantify the reliability of the data used
when stating; “But with regard to statistical data, in terms of pie charts and graphs, we
are not really into that. It would be more hard figures like what average room rate are
we getting.”

While objective verification of the data was not considered necessary, respondents were
quick to indicate that they trusted the data that they chose to use, even though it was not
validated. “Oh yeah, we trust it, because we ourselves have actually inputted the
information, so therefore, the information that comes out is only what we have put in.
So unless we put a load of rubbish in we are going to get decent information out” (C)
This view was also supported by respondent (D), when stating:

“Do I trust the data, or do I rely on it, I’d say maybe seventy-five per cent or
eighty per cent reliance on, or confident in any data that I would be given to
look at but I would rely probably more on the feedback from the revenue
agents, like what they hear on the phone.”
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4.2

Analysis of findings Associated with objective (i)
To ascertain if there is a predisposition towards a particular decision model.

Inherent in the language of this sub-objective is the suggestion that the decision maker
may be influenced, because of a particular set of circumstances, to consciously or
unconsciously apply a particular decision model. Accordingly, in the course of the
interviews, while none of the respondents consciously referred to a particular decision
model, neither did they give the impression that any systematic analysis of options took
place. Indeed, many of the respondents alluded to the necessity of selecting specific
data in order to justify the decision taken. Yeoman et al (2000) argue that for the
rational model to be successful, a common set of preferences, with perfect knowledge of
the alternatives needs to exist. The research found that there were more often conflicting
preferences, where individuals followed a solo agenda in making decisions.

With regard to the application of the rational model of decision making, the findings
suggest that systematic analysis and objective evaluation of a complete suite of options
did not occur. Neither did a cost-benefit analysis of the chosen options occur through
the evaluation of the relationship between the chosen data and the resultant outcome.
The findings thus correspond with those of Yeoman et al (2000), who argue that a cost
benefit analysis of all available options is greatly facilitated by adapting the management
science model of decision making. The findings also correspond with those of Gore
(1995), who posits that internal political factors and time pressures may mitigate against
the acceptance and appropriateness of the rational/normative model of decision making.

While one of the respondents in advocating the need for human intervention, described
rational decision making as “cold and unfeeling,” thus corresponding with March’s
(1994) proposal that assigning a label to rationality of being either coldly materialistic,
or alternatively intelligent, confers an acceptability or unacceptability on the strategy,
other respondents referred to the necessity to feel good about a decision. This finding
corresponds with the “feeling factors”, characteristic of the affect heuristic (Slovic et al,
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2002) and the imputation of a negative evaluation to negative feelings as proposed in
magical theory (Rozin et al, 2002). The apparent rejection of rational decision making
may additionally be attributable to unconscious factors such as Lacan’s (1956) signified
and signifier theory, and other unconscious determinants such as use or misuse of
analogy (Brindle, 1999), wherein a concerted dismissal of the rational model of decision
making, particularly the management science model, appears to have infiltrated the
mindset of the respondents and possibly influenced the hotel’s approach to the use of
technology based decision models. This strategy corresponds with a number of Freud’s
defence mechanisms, particularly displacement or projection, where blame is transferred
to other sources (technology), and rationalisation, wherein respondents provide
“rational” explanations for a preference that satisfies an unconscious need, by blaming
or downplaying the benefits of a perfectly legitimate alternative (Glassman, 2001,
Furnham & Taylor, 2004, Kahn, 2002)

The management science model was not considered as being appropriate to decision
making by each the respondents, evidenced by the significant downplay of the role of
technology, and as significantly illustrated in the previous section (findings). These
findings agree with Wisniewski’s (1997) contention that information overload ultimately
diminishes the ability of the decision maker to analyse or react to a problem or an
opportunity.

In addition, this author feels that although there was an acute awareness that technology
could facilitate the making of decisions, the respondents chose to ignore this for a
number of reasons, particularly, a fear of losing control within their decision
environment, and thereby, the likelihood of personal recognition.

This finding

corresponds with the phenomenon identified by Carroll & Siguaw (2003), who argue
that the global shift to increased numbers of distribution channels, with their complex
interconnectivities, can create the feeling of a loss of control on the part of the decision
maker, and this in turn creates a mental block against utilising the technology.
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The fear of losing control of their decision environment was also apparent where,
despite the fact that centralised decision making was available at each of the research
locations, respondents invariably expressed a wish for decentralised decision making.
Additionally, the lack of belief in the need to validate data signified an unconscious
rejection of the rational normative model of decision making. Furthermore, the author
feels that respondents indicating that they have problems with the specific technology
(the property management system), seems at a surface level to indicate a genuine
concern and rationalisation for not using a technology. However, subsequent statements
by the same respondents, indicating lack of trust in the system and fear of exposure on
internet technology booking systems, both contradict and undermine their initial
statements, and demonstrate the presence of deeper unconscious factors impacting
negatively on the acceptability of technology assisted decision making processes.

In terms of the decision models that were favoured by the decision makers, bounded
rationality, logical incrementalism and elements of the garbage can model were
practiced across most of the research sites. Logical incrementalism and aspects of the
garbage can model were used when the decision time was short.
The practice of recycling information in order to make decisions, particularly when it
came close to the decision time evidenced itself as a common practice across each of the
hotels taking part in the research, thus following Quinn’s (1978) model. This model
suggests that decision making is associated with proactive steps taken in an environment
of ongoing evaluation of options. The weekly yield management meetings, held by the
yield management teams, afforded the opportunity to enable decision making through a
series of small proactive steps where ongoing evaluation and flexibility, enforced by a
changing competitive environment, conspired to deliver a “localised” solution to the
problem of maximising occupancy and revenue generation.

However, an optimum solution was not sought or achieved, as the full range of options
was not considered, due to time pressures and the urgency created by the relationship
between the unresolved occupancy problem and the shortening decision time. The
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author concludes that this practice lead to satisficing outcomes through management by
exception, wherein the decision maker, internally minimised the willingness to evaluate
or take risks as proposed by Yeoman et al (2000), Miller et al (1996), and Sloman,
(2002). Indeed the findings also indicate the possibility of decision makers becoming
risk averse, as proposed in Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory.

Cohen et al (1972) suggest that the garbage can model of decision making is appropriate
to decision environments characterised by poor goal definition and ambiguity, and
where problems and solutions co-exist.

The environment of “organised anarchy”,

typical of a collegiate, non bureaucratic environment, as defined by this model is, in the
view of the author, suited the decision practices outlined in some of the transcripts as
being “chaotic.” For example, respondents “keeping rooms up their sleeves” and the
consistent downplay of technology suggest an environment wherein people may push for
their own individual choice opportunities.

The use of the garbage can model was also evidenced by the fact that cause and effect
relationships were chosen not to be identified, as evidenced in the findings, through a
determination not to evaluate data. This absence of evaluation, in conjunction with the
fact that explicit databases that could offer decision scenarios were either absent, or
considered unnecessary by the respondents, corresponds with Daft’s (2001) analysis of
the model’s applicability.

Avoidance of addressing the inherent problem in yield management, namely how to
optimise decision forecasts under conditions of uncertainty, is therefore facilitated by the
garbage can decision model. A consequence of using the model is that problems persist
without being solved (Daft, 2001). This promotes familiarity, through decision makers
becoming used to, and comfortable with the problem. The author feels that this in turn
justifies the use of the bounded rationality model by the respondents, wherein fear of, or
avoidance of the need for finding an optimum solution promotes usage and acceptance
of the garbage can model. Thus, according to the author, the model itself in becoming
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associated with bounded rationality creates a comfort zone of indecision, wherein non
optimisation becomes an acceptable practice.
Bounded rationality, on the other hand applied, when the pressure was less intense
Indeed, the bounded rationality strategy was the key strategic model utilised by the
respondents as evidenced by strong evidence of the use of pattern recognition
throughout the interviews.
In addition, evidence of “satisficing” (delivering “good enough” solutions) was also
determined, through the practice of not evaluating all of the options and the emphasis on
the importance of experience and was in some cases used to emphasise the criticality of
human intervention in the decision process.
Thus, the preference for the bounded rationality model may not be totally attributable to
a conscious belief that this particular model was more appropriate to realising an
optimum solution. Rather, it may be more to do with the unconscious effect of the need
to negate the merits of using technology to make decisions, or significantly assist in the
making of decisions. The findings correspond with those March (1994) who argues that
satisficing leads to framing the decision, through editing the problem before entering the
decision environment, and with Arnold et al (1991) who propose that individuals make
decisions on the basis of expected outcomes.

The author feels that this expressed preference for the role of the individual in the
decision making process also broadly corresponded with a strongly expressed desire for
autonomy in the decision making process. This finding suggests itself, both in terms of
the need for power, and the need to feel good about the decision taken.
The author also feels that the boundedly rational approach adopted by the respondents is
analogous with the garbage can decision model (Cohen et al, 1972), and facilitates the
mindset of the decision maker, not just through the decision maker being unable to
specify goals and objectives, even when knowing what the problem is, but in addition to
this, not wanting to specify them.
Having explored the preferences for decision models, the author will now address the
influence of heuristics and bias on the decision making process.
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4.3

Findings associated with objective (ii)
To investigate if bias or heuristical factors influence the decision making
process.

Examples of the traditional heuristics of representativeness, availability and anchoring
and adjustment (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974) were evident in the interview texts, as
were examples of the influences of both magical theory (Rozin et al, 2002) and the
affect heuristic (Slovic et al, 2002).

In a number of the interviews, respondents associated themselves with data that
represented situations that were familiar to the respondent.

Respondent (A), when

discussing the data he uses to effect a decision stated that he buys in a whole series of
reports that provide “market intelligence relevant to our business,” and that this data is
important because it shows “where you, as an individual property are, relative to the
whole market.”

Similarly, in describing approaches to pricing respondent (B) articulates the need to set
prices in terms of “what the local market has, or our competitive set had as its price
range”, thus indicating being guided by the representativeness of the market rate.
Respondent (E) equally indicated a dependency on the representative heuristic when in
relation to how he decides on contract rates for a particular period states; “We can
command these rates at this time because there are facts, and these facts come from the
past.”

The justification for an unwillingness to evaluate data corresponding with the
importance of representativeness was forwarded by respondent (C) who stated:

“The Fidelio property management system is as good as the information that
we put in, and is as good as the information that you get out of it. So we
have created our own manual reports by way of spreadsheet, or whatever,
and we input these figures into various reports, and manipulate and use
these figures to gauge our performance on those figures. And to date, we
haven’t had any real issues with that, as far as I am aware.”
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Another theme that emerged related to data overload. The perceived problem of data
overload also appeared to impact on the decision process, with respondent (B) stating;
“you have to know how much of the data you need to present, I mean, you do in a sense
pre-select to know what you can and can’t use”
Later in the same interview, this view is reinforced with respondent (D) stating:
“The individual will always have to pick which is the most relevant piece of
information, and who you are going to give that information to that you
think will yield the best possible answer. And you pick that information in
terms of who is going to support or go against the decision that you think is
best.”
The overload of data, in the opinions of the respondents also impacted on the process of
making decisions. This overload, sometimes lead a number of the respondents to engage
in the selection of particular data sets to suit the required decision. Respondent (B) was
quite succinct about this, stating:
“Can you get to all of it? Probably not. The individual will always have to
pick which is the most relevant piece of information for who you are going
to give that information to and that you think will yield the best possible
answer. And you pick that information in terms of who is going to support
or go against the decision that you think is best”
The perception of time pressure, particularly when close to the implementation date for
an inventory decision, accentuated this pressure, resulting in a limiting of the search for
solutions, with a consequential dependence on available data. This time pressure was
listed as decision determinants by a number of respondents, typified by respondent (F),
who commented, “time pressure is a big factor, but it’s a business-yeah, that’s what you
expect.”

The need to confirm the status quo was also apparent in descriptions of a fear of failure.
Respondent (B) addressed this issue when stating “internal pressure is always more
important than the external pressure applied by the bosses”.

Later in the same

interview, when discussing how others felt about him, respondent (B) again addressed
this fear of failure when stating “Yes, yeah, yeah, your reputation, if you like is at stake
with some decisions that you might make”.
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When asked to elaborate on “intuitive” approaches to data evaluation, respondent (B)
outlined how he tries to “track typical patterns of guest stays by market segment, what
rate they are at”, confirming the status quo in the process, and reaffirming this later in
the interview when stating that they “don’t have a computer system that they could put
data into and that would give us the answer.”

Selection of specific sets of data further reinforced evidence of the use of the
representative heuristic. Evidence of the pre-selection and discarding of data in order to
inform the decision process were apparent throughout the interviews. Respondent (D)
confirmed this strategy when stating; “You can look at loads of data at the moment but
what we are really concerned about is the average room rate that we are getting”

This was reinforced later in the interview when stating;

“We are only interested in certain amounts of data, like company statistic
reports, in the sense of who are the top rated companies, what was our top
twenty companies during June of last year, why is it changed, who is the
new company that is using us, and we would then obviously follow up on
that.”
And when being even blunter later in the same interview; “Yeah, to be honest there’s
quite a bit of data we wouldn’t use.”

Respondent (E) also alluded to the need to be selective with respect to data
when stating:
“There are times when we disregard data depending on where it comes
from. I mean there is nothing that we have now that I would completely
disregard. I mean I would take some of it with a pinch of salt but some of
the stuff is way too general.”
An associated theme was addressed by respondent (B), when being asked if decisions
ever felt automatic, replied “You do have to think about it, but you use your past, pre-set
of experiences to automatically make your decisions. Whatever you have done in the
past will effect how your decision making is going to be”.
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This citing of the significance of past experience in terms of decision making was of
immense value to respondent (D) when stating “you have constantly to look to past
experience.”
Pattern recognition, in terms of previously experienced situations, was equally relevant
for respondent (E) when stating; “We have demand trends, how we fit against our ideal,
how we fit against how we think it should be, and if it is falling away from there, or if it
is above, then we adjust. So we set our rate based on this.” This practice, while
indicating the use of the representativeness heuristic, is also associated with the
anchoring and adjustment heuristic. In addition, these findings also exhibit evidence of
satisficing in addition to being associated with the representative heuristic.
Further evidence of this association emerged later in the interview when (E) comments:
“So if 1,500 rooms are sold on the 31st of August going into September, you know that
you should be going into September of the following year with the same number, if not
more.”
Respondent (F) also speaks of the significance of past experience when stating:
“Christmas decisions are being made at this time, so we sit down and look at last year,
we look at the history, and we look at the special rates that other hotels are offering
around Christmas, so therefore, there is a lot of history.”
Factors associated with feeling positively disposed to the decision taken, and its
association with the representative affect and magical theory heuristics were expressed
by respondent (D), when discussing the feelings associated with making successful
decisions:

“It’s a confidence thing, I mean, being able to go into a meeting with the
general manager and say, I have a fixed amount of business at an increased
rate, makes you feel good, and you feel confident about going up another
notch with other business.”
In addition, the unwillingness to criticise a colleague associated itself with the need for
the comfort of familiarity, or indeed fear and anxiety, as associated with the affect
heuristic. Respondent (F) addressed this when declaring; “I don’t question my seniors.”
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Further examples of how respondents relate to feeling good or bad about a decision, and
how these feelings predispose them towards making or nor making that decision, were
also evidenced in the transcripts.

Respondent (B) refers to this when speaking about seeking support from colleagues
before making a decision. “If colleagues feel it is a bad idea, I don’t go with it, if they
feel is a good idea, I go with it.”

And respondent (C) supporting this philosophy commented that she is “happiest working
with decisions that she feels happy about.”
Evidence of the use of the availability heuristic, and its influence on the decision making
process was common. Respondent (D) enforced this view when stating that they “are
not really into pie charts or stuff like that” arguing that they are “more comfortable with
pre-selected data.”

The vividness of data also determined the decision protocol. Respondent (B) described
how guest profiles particularly stand out when reviewing the guest’s history and that this
in particular “aids the making of a decision.” Respondent (B) also stated that “the
vividness of historical data makes you feel that you are on the right track.”

The exclusive use of historical data was considered as being significant in the making of
decisions by many of the respondents. Respondent (G) was quite emphatic, stating:

“Guest history is an important one that will help me personally to make a decision.
That means looking back at our guest history.”
Other respondents equally regarded the availability of historical data as being significant
in the construction of decisions. The following quotes illustrate this dependence:
“We would use last year’s numbers, 2003’s numbers, to forecast for 2004,
and then we would use 2004’s numbers to forecast for 2005 and that
determines our budgets, and we would look at the first six months of any
year and we tend to take that time period and its trend as a way of moving
forward for the second six months.” (B)
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“There are facts that we go on to make the decision and these facts come from the
past” (E)

Some of the respondents appeared to be anchored to the evidence of past trends, with
respondent (D) commenting that “decisions are always based on what happened in the
past.” For most respondents, this historical data was mined locally through the property
management system although in some cases, it was supplemented with bought in data
and opinions from staff, competitors and customers.
Respondent (A) articulated a clear view of this when stating:

“Well you have your own hotel’s data, which is obviously very easy to get
coming primarily from the property management system that you operate, in
our case Fidelio. There is a whole series of reports that we buy that relate
to booking pace, and all those kind of things. So that is where we get
market intelligence relevant to our own business. This technical data is in
turn supported by intuitive information that one has about what is going on
in the marketplace, what you hear from other properties, what we hear from
customers and what we hear from our employees.”
Respondent (B) from the same hotel took a slightly different approach stating:
“Generally speaking, we don’t buy in much data. No. In fact, I would nearly go so far
as to say that over ninety per cent of our data is mined internally.”

Evidence of the combination of the representativeness and anchoring and adjustment
heuristics were apparent in the influence of competitor data on the decision making
process, with respondent (D) stating: “I suppose past performance, forecasting, looking
at how competitors are doing, yes, we would tend to look at that an awful, awful lot”
Further evidence of this was found, with respondent (A) commenting:
“Primarily because we know what we are doing. We equally have good
market intelligence from one or other of our competitors and we can
compare that with the total, and if we are doing x we know where we stand
in the competitive table of hotels, and equally we know where this other
competitor is. So then, we would pretty well have a good gut feeling for
where there is an inaccurate report or if there is faulty reporting going on
or not.”
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Competitor behaviour was strongly perceived as being a determinant of decision
behaviour, wherein part of the data used to influence a decision was the performance of
a number of competitors, and the hotel’s position in relation to that competitor set. “We
get them (data) from the competitor-probably.” (E)

Respondents expressed a need to be aware of what competitors were doing and how they
were performing and that this also influenced them when making pricing and room
allocation decisions.

This external factor was certainly a significant factor for

respondent (B), when commenting; “So the big question is - what does the local market
have, or our competitive set, have as its price range? And we set our price within that
range, or maybe a little bit higher, as we would like to be the top product in the market.”

This view was confirmed by a similar response from other respondents. Examples of
their comments extracted from the transcripts included;

“It is also what our competitors are doing and what we need to achieve as a hotel (C)

"Where do we get our figures? We base them on competitors, probably” (E)

“See here, they get the occupancy but their rates are not as high, and this relates to the
competition that is out there at the moment. I mean, you just can’t…it’s a balancing act
at the moment” (F)

Interdepartmental competition did not really as a particularly strong influence in the
decision making process.

Indeed it was only a significant factor in one or two of the

responses. Respondents did not perceive this as an impeding factor in the making of
decisions, suggested in (B)’s articulation; “I suppose, another thing that happens at the
meetings is that we have interdepartmental competition for room availability, but that’s
not a problem, we do what’s best for the hotel”. This comment appeared to contradict
other perspectives in the transcripts that indicated a need for individual reward.
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In addition, anchoring on the part of an influential member of the decision team resulted
in anchoring the opinions of other members of the decision team. Respondent (C) hinted
at this when describing revenue managers at various stages in the interview as being
“like gods,” capable of “making or breaking a hotel,” and “they are like voodoo, they
are the future, if they are not already.”

4.4

Analysis of findings associated with objective (ii)
To investigate if bias or heuristical factors influence the decision making
process

This sub-objective was utilised to firstly establish if heuristics and biases influenced the
decision making process, and secondly to ascertain if these factors influenced the
decision process either positively or negatively

The general finding was that they do indeed influence the decision process and that the
decision makers are conscious of this fact in that they use rules of thumb to improve the
quality of the decision taken.

However, the findings also concur with Nutt (2002) in showing that time pressure on the
decision maker resulted in limiting the search for remedies, consolidating a fear, in the
eyes of the author of respondents moving away from the tangible to the unknown. This
practice was evidenced by the degree of dependency on the representative heuristic.
Evidence of an unwillingness to learn from mistakes also emerged, which resulted in
some of the respondents escalating their commitment to decisions already taken. This
finding was apparent where decision makers selected specific data to justify the already
taken. This finding was also associated with respondents alluding to their fear of a loss,
aligning it with Tversky & Kahneman’s (1979) prospect theory.
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In addition, here was strong evidence of decisions being based on gut feeling that
corresponded with previously formed stereotypes. This was apparent in a number of
interviews, where there appeared to be a comfort factor associated with the reliance on
historical data, leading in some cases to satisficing behaviour. The findings thus concur
with Bazerman (2004) who argues that judgemental deficiencies arise where individuals
tend to rely on such strategies in the absence of sufficient information or when better
information that would lead to more accurate decisions exist but is ignored.
The findings were also associated with the respondents seeking comfort in the similarity
offered by previous scenarios. This corresponds with the affect heuristics (Slovic et al,
2002). Findings related to the selection of data to confirm decisions already taken were
also associated with the evidence trap as proposed by Hammond et al (1999), who
proposed that decision makers will seek out information that confirms their instinct or
point of view, while avoiding information that contradicts it. Examples of this practice
were found in the transcripts, where one respondent suggested their strategy was to
decide what they wanted to do before attending a group meeting.
This phenomenon was also apparent through the availability heuristic where information
overload propelled decision makers to use information that was readily available, while
overlooking information that may have been more diagnostic, as suggested by Nutt,
(1999). This author concurs with Bazerman (2004) who posits that the availability of
vivid information may cause the mind to unconsciously block out undesired information.
This finding also associates itself with Slovic (2002) affect heuristic where personal
experience of the success or failure of a decision is more significant than reading or
hearing about it.
The author also believes that these phenomena conspire to propel the decision maker to
seek out the comfort zone of familiarity rather, as was detailed in the analysis of subobjective (i) to engage in objective analysis of available options.
As an evaluation of the outcomes of yield management decisions taken in the research
sites was not carried out by this researcher, the determination of whether or not
systematically biased mistakes were inherent was not possible.

However, broad

evidence of respondents not being willing to validate or evaluate data would indicate the
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possibility of these systemically biased errors being inherent in the process. Indeed, the
importance of salience to the respondents confirms the attractiveness of decisions that
are preferred over the merit of objective decisions. Finally, the misuse of evaluation
through collecting information to justify decisions that were already taken provided
evidence of a Freudian defensive mechanism of rationalism (Glassman, 2001, Furnham
& Taylor, 2004, Kahn, 2002), adapted by the decision maker.

Evidence of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic was also prevalent and broadly
corresponded with the need for satisficing, as proposed by Simon, (1972). Respondents
appeared to strongly associate with past trends and the “excessive” relevance of historic
data, leading them to adjust their position to correspond with equivalent scenarios from a
previous time period.

This previous experience was used as an analogy to justify decision behaviour. These
findings are consistent with those of Yeoman et al (2000) who conclude that, yield
managers when offering opinions on a forecasting option which is based on their
previous experience, often result in anchoring and adjustment of other team member’s
opinions.

Again, this over-dependence on previous experience appeared to make

decision makers give disproportionate weight to the information available.

The influence of magical theory (Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002) was apparent where some
respondents appear to rationalise the irrational through a conscious contradiction of
empirical data. In addition, respondents avoided the difficulty associated with negative
feelings by avoiding disagreement with authority figures that they either liked or feared.
Evidence of the law of similarity promoting categorisation was also apparent in a
number of the interview transcripts, thus agreeing with similar arguments made by
Slovic et al (2002).
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In summary, this researcher feels that bias and heuristical factors did indeed play a
significant role in the decision making process and while these factors were used in an
effort to short cut decision making, due to factors like time pressure and data overload,
they were also used in an unconscious manner to validate and justify preferred decision
practices.

Having established that bias and heuristical factors play a part in the

individual decision making process, the next section will address findings associated
with unconscious factors, and if they also influence the decision process.

4.5

Findings associated with objective (iii)
To explore the role of psychodynamic forces in the decision making process

In addressing this sub-objective, the author sought to ascertain if unconscious factors,
inherent in the decision behaviour of the respondents, influenced the decision making
process.

For some respondents, incentivisation was associated with the need for recognition.
Although there were mixed feelings when it came to discussing incentivisation, the
majority of respondents reacted in a positive manner to the idea.

Interviewee (A) was quite enthusiastic about the beneficial impact on the decision
making process, stating:
“I think that it certainly brings a lot of focus to things. I think that it makes
people very clear that if they have an incentive plan driving them…. I meant
to say directing them in a certain direction; I certainly feel that that would
be very helpful to focus the mind set.”
However, contrasting viewpoint was also expressed wherein a fear of incentivisation
also posed problems for some interviewees. Respondent (B) indicated a concern about
possible repercussions of making wrong decisions when commenting:
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“But you don’t want to have a performance measuring system based on, I
mean, for somebody to make a poor decision, or what might be perceived as
a poor decision, that I would have thought at the time right, you can’t fault
somebody for taking the action or steps to have made the decision. I would
always say to make a decision is better than making no decision at all. If
you come up with a plan of action well then you should be rewarded for
making that decision. If it turns out to be the wrong decision well then you
can learn after the fact that maybe the next time you won’t go with that
decision again.”
For other respondents, incentives were a significant factor in driving the decision
process, interviewee (C) commenting:
“Yes, we are all incentivised to achieve those targets here, and that has an
awful lot to do with managing the rate and making sure that it is up there
and getting the maximum, and you get to know what you need to do in these
circumstances.”
And later, when relating incentivisation to performance, respondent (C) confirms this
view, when stating:

“Oh yes, certainly.

I mean our reservations manager is incentivised; the

guys on the desk are, yes, that is there. And as I said earlier, the revenue
manager is on big bucks to do this.”

For others, however, these incentives did not, in their view, drive the decision process.
Respondent (D) viewed the emotional high associated with achieving targets as being
more motivational than the financial reward associated with this achievement.
“We do incentivise all our sales staff, our reservation staff, our reception
staff, our sales team etc. There is an incentive bonus there. Basically it is
based on our budgets that we sit down and do, but to be honest with you I
am not sure that it’s a huge factor. It is more kind of based on the team and
how did we did last night and did we fill last night. It’s more kind of giving
them a clap on the back. I’m not sure that money is the big motivating
factor for them. I mean, it’s nice but…”
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The pressure to achieve pre-set targets was also seen as impinging on the decision
maker, resulting in the expression of stress and anxiety.

When discussing what

influences their decision making, each of the respondents felt quite strongly about its
effect. This is illustrated in the following comments from respondents.

“How much business you have already booked at that particular time, how
many rooms you are anticipating that you are going to pick up, or what’s
more important, what you need to pick up to maximise your yield, ultimately
influences your decisions.” (A)
“How many room nights we need to achieve against that rate type that leads
to the ultimate end goal of what we want to achieve from a rooms’ revenue
perspective for the year ahead.” (C)
The anxiety caused by the closeness to the date on which the room needed to be sold
also influenced the strategies adopted by the decision maker in order to achieve these
targets. However, attitudes to the pressure imposed by last minute decision making
varied, with some respondents being quite sanguine, while others indicated being placed
under increasing pressure. These views are illustrated in the following comments:

“Generally speaking you look at how far away you are from the dates in
question, and this determines the promptness that is required to open or
close or do other things.” (A)
“We have it on a big white board in the meeting room. It faces you every
day you walk in. No, I am not joking. It’s very obvious and that influences
the way we make our decisions. I mean there is no point in hitting an
occupancy target and nothing else. That doesn’t do anyone any favours. I
mean it’s all about revenue here.” (E)
“I mean I have been around long enough to understand when pressure is
being put on you. I mean we are very target focused here. It is very
competitive and the figures are there within the reservation system for
previous months that your performance is compared to. You can’t bluff
your way through because it’s all facts and you have also got the situation
where your performance is based on what our competitors do daily.” (E)
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“I mean what he will probably say is, ‘you knew in July that these big GAA
dates were coming up. Why did you let five or ten rooms slip in at only
€170 when you could have got more?” (E)
“I mean if you think of September 11th you are there on that day and you are
trying to make loads of money for the hotel and then all of a sudden
something like that happens, it’s a global issue and you certainly didn’t do it
and it whips the carpet [of sales] out from under everybody and you put
your head down and you just feel bad, and it’s like in any job, when you are
winning they love it and when you are losing, it’s like really (pause) in the
last few years have been very difficult on hoteliers. The competition has
increased and the people just aren’t there to fill the rooms. It’s just…it’s
crazy stuff. So you are very much aware of not meeting your targets, but
you have to look at why you didn’t, what are the influences and what
stopped you from doing it.” (F)
“For example, we had a great month last month. We were well over budget
and it was just great to have the peace of your superiors being happy, that
peace is priceless here. You can put money on that...but the second that
your sales are down and you are worrying about paying full time staff, and
trying to manage your own pay roll, and there is that kind of pressure on
you, it comes back into view then in the weirdest of ways. Like for example,
if the front desk is cluttered it will be picked up by the sales people if the
sales are not good. And every little thing is picked up in situations like that
by them” (F).
In addition to these external pressures, internal pressure also played a part in the factors
influencing how decisions were made. Some of the respondents viewed not meeting
their targets as being a measure of their own ability as a manager.

This view is

illustrated in the following quotes.

“Like you are always conscious of your target or the budget, even as I say,
when you have set it yourself. Like if we are not achieving budget. Yeah,
like with all the planning and the effort you tend to feel bad when things are
not going according to plan. Yeah, I suppose that annoys me more than
anything else or frustrates me.
It’s more frustrating than anything
especially when you know the effort that has gone into things, and the effort
that you have put into filling the rooms and you just feel let down, of a group
has cancelled on you and you feel, yes, particularly as a sales person where
I feel that my responsibility is to keep the phones ringing to achieve budget
(C).
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When discussing their view of what happens if they miss a target, respondent (E) shared
this insight:
“Limbs get taken off [laughing]. No seriously speaking, what you will
always try to do is to make up for it in the next month. So it sort of puts a
bit of pressure on you.
I mean the pressure comes from the senior
management and in a way we put pressure on ourselves but the main
pressure comes from the general manager.”
This internal pressure was later aligned with a determination, bordering on
overconfidence, when the same respondent added:
“That takes an ability for us to say we know the way things are going to be
at a GAA final, or at Madonna concert time, or a big event. We can
guarantee that it might be late but it’s sure as hell going to come and we
will hold firm until we get that rate.”
Attitudes to rate integrity and transparency varied across the interviews.

Some

respondents, for example interviewee (A) were quite adamant about its significance.
“One of our core company philosophies is ‘rate integrity across all
distribution channels.’ So we do not believe in selling rooms on the
Internet, for example, at a lower price than you can buy if you telephone the
hotel directly.
We have complete transparency across all distribution
channels.”
While others, as stated earlier stated a preference for limiting the transparency of rates
through only allowing a certain number of rooms to be “visible” to customers and
competitors. This practice was tied in with the need to maximise revenue generation in
order to either guarantee incentive payments or satisfy the internal needs for recognition
and applause in the decision maker.

Use of analogy was also quite apparent in talking down elements of the decision making
process with which the interviewee did not agree. Much less evidence was found
wherein respondents used analogy to accentuate aspects with which they agreed.
Revenue (yield) managers were described by one respondent (B) as having to “wade
through e-mails,” another respondent (F) repeatedly referred disparagingly to other
members of the decision team who exclude her from the decision forum as “them
upstairs.”
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Respondent (C) spoke of “actively promoting decisions that she had done her homework
on, to ensure acceptance by other members of the decision team,” while other
respondents (B) used contradicting terminology such as “so called automated”, in
describing decision making systems, teams as “huddled around a table” and central
reservation systems selection processes as “weeding.”

The desire for autonomy was addressed in objective (i) when considering the
respondents’ preference for human intervention and decentralised decision making in the
decision making process, over the acceptability of technology assisted decision
processes. The findings associated with this sub-objective suggest that this desire for
autonomy is in turn related to the need for power, and that this is an unconscious
influence on the decision making process.

Respondent (C) articulates this need when stressing the “importance of sales being
separate from operations people, who won’t always know what the sales and marketing
people do.”

This corresponds with evidence of a superficial belief in team work.

Respondent (C) felt that “everyone should be sitting around a table but it does not
happen”.

Further evidence of this need for control and power was found when

respondent (E) describes the rush of adrenalin arising from “waiting to sell a room and
being- better than the computer.” Evidence of this individuality was also apparent in
the participant observation exercise, where individuals at the meting emphasised what
they had done to deliver solutions close to what the printout had required.

The need for recognition was also apparent in some of the interviews. This needing to
be recognised became an important part of the decision process for some participants,
leading respondent (C) to declare that she saw the benefit in optimisation, “only as a
personal feel good factor.” Other participants viewed the need for “personal input” into
the decision making as generating a feel good factor for them which influenced their
wish for autonomy.
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The link between overconfidence and fear of failure was again demonstrated when one
respondent (B), on being asked how they felt about decisions they have made,
commented:
“I would have made most decisions pretty confidently,” and later when contemplating
fear of failure the same respondent stated: “Failure is something that happens on a dayby-day basis and if you let it overcome you then you are going to become overwrought
with it and we all have to move forward.”

In expressing views on her need to be well thought of, respondent (C) states:

“Oh yeah. Terribly important because I need to know myself, maybe it’s a
human thing to see what we have set out to achieve is being achieved in the
way we planned and I would need to know that.”

This need for applause was repeated by interviewee (E) who, in considering her frame of
mind when going to a meeting, states:

“It’s a confidence thing, I mean, being able to go into a meeting with the
general manager and say ‘I have fixed a certain amount of business at an
increased rate;’ makes you feel good, and you feel confident about going up
another notch with other business.”
This necessity to feel good about the decisions taken created the sense of overconfidence
on the part of the decision maker.

This was exhibited on a number of occasions

throughout the interviews and during the observation exercise undertaken in the hotel
that agreed to do so.

Attitudes to risk were evident in the transcripts. When contemplating the risk involved
in overbooking the reservations, respondent (D) states;“At this stage sitting here there
are quite a few days in 2005 that we would be way over overbooked for, but I am one
hundred per cent confident that a huge amount of that will wash down and will cancel
out.”
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Equally, when addressing how they felt about technology making decisions, respondent
(E) commented:

“I really don’t think that the system is efficient to tell us something that we don’t know at
the moment.”

This need to feel good about decisions resurfaces as overconfidence later in the
interview in an unwillingness to acknowledge the significance of a mistake.

“If we make a mistake on our rate, if we make a mistake in setting a rate or
something, you know, maybe our GM will say that we should look at it
separately at a different time, but it’s never a case of saying, ‘wow see
those guys in Rev, they’ve made a big booboo there.’ It will never happen
because they know how much good we do.” (E)

While respondents indicated that they would utilise the internet as an advertising
channel, the possibility of being defined by it was negated with respondent (D) seeing
additional usage as “exposing your soul on the internet” and supporting a policy of
“minimising the number of rooms on selling engines.”

Other unconscious determinants were evident within the interview texts. These included
Fear of failure, the practice of never questioning seniors, feelings of guilt about not
meeting targets, needing to show confidence at all times, seeing continued success in
decision making as a career issue, unwillingness to admit a mistake, the need to avoid
transparency, anxiety and the need for perfection.
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4.6

Analysis of findings associated with objective (iii)
To explore the role of psychodynamic forces in the decision making process.

The research findings in this section suggest that psychodynamic or unconscious forces
potentially impacting on the decision making process, relate to issues as diverse as the
linguistic factors associated with misuse of analogy, the influencing factors of
overconfidence, and the need for power, recognition, and anxiety. The analysis in this
section used hermeneutic enquiry to probe beneath the text of the transcripts. The author
was more sensitive to the language used and indeed not used by the respondents. Tapes
were listened to and voice tone and body language were factors that influenced the
determination and analysis of the findings.
The need for applause and recognition, as a theme was evident in the transcripts, where
respondents expressed the need to be well thought of.

This highly personalised

response, in a number of cases, was associated with a form of overconfidence playing its
own part in the decision making process. This corresponded with an individualistic
approach to decision making, where as discussed in previous sections, some respondents
formulated decisions in terms of how they would be viewed, prior to attending a
meeting. Indeed widespread evidence was apparent of respondents preferring autonomy
in the decision making process. This leads the author to speculate that the referring to a
“team approach” is but a front for the subliminal need individual power roles in the
decision making process.
In relation to the unconscious influence of overconfidence, a number of findings
presented themselves. Examples of delusional optimism dominated some of the text
where participants appeared to exaggerate their own talent, rather than address the
possibility that a rational choice may have been wrong, thus agreeing with Lovallo and
Kahneman (2003). Evidence of the spinning of scenarios of success were also apparent
leading, in some cases, to an escalation of the decision making process. This practice
almost universally corresponded with the need for recognition.
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The unwillingness to acknowledge a mistake, evidenced in the transcripts through the
disproportionate balancing the weight of the mistake against the respondent’s perception
of how important they are to the success of the organisation, was additional evidence of
the repressive impact of overconfidence on the decision process This, in some cases,
also appeared to encourage escalating commitment to decisions that were oriented
towards the self advancement of the individual, rather than for the benefit of the
organisation.
As outlined in sub-objective (i) the difficulty with being controlled dominated a number
of the texts, linking it with Foucault’s (1979) proposal that the individual’s freedom is
often compromised by the mere fact that they belong to an organisation.

Evidence was also apparent where respondents rationalised their behaviour through the
bypassing of organisational rules, agreeing with Slovic (2002) and Furnham & Taylor
(2004), who suggest that individuals perceive rules as being either unfair or leading to
unnecessary additional work being required.
In fact, the practice of keeping “rooms up sleeves” enabled one participant to justify
their actions by constructing and justifying outcomes as being better for the hotel, while
openly stating that the real reason was for their own satisfaction and pride. These better
results were rationalised in the transcript, while the respondent simultaneously
downplayed the potential outcomes if the required organisational protocols were
followed.

As discussed in sub-objective (i) the need for decentralisation and autonomy overrode
the possibilities of centralisation and team decision making in a number of transcripts.
This corresponded with the individual’s need to control and influence their own decision
making environment rather than being controlled by it, associating the practice,
therefore, with the desire to use decision models where human intervention was a
predominant factor. In addition, a number of participants spoke of the likelihood of
interdepartmental competition for space. The use of coalitions of individuals to provide
a defence mechanism also exhibited itself in one of the sites.
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The removal of items from the agenda, that complicated the status quo, was also in
evidence in one of the research sites.
Strong support also existed of a pre-occupation among participants with perfection. This
corresponds with the theories of Walsh (1999), who argues that relationships within an
organisation can be characterised through an acute awareness of never being good
enough, even when agreed targets are exceeded, resulting in anxiety being
unconsciously acted out through defence mechanisms, such as denial and repression.
Anxiety, due to being uncomfortable with the practice of overbooking as cited by
Yeoman et al, (2000) was also apparent.
The major psychodynamic factor however, impacting on the decision making process
involved attitudes to technology, in particular in relation to the management science
decision making model. This author agrees with Orlikowski (1992) who suggests that
human behaviour is both enabled and constrained by the rules and resources that result
from previous actions. Her structurational model suggests that a duality of technology
can exist, where designers physically construct a technology to satisfy management
priorities and expectations, within which users socially construct the technology by
deciding which features to accept or ignore.
This corresponds with the findings in the research that an escalating commitment to the
dependence on human intervention in decision making exists, despite the evidence from
both the secondary research, and the muted acknowledgement from a number of the
respondents, that technology assisted decision systems offer more optimised solutions.
The author feels that a possible reason for this escalation, may be that consistency and
persistence are valued in modern society where they become signifiers of good
leadership (Daft 2001), linking it with the need for applause and recognition, and the
flipside of that coin, the fear of shame and failure. This escalation, therefore, involves
managers blocking out or distorting negative information when they sense that they may
be personally responsible for negative decisions.

Human intervention in this case,

though appearing to be consciously selected, is in fact unconsciously driven by the fear
of failure.
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However, one must also speculate if decision makers are correct in rejecting the
management science model of decision making due to their belief in the inherent flaw
incorporated in the model resulting from the human inputting of data.

This may

correspond with their belief that the model itself does not have an ability to deliver
objective, quantitative data, or to incorporate the qualitative data required to assimilate
the “softer” side of decision making.

If this is true, then the management science model satisfices, thus allowing the decision
maker to use the technology in a socially acceptable format to deliver reports as they
want to receive and utilise them. This therefore associates itself quite overtly with
Lacan’s (1956) theory of the relationship between the signifier and the signified. This
then becomes a major theme in the analysis of decision practices in yield management,
wherein, the management science model, through enabling the delivery of data, which
has been internally constructed to suit the aims of the decision maker, is subsequently
used to validate the decision taken.

These findings also correspond with those of Walls (2002) who argues that individuals
are uncomfortable with objectively assessing the known facts and estimating possible
outcomes through weighting them against their respective costs.

With regard to the unconscious influence of anxiety, evidence of decision makers feeling
either valued or undervalued by senior management appeared to play a significant role in
the decision making process. Furthermore, experience of authority figures through
never wanting to go back to previous employment was also evident. These findings
correspond with Bion’s (1961) BAD group dependency theory. This emerged in the
interviews where a search for collegiate support for a decision taken corresponded with
the fear of making a bad decision.
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4.7

Findings associated with objective (iv)
To ascertain if a relationship exists between conscious and unconscious
decision making.

This objective is explored in terms of the relationship that may exist between conscious
and unconscious decision making. The author wished to ascertain if one of these forms
of decision practice influences the other, or if indeed they can comfortably live side by
side. An associated theme that the author wishes to explore is the relationship between
rule based and “feelings” driven decision making.

As explored and discussed in previous sections, statistical evaluation of data does not
appear to take place. This suggests that the decision process appears to lend itself to
decision makers giving a disproportionate weighting to their first thoughts.

This

ignoring of information leads to what respondent (B) describes as a dependence on
“preset experiences.”

When discussing how customers might feel about dynamic pricing, interviewee (A)
countered by arguing on a number of occasions his need to control prices.
“I think that the customer understands to a certain extent the practice of
dynamic pricing. However, I think that the volatility of that acceptance is
quite low. If they (the customer) could not get access to the rate that they
believe they have negotiated in the contract, then, I think it would defeat the
whole purpose of entering into any kind of contract to produce a certain
level of business over a certain period of time.”
“Dynamic pricing is based more upon the premise of total choice on both
parties perspective. The room is available at the rate that it’s available at,
and if you want to book you book. The problem with this is that it takes
control out of your hands” (A).
For some respondents, rules were viewed as being part of the decision process but which
could be overturned by the individual, evidenced by the following comments:
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“I suppose you could say that rules are there for the good of everybody, as
well to give general guidelines, but I don’t think they are always a black and
white situation.” (B).

“There are indeed times when you have to tell little white lies, but I mean,
these do not do any harm.” (G)

“I suppose I do like living within them, they are safe, but I do think if you
are going to break a rule you have to know how to break it, and you know
like, but I suppose I do like the safety of rules.” (F)
An interesting caveat to this was offered by respondent (F), who suggested that if she
had made an intuitive decision, which subsequently, her supervisor asked her to revise,
she would use rules as a defence blanket.
“But on the other side ... mmm…if my boss tells me to do something and it’s
going to fall back on him, then I will do what he tells me, ‘cos it’s his
decision and he’s going to pick up the can for it! And I don’t mean that in
terms of ‘for the greater good.’ If he is willing to go with that then I step
aside. You have to …like…but if it’s my decision then I go with my
intuition. I cover myself, but stay within the rules.”
Later in the same interview, when discussing living within a rule based environment, (F)
comments:
“I suppose I do like living within them, they are safe, but I do think if you
are going to break a rule you have to know how to break it, and you know
like, I suppose I do like the safety of rules.”
And later again, she reinforces this point when stating;
“So, therefore, I went and I learned the rules. I loved having the rules
there but when you get to a certain level you kind of know what rules you
can break and what rules you can’t, and at the end of the day you have our
intuition to fall back on”
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When asked to elaborate on this by suggesting how she would recognise a rule that she
knew she could break, respondent (F) answered:

“Mmm..[long pause] I suppose they are unwritten rules. Maybe, maybe
sometimes…and em…and you just make them up in a certain situation
where you know you do not have to follow through on that rule and you
figure out that it might be a better decision if you don’t, and you will get
support for it.”
The justification of the breaking or bending of rules, while proclaiming to believe in the
same rules, were yet further examples of not wanting to be determined by their
environment. Evidence of this was peppered throughout the transcripts, with respondent
(G) stating that rules should never be perceived as being “black and white” and
respondent (F) speaking of “keeping rooms up my sleeve that those upstairs don’t know
about” in an effort to maintain control and derive satisfaction out of selling them later at
a higher price.

Attitudes to rules also played a part in the decision making process. When asked if how
she would react if she was not allowed to stray outside the rules, respondent (F) stated:
“Oh I would lose, what would you call it, not face, I would slowly,
certainly get disinterested, and I would probably end up losing motivation
totally. I like to be encouraged, you know, all my team like to make
decisions so that it why I empower them”.
Respondent (B) also alluded to this when stating:

“Rules are there [laughing]…I suppose you could say that rules are there
for the good of everybody, as well to give general guidelines, but I don’t
think they are always a black and white situation.”
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A dislike of being controlled was also apparent across the interview responses.
Examples taken from the interview texts confirm an almost universal dislike of the
decision environment being externally controlled, with respondent (C) commenting:
“Well I have had that; I mean the shoe has been on the other foot in a big
chain of hotels where you do get an element of centralisation, you know,
directions or instruction coming out which I don’t necessarily agree with.”
Later in the interview, the same respondent added:
“So when it comes to somebody saying to me, ‘lower your rate’ or ‘do this
or do that,’ I tend to say, ‘well hold on a minute. We’re in this market
place, we have these clients on the books, and I know how we work and I
think you will be foolish to try and force that upon us.”
Although the above responses indicate a strong dislike of being controlled, there was
also an indication of unwillingness in some of the respondents to allow others to make
decisions. This was articulated by respondent (D) who stated: “We try to give each
hotel a certain level of ownership and although we do like to control things we do not
exactly try to do a Big Brother on them. We do like to give them a bit of a free hand”

Some respondents characterised their environment as being determined by the simple
laws of supply and demand, in addition to being influenced by targets being set
externally or through being part of a decision team. Respondent (A) describes the
decision environment as being about “supply and demand.”

There was also a high degree of dependence on what customers were thinking, which in
turn became external determinant in decision making.

This second guessing of

customers, through rationalising that “alienated” customers may not accept time related
differentiated prices for hotel rooms because of the degree of competition in the
industry, was illustrated by respondent (A), when stating: “I think the customer, only to
a certain extent, understands the practice of dynamic pricing.”
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However, strong evidence was also found of participants wishing to determine their own
decision environment. Specific examples of this were found in the transcripts where
respondent (C) articulated a need to “bring her own individual sets of information to the
decision table.”

When asked about how they deal with conflicting data, respondent (A) replied; “If you
are asking me what wins out, generally speaking your gut wins out over technical
information although you do try over time to balance the two.”

Respondent (B), dealing with the same issue, namely whether to discount associative
data comments; “No. No. Never discount it. Sometimes those are the right things to
do, right? No, never discount it. That is probably the most honest thought that comes
in your brain”.

Respondent (C) in addressing the same issue comments:

“That’s because I am established here and I have the knowledge and the
experience, and I am not saying that I don’t think about things. I like to
think that I would always think about things. No. No. There’s always
thought behind what I do. I don’t go out there and say things willy-nilly. I
would always weigh up stuff. I would always weigh up a situation.”
This conflict of data appeared to enable the interplay of conscious and unconscious
decision making, evidenced by respondent (B) commenting:

“If you want to present information that’s for the decision that’s easy to
get; if you want to present information that’s against you can always find
information there also. In fact, you can find information to support both
sides. So it really is as much up to the individual to use the technology to
find data to support a decision that they want to make.”

140

Later in the same interview, when describing the good feeling that they felt from being
autonomous, respondent (B) commented:

“But you can also go the list as well and create a list of people that compete for a
room or bid for a room and you compile a wait list and when you have enough
information there and enough high rated guests you take them through.”

When asked in a follow up question if this was company policy, the respondent
answered; “No, not really. But what we do in my department we do for the company.
We do what’s best, you know.”

This practice appeared to be facilitated by the lack of a training programme, with
respondent (B) commenting:

“I don’t know if there is one really in analytical decision making but I think
as a general rule we would be given the empowerment to make those
decisions as an individual and you are encouraged to do that, and follow up
on your decisions”.
The need to gain support for decisions made was also a common theme in the
transcripts. Respondent (B), when asked if fear of failure would promote shying away
from decisions commented:
“Maybe it would make you, rather than shy away, just get the support on
the decision before you put it out there as a finalised choice. Go to
somebody else and say, what do you think? Is this a good idea, I’m going
to go ahead with it. Or do you think that this is a bad idea; I would not
like to do it? At least then I think that you are reinforcing your support
again, so if you had a failure on one occasion, or as you say, a decision
that did not work out so well, then you come in the next time and you have
that same decision, then you might just double check and say, this is what
I did the last time – this is what I’d do this time, agree/disagree and go
with that.”
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The protection from anxiety, espoused in the need for collegiate support in the decision
making process was also expressed by respondent (D), when commenting:

“I mean, I think that it is very important never to make a decision alone,
to involve other people in it, to ask questions. I mean, for instance,
another woman was here …(pause)………we didn’t have car parking here.
You get the odd negative comment but city centre hotels don’t have …but
you know when we got the opportunity ….if we had a car park would we
get more business, would customers be happy and I wanted to know and I
asked the Receptionist to ask the people involved, to ask the odd customer
don’t be afraid to ask even if it seems like a trivial question and base your
decision on that rather than we will or we wont or whatever”.
This was further stated by respondent (E) when commenting on the consequences of not
meeting targets
:
“But other hotels that I have worked in out in the country, I mean big four
star hotels, I don’t think that they are under the same kind of pressure.
What I would really love would be to sit down with all the people at my
level in a load of hotels so that we could talk to each other about the
problems we have and about the pressures that we are under.”
Being controlled by the decision environment, as outlined in earlier sections, also
created difficulties for the respondents. Respondent (C) comments;
“You know, they all have these wonderful titles like Directors of Revenue
Maximisation, I mean, they are earning big bucks out there. I have a
friend. He’s doing very well. He’s in big demand, ‘cos in the end of the
day when you think of it, these guys can make or break a hotel, especially
for a big hotel, they can make or break the hotel big bucks or not, and I
think for people who get into this end of things it has already become a
career issue for them. These guys are in demand, yeah.”
Later in the interview, (C) again stresses this point when stating:
“Well I have had that; I mean the shoe has been on the other foot in a big
chain of hotels where you do get an element of centralised, you know,
directions or instruction coming out which I don’t necessarily agree
with.”
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Respondent (F), when discussing how she felt about “the others upstairs” making
decisions for her commented, in a disappointed tone of voice; “Well yeah, but that is a
good thing, ‘cos I have got my hands full.”

When asked if she felt that she might better decisions than “those upstairs”, the
respondent appears evasive, commenting:

“Em...I would never question, not never, but I suppose I don’t question my
seniors, I don’t, I don’t you know. They’re there, they get paid for a job
and I don’t question them.
Sometimes some certain characters can
question other people’s position and their jobs, but I don’t. They are paid
to do that. But they work hard and they do their best”.
The disinclination to evaluate data, based on the outcomes of decisions that had been
taken, was another example of maintaining control. A number of respondents, although
aware that technology could perform this task, chose instead to denigrate the technology
in favour of their becoming more proactive in the data analysis. This practice enabled
decision makers, according to respondent (B), to “present data in a way that is most
beneficial for myself.”

Examples from the interview texts of not wanting a written training programme,
preferring instead being part of an “empowerment system” represented further evidence
of a preference on the part of decision makers to determine their own environment.

In addition to this, the need to maximise applause for the individual was also evident.
This possibility was enhanced wherein, individuals, in controlling the revenue generated
from their environment spoke of “the effect being able to go up a notch in the eyes of the
general manager.” (F)
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An interesting interplay of comments from respondent (F) illustrated the relationship
between bending the organisational rules and the need for applause and recognition.

“And we have rooms at €110, and I will try to get them to pay that for room
only, so they then will have to pay more for their breakfast, or they can go to
a bagel place or somewhere else for their breakfast, that’s their decision.”
She later elaborated:
“So if €190 is on the web at a special rate, other hotels will start charging
€190 because they see your special offer, and you will be delighted to have
your hotel full at that rate, so in that case I would keep ten rooms up my
sleeve because at the last minute you can all these people calling because
every room in the city is sold out and you have ten rooms up your sleeve,
and you can sell these at whatever rate that you want.”
This was justified by the respondent, when stating:

“Because I know they put some rooms up their sleeve, which is a common
practice and they just taken them and they have them under one name.
So, at the last minute they will have a few rooms to flog for high rates and
that.”
And later again when stating; “I know, I know. I don’t know who many times I have
done this and I will never apologise for it.

And I watch all the time, and if it’s two

weeks out and I have got ten rooms.”

Finally when asked why she engaged in this practice he replied:
“Satisfaction. It’s pure satisfaction. So if I had ten rooms up my sleeve,
and I could sell them, you know, and I am not the Revenue Manager, I
mean, that just gives pure satisfaction, that you are after selling it, and
after getting a better rate. You are after getting more money for your
hotel, the place that you work in, and its pride like, you know.
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What makes this particular sequence of thoughts interesting is t fact that in a subsequent
interview in the same hotel, with a different member of the revenue management team,
Respondent (G) was at pains to stress that;
“Although you might think that there is a universal practice in the industry
of putting rooms up sleeves, it does not happen here. In fact It is true to
say that we all sing from the same hymn sheet here. Everyone is part of
the team here and works for the good of the hotel”
However, the preference for autonomy over teamwork emerged again and again in the
interviews. While views were expressed that the actual decision process took place in a
team setting, strong evidence emerged from the interviews that the individuals ensured
that the decision was made in their own minds before attending the meeting. Some
respondents also indicated that it was important for their own departments to be seen to
be making the decisions. A selection of responses listed below, illustrate these feelings.

“That’s why I suppose I am happy working in a smaller hotel where I can have
my own say.” (C)

“But if they were any good at their job they should be battling their corner, yeah,
every time, yeah we should all be fighting our corners.” (C)

The emergent theme of the importance of being in control of the decision making
process was also associated with the desire for autonomy as exhibited in the following
responses.

“As far as I am concerned there is only an optimum level of that business
you need and once you have got enough money in the kitty you can control
the rest of your business in whatever way you like.” (E).
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In commenting on allowing the maximum number of rooms to be sold through internet
channels, respondent (E) later comments:

“Oh my God, no. The maximum number of rooms we would like to put on
with them would be only five rooms and once they are gone they can’t sell
anymore rooms for us and we can get more for the rooms that are left. So
we have total discretion then over other rates, so we have discretion over
every other rate that is not contracted.”
This coincides with the need for applause, fear of failure and the wish to
maximise revenue to boost incentive payments.

The need for applause also surfaced here, respondent (F) commenting;
“No…I mean…to a certain extent…I enjoy overbooking to be honest with
you, because it is a challenge, a further challenge trying to make the guest
happy if you have to out book them, and overbooking…we are very lucky in
this hotel that we have apartments….so we have some apartments that are
two or three bed roomed apartments, but they are only in the system as one
room, so when it comes down to it on the day you might be over by five, but
you might have different groups coming in, and you might convince them to
share a three bed roomed apartments which has two bathrooms, and you
sent them up a bottle of wine and they are happy enough”.

4.8

Findings associated with objective (iv)
To ascertain if a relationship exists between conscious and unconscious
decision making

This objective sought to examine the relationship between existing in a rule governed
environment and an associonastic environment.

This equated to determine how

respondents felt about their decision processes being determined by the decision
environment (rule based) or whether they consciously or unconsciously decided to
define their own decision parameters (associonistic based).
number of specific themes emerged during the interview.
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As indicated above, a

Varying attitudes towards being controlled by the decision environment and the
corresponding and conflicting wish to control their decision environment, peppered the
interviews. Strong evidence of this theme was found through specific preferences for
decentralisation, a preference for autonomy over team work, the need for applause and
the requirement to control decisions.

Throughout the transcripts, strong evidence appeared to exist where unconscious urges
determined conscious practice, and where conscious behaviour was rationalised by the
interviewee. A number of respondents spoke of incentives as leading them to managing
the rate that they charged customers.
On an initial reading of each of the interviews, concrete examples of the decision maker
being determined by their decision environment seemed to dominate the transcripts.
However, following subsequent readings and using discourse analysis techniques, and a
hermeneutic approach, evidence of decision makers conspiring to determine their
environment became obvious. The author feels that the many examples of rule aversion
illustrated above illustrate the practice of the unconscious determining conscious
behaviour.
The research concludes that although some examples of the decision maker being
determined by their environment were genuine, a number of examples of decision
makers endeavouring to control their environment, while professing to “exist” within a
deterministic environment, were also evident.
In some interviews, the negating of the benefits of technology was obvious. On almost
every occasion that this happened, it corresponded with a reinforcing of the importance
of human intervention in the decision making process. This researcher felt that this in
turn correlated with the strongly declared need for autonomy, indicating that some
decision makers deliberately downplayed the role of technology in order to remain in
control of their environment, wherein talk of “teamwork” appeared as a façade for the
real needs of the individual.
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The author concludes that it is not that the respondents undervalue or mistrust the
technology, it’s more a case that it gets in the way of their achieving their unconscious
desire, epitomised in the need for control and the need for applause and recognition.
Indeed, the author believes that the need for applause is dependent on the need for
controlling the decision environment.

In other words, it removes their ability to

rationalise conscious decisions to facilitate the satisfaction of unconscious needs
The findings in this section seem to illustrate that the mind categorises vividness, thus
becoming an important pre-filter in decision making. This significantly corresponds
with Freud’s theory on primary process thinking, in which the author differentiates
between the thinking processes of the conscious and the unconscious.
Conscious obeys secondary processes (logical, orderly and causal), wherein the past is
separate from the future and where phantasy and action are differentiated.

The

unconscious obeys the laws of primary process thinking, operating without regard to
reality, wherein there is no concept of mutual contradiction (Kahn, 2002).

The author feels that this is illustrated in the fear of technology being displaced onto the
fear of the loss of control.
This also exhibited itself in the findings wherein being angry at the technology is
another way of being angry at the organisation.

The pleasure principle also transfers to the reality principle (Kahn, 2002). This is also
evidenced in the research where individuals learn the necessity manipulating the real
world to satisfy their wants, and where individuals learn to estimate consequences. The
author feels that this offers the opportunity for the unconscious to play a role in driving
the decision making process, as proposed by Pinker (2003).

In conclusion, the author feels that talking about linking the unconscious to the
conscious is less of a dark domain, as suggested by Mansfield (2000), but is much closer
to that posited by Lacan (1956), that the unconscious is structured like a language.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Recommendations
5.0

Conclusions

This research commenced by attempting to answer the research question “how are
decisions made in hospitality yield management environments?” The previous chapter
addressed each of the supporting objectives in terms of the primary findings and how
these findings related to the secondary research provided by the literature review.

The overall research conclusion is that the management science model of decision
making has been subverted by all of the respondents in favour of a decision making
approach that emphasises human intervention. However, what is really significant is
that those interviewed believed that technology assisted models were appropriate to the
delivery of optimum solutions. The influence of bias, heuristics and unconscious factors
significantly impacted on this decision to reject use of the management science model.
Furthermore, these unconscious factors were internally rationalised, thus becoming
conscious and, therefore, real for those interviewed.

The respondents expressed an unconscious preference for a combination of the garbage
can model of decision making, logical incrementalism and bounded rationality to effect
their decisions. Although some of the respondents agreed that the management science
model would significantly contribute to the delivery of an optimum solution, the
availability of these models, overlaid with a boundedly rational approach, provided a
perfect cover for rejecting the rational model of decision making, while simultaneously
providing space for advocating a disproportionate preference for human influence in the
decision making process.

149

The rational normative model did not seem to be applied as there was little evidence of
evaluation of all the available options. This approach was justified by a conscious
support for the non-evaluation of data throughout the interviews. While elements of the
garbage can model and of the logical incrementalist model were in evidence, the
bounded rationality model emerged as the favoured approach of the respondents to
decision making.

At times this researcher felt that this approach was genuinely used by participants.
However, there was also ample evidence of it being advocated to deflect attention away
from the consideration of technology to assist with or to make decisions.

This

corresponded with the findings that management science evaluation procedures were
anathema to a number of the respondents.
An interesting finding was that a number of the respondents were aware of the
irrationality of this rejection, but persisted with it nonetheless in that they were aware
that technology could make decisions, but persisted with a defence of the importance of
human intervention, over and above what technology might offer.

The research also concludes that decision makers through not having a training manual,
nor being trained in decision making, afforded the opportunity for them to see rules as
getting in the way of the decision making process, where their own need for recognition
became more important.

While at a superficial level, tacit support was expressed for being determined by
organisational rules, strong evidence was found for an inclination to use this façade,
through a policy of reinforcing, while bending organisational rules, following Bittner’s
(1955) theory, and the theories of bureaucratic dysfunction as proposed by Merton
(1968) and Selznic (1966). This in turn led the respondents to a yearning for, and indeed
in some cases, the actual determining of their own decision environments.
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In addition, the findings conclude that feelings towards a decision outcome are
important, suggesting that associonistic behaviour is more significant for, and relevant to
yield management decision makers than rule based behaviour, thus agreeing with
Sloman (2002), Slovic et al (2002) & Rozin et al (2002).

The research also indicates that conscious decision making and unconscious decision
forces are inextricably linked, the latter in many cases informing the former.
Strong evidence of heuristics and biases influencing the decision process were also
found. This corresponds with the relationship between conscious and unconscious
decision making being facilitated through heuristics such as the affect heuristic (Slovic
et al, 2002) and magical theory (Rozin et al, 2002), and indeed the unconscious need for
individuals to determine their own environments.

The author feels that heuristics and biases were used to create a comfort zone of
familiarity in addition to a genuine belief that their experience and judgement offered a
shortcut to an acceptable solution.

Unconscious factors, such as overconfidence

associated with a fear of failure were used to downplay the role of technology and to
justify conscious practices.

Evidence of the unconscious application of the garbage can model of decision making,
was also apparent, particularly through the limited use of the Internet, and the chaotic
decision forum that emerged as decision makers moved closer to the sell-by date. This
loosely defined, but interconnected set of activities approximated with the decision
making process in a management science yield management environment wherein the
“decision maker” is the software or internet system, the choice opportunity is the
maximising of revenue through room occupancy, the problem is characterised by the
customer seeking accommodation at a specific time and the solution is the satisfaction of
both hotel and the customer needs at the required moment.
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The author concluded that personal constraints (a desire for prestige), introduced
unconscious factors into the rational models of management science, thus making it a
boundedly rational model, by the inherent constraining of the search for alternatives, or
the constraining of the acceptability of an alternative (Daft 2001). Personal constraints
constrain the perfectly rational approach that should lead to an ideal choice. So, it’s not
just a case of being overburdened or overloaded that precipitates the use of bounded
rationality, but it is also a case that unconscious forces drive decision makers to an
acceptance of bounded rationality. Rather than being an intuitive, experience based
shortcut to an optimum decision, could it also be a comfort blanket for the decision
maker?
Daft (2001) argues that intuition is nor arbitrary or irrational. But if unconscious forces
drive this intuition, then this author feels that it can be , as evidenced by the fear of
negative forces in magical theory (Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002) and the unconscious
differentiation between feelings of “goodness” or “badness”, demarcating a positive or
negative stimulus towards a decision, as outlined in the affect heuristic (Slovic et al,
2002).
What is really interesting here is that while Daft (2001) proposes that intuition is
associated with non-programmed decisions, and is geared towards optimisation of
organisational decisions, he does not appear to consider the flipside of this coin. What if
instead, it is geared towards avoidance of failure, or individual self aggrandisement, or
indeed, self preservation?

What if it is associated with an avoidance of making

programmed decisions? But questions emerge from the findings; namely, were the
respondents irrational in rejecting the management science model of decision making, or
indeed, were they behaving rationally by recognising the inherent heuristic flaw of
human intervention in the model
The author speculates if decision makers believe that the inherent flaw incorporated in
the model, results from the human inputting of data, this may correspond with their
“belief” that the model itself does not have an ability to deliver objective, quantitative
data, or to incorporate the qualitative data required to assimilate the “softer” side of
decision making.

152

If this is true, then the management science model satisfices, thus allowing the decision
maker to use the technology in a socially acceptable format to deliver reports as they
want to receive and utilise them, corresponding with Orlikowski’s (1992) duality of
technology theory which proposes that individuals construct a socially acceptable
environment in which technology is used to validate social practices. This therefore also
associates itself quite overtly with Lacan’s (1956) theory of the relationship between the
signifier and the signified. This then becomes, according to the author, a major theme in
the analysis of decision practices in yield management, wherein, the management
science model, through enabling the delivery of data, which has been internally
constructed to suit the aims of the decision maker, is subsequently used to validate the
decision taken.

5.1

Recommendations

As confidentiality was assured in all research sites, the author feels that it is not in his
brief to offer recommendations to the hotels in question. In addition, the research
paradigm was mainly interpretive, using a broadly based phenomenological approach to
explore the conscious and unconscious experiences of the participants with regard to
their decision making, rather than a positivistic approach that might have been more
disposed to conclude generalisable findings.

Research is a continuous process, which provides answers to specific questions, but
while doing so, raises many other questions. The primary objective of this dissertation
was to explore the experience of decision making in a hospitality yield management
environment, from the perspective of the individual participant. The author feels that
there is considerable potential to expand this research.

Accordingly, a number of

research questions and areas for further research have come to light, such as:


An exploration into differences of emphasis between senior management
members of the yield management team and ordinary members, on what
constitutes an optimum decision might offer a fruitful area for research.
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Similarly the relationship between the responsibility of being a team member,
participating in team decisions, and the role of the individual within that team
would prove equally fruitful. A longitudinal study of these relationships might
also facilitate greater depth to such a study.



This study could also be extended to two and three star hotels, where the
availability of technological support is less obvious and where the impact of
heuristics, biases and the unconscious may be even more significant.



Further research into the relationship between management science and the
human idiosyncrasies, epitomised in the influence of unconscious decision
making would also prove fruitful.



A positivistic study of the cause and effect relationship between decision
practices and quantifiable outcomes would provide interesting research findings
for the hospitality industry.



Finally, it would also prove fruitful to specifically explore, through a
comparative inter-industry study, why hospitality decision makers have not
adopted the dynamic decision model used by the airline industry.

The author believes that these questions present opportunities for further investigation.
Research into these areas will support a more comprehensive understanding of how
decisions are effected in the hospitality industry. It is only through further research that
gaps, identified in this research will be addressed. The author concludes that in an ever
changing and more competitive marketplace, with increasingly more discerning and
demanding customers, increasing awareness relating to the factors that improve or
impede decision making, is critical.
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Appendix 2.

DECISION-MAKER

Dialogue generation and
management system

Database
Databasemanagement
management
system
system

Model-based
management system

To deal with the structured aspects of a decision the above decision support system
needs three fundamental components. These are:


A dialogue generation and management system that enables the user to interact
with the decision support system.



A model-based management system that enables the system user to explore the
decision situation and the range of alternative solutions to the problem. This is
achieved through the used of a model-based on algorithmic mathematics, aligned
to a range of procedures and management protocols.



Database management systems that enable the decision support system to draw
upon data contained within either an interfaced or integrated database and to
make available these data to the user of the systems who may require it in order
to inform the decision situation. Within the hospitality industry this database is
normally the central reservations system or the property management system,
linked to the front office software the database collects, stores and maintains
information about inventory levels, availability and the range of prices to be
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considered. It usually holds vast banks of historical data about previous demand
patterns.
Source:Johns, N (2000).

Appendix 3.

Actual
market
Category
strategy

Competitors’
price

OPTIMISATION
MODEL

Optimal price
decisions

Competitors’
reaction

Sales
forecast

Profit
forecast
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Uncertainty variables associated with the yield management decision making process.
Source: Johns N, (2000).

Appendix 1.

Bounded Rationality:
Limited time, information,
resources to deal with
complex, multidimensional
issues

Trade-off

Personal Constraints:
Trade-off

Desire for prestige, success,
personal decision style; &
the need to satisfy emotional
needs, cope with pressure,
maintain self-concept

Organisational
Constraints:
Need for agreement, shared
perspective, cooperation,
support, corporate culture &
structure, ethical values

Decision/
Choice:

Trade-off

Search for
a highquality
decision
alternative

Trade-off

Source: Daft R, (2001), Essentials of Organisational Theory & Design, South Western College
Publishing, Ohio.
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Appendix 4.
Respondent Profile
Respondent A is the Managing Director of a four star Dublin hotel with responsibility
for Revenue and Yield Management. This hotel is part of an international group of
hotels and has a complement of two hundred and fifty bedrooms.
Respondent B is the Reservations Manager within the same hotel and is part of the
Revenue Management Team. He has been employed by that hotel for over three years.
Respondent C is the Sales Manager of a four star Dublin hotel. It has a complement of
forty-four bedrooms and suites. The respondent has been employed by the hotel for four
years.
Respondent D is the General Manager of this four star city centre hotel which is part of a
group consisting of three city centre based hotels. The hotel consists of eighty two
rooms and the respondent has been employed there for five years.
Respondent E is the Revenue Manager of a four star city centre Dublin hotel and has
been employed there for four years. This hotel is part of an international hotel chain and
has a complement of one hundred and twenty five rooms.
Respondent F is the Reservations Manager of a city centre Dublin hotel and has been
employed there for one year.
Respondent G is the Revenue Manager of a city centre Dublin hotel with a complement
of one hundred and ten bedrooms. This respondent has been employed at this hotel for
the last three years.
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